@Goran Bosk @Marin83 @piciginx @HdeL @klikk
Since the start of Ukraine’s offensive
on June 4, a widespread
belief has become apparent — that Ukraine would be able to advance relatively smoothly after days of preparatory strikes against Russian positions, quickly recapture large swathes of territories, and prompt the progressive collapse of the Russian military.
The reality is very different. While in Kharkiv and Kherson districts last year, Ukraine faced overstretched and severely undermanned Russian units, the new counteroffensive must deal with a curtain of
fortifications,minefields, and anti-tank ditches aimed at slowing down maneuver units, hindering the use of mechanized formations,
and channeling Ukrainian attacking columns into pre-defined kill zones for Russian artillery fire, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), and attack helicopters. As a result, Ukrainians must embark on very dangerous operations characterized by high attrition for personnel and equipment.
The complex net of Russian fortifications will slow the operational tempo of the attackers and provide a key advantage to the Kremlin’s forces: time. With Ukrainian units hampered by a layered belt of obstacles, the occupiers can mount and adjust defensive action more effectively, employing close air support and concealed ATGMs to disable armored vehicles, and then wreaking havoc on dismounted infantry with concentrated artillery barrages.
Ukraine’s problems are compounded by the lack of substantial air support along the frontline due to the persistent threat from Russian air defenses. Consistent with the trend seen since the beginning of the invasion, both Ukraine’s fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft must
fly low and
lob unguided rockets from afar to minimize the risk of detection by ground-based enemy radars, and have difficulty providing close air support to advancing troops, let alone executing in-depth interdiction of potential Russian reinforcements. Consequently, Ukrainian forces will struggle to conduct proper combined arms maneuver operations, with inevitable implications for the counteroffensive.
Furthermore, Russia has had time to adapt and prepare its defenses, relocating its command-and-control structure and readjusting its logistical footprint to cope with Ukraine’s newest long-range strike capabilities. While the quality and number of Russian troops deployed along the frontline are far from uniform, the latter nonetheless have the advantage of defense and can rely upon partial air superiority.
Furthermore, Ukraine must deal with the threat from the constant aerial surveillance provided by Russian drones and the resultant artillery strikes. This requires the integration of mobile short-range air defense (SHORAD) capabilities at scale, in order to counter enemy unmanned aerial systems (UAS), disrupt Russia’s tactical and operational intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), blind its artillery, and protect maneuver formations. This factor tends to be overlooked, but is critical for Ukraine’s military success.
In other words,
Ukraine is trying what no single NATO country has done since the alliance was created in 1949: to conduct large-scale combined arms maneuver operations against a near-peer or peer adversary. It is no exaggeration to say that, at present,
no NATO country, with the exception — perhaps — of the US, possesses sufficient capabilities and resources to conduct an operation like this. To put this in perspective, the only time some NATO members fought a large-scale land campaign against a conventional – albeit much weaker – adversary during Operation Iraqi Freedom against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003, they enjoyed total air supremacy.
Ukratko: Ukri su pukli, kao zvečka.
