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Šopenhauer pravi vezu između morala i negacije volje, tako da je njihova osnova ista - spoznaja iste volje u svim bićima i negaciji te volje, s obzirom na količinu patnje za koje je odgovorna, što on u jednom momentu i naziva ljubavlju prema drugima kao najvišim moralnim dobrom:
"The common source for both moral goodness and negation of the will is the recognition of one’s innermost self in all beings. The morally good person already “makes less of a distinction than is usually made between himself and others” (Werke 2: 439/WWR 1, 399), and the highest moral goodness belongs to the person who attains a “pure … unselfish love of others". The person who exhibits this kind of selflessness can undergo a transition to will-lessness: someone takes over also the sufferings that originally fall to the lot of others … [H]e now identifies his own lot with that of mankind in general; but this is a hard lot, namely that of striving, suffering, and dying. Therefore, whoever … wills for himself no other lot than that of mankind in general, can no longer will even this for any length of time. Clinging to life and its pleasures must now soon yield, and make way for a universal resignation; consequently, there will come about the negation of the will. (Werke 3: 696/WWR 2, 606–7; translation slightly modified)."
Ko je nekada preuzeo patnju drugih bića na sebe, patnju koji poništava individuu, patnju bića koje ni ne poznaje, koja ga se lično ne tiču, toliko vremenski ili prostorno udaljena da ne mogu kao imati nikakve veze sa njim, može da nasluti o kakvoj vrsti patnje se radi, koja dovodi do potpune motivacione rezignacije i mogućnosti negacije volje, sasecanja patnje na samom njenom izvoru:
"It accords with this that the presence of a desire to be without individualistic desires appears anomalous and can be revealed only in the exceptional circumstances Schopenhauer mentions — reflection on overwhelming suffering, receptivity to tragic drama, saintly concern for the world that extinguishes concern for individual wellbeing, encounter with a saintly person or an imaginative attempt to identify with what they would experience. In these circumstances we glimpse what for Schopenhauer must be a truth, that beyond willing their own individual well-being, and beyond willing even the well-being of all individuals equally, human beings also will release from that kind of willing altogether, indeed release from individuality as such."
Izvor: What’s so good about negation of the will? Schopenhauer and the problem of the summum bonum, Christopher Janaway
Iako u formi izgleda slično, koliko se god trudim, ne mogu da zamislim da ovo dolazi sa tog mesta:
"The common source for both moral goodness and negation of the will is the recognition of one’s innermost self in all beings. The morally good person already “makes less of a distinction than is usually made between himself and others” (Werke 2: 439/WWR 1, 399), and the highest moral goodness belongs to the person who attains a “pure … unselfish love of others". The person who exhibits this kind of selflessness can undergo a transition to will-lessness: someone takes over also the sufferings that originally fall to the lot of others … [H]e now identifies his own lot with that of mankind in general; but this is a hard lot, namely that of striving, suffering, and dying. Therefore, whoever … wills for himself no other lot than that of mankind in general, can no longer will even this for any length of time. Clinging to life and its pleasures must now soon yield, and make way for a universal resignation; consequently, there will come about the negation of the will. (Werke 3: 696/WWR 2, 606–7; translation slightly modified)."
Ko je nekada preuzeo patnju drugih bića na sebe, patnju koji poništava individuu, patnju bića koje ni ne poznaje, koja ga se lično ne tiču, toliko vremenski ili prostorno udaljena da ne mogu kao imati nikakve veze sa njim, može da nasluti o kakvoj vrsti patnje se radi, koja dovodi do potpune motivacione rezignacije i mogućnosti negacije volje, sasecanja patnje na samom njenom izvoru:
"It accords with this that the presence of a desire to be without individualistic desires appears anomalous and can be revealed only in the exceptional circumstances Schopenhauer mentions — reflection on overwhelming suffering, receptivity to tragic drama, saintly concern for the world that extinguishes concern for individual wellbeing, encounter with a saintly person or an imaginative attempt to identify with what they would experience. In these circumstances we glimpse what for Schopenhauer must be a truth, that beyond willing their own individual well-being, and beyond willing even the well-being of all individuals equally, human beings also will release from that kind of willing altogether, indeed release from individuality as such."
Izvor: What’s so good about negation of the will? Schopenhauer and the problem of the summum bonum, Christopher Janaway
Iako u formi izgleda slično, koliko se god trudim, ne mogu da zamislim da ovo dolazi sa tog mesta:
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