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The successors of Charlemagne, in the empire of the west, were accustomed to associate with themselves in the government, the person whose election they wished to secure to succeed themselves, by crowning him King of the Romans. This power of conferring royalty has been claimed by the emperor, in modern times ; and was exercised by Leopold, in the case of the Elector of Brandenburg, whom he raised to the dignity of King of Prussia. The other European princes refused to acknowledge this title for some time ; but, at theTreaty of Utrecht, they all agreed to admit, it. The late Emperor of France, who wished to restore the dignity of the Western Emperors in his own person, exercised several of the privileges of that office. He created his son King of the Romans ; and elevated to the rank of Kings, the Electors of Saxony and Wirtemburg ; the title of the latter has since been recognised, and Holland and Hanover bave been added to the regal governments of Europe. The Hungarians formerly gave the name'of King to their Queen Mary, to avoid the infamy which the laws of that country cast upon those who are governed by women ; accordingly, she bore the title of King Mary, till her marriage with Sigismund, at which time she took the title of Queen. The supreme executive power of the British dominions is vested, by the English laws, in a single person, the king or queen ; for it matters not to which sex the crown descends, for the person entitled to it, whether male or female, is immediately invested with all the ensigns, rights, and prerogatives of sovereign power, by the general consent of the people ; the evidence of which general consent is, long and immemorial usage. It became necessary to the freedom and peace of the state, that a rule should be laid dowu, uniform and permanent, in order to mark out, with precision, who is that single person, to whom is committed, in subservience to the law of the land, the care and protection of the community; and to whom, is return, the duty and allegiance of every individual is due. The grand fundamental maxim upon which the jus corona, or right of succession to the throne of Britain depends, Sir William Blackstone takes to be this: that the crown is, by common law, and constitutional custom, hereditary ; and this in a manner peculiar to itself; but that the right of inheritance may, from time to time, be changed or limited by act of parliament ; under which limitations the crown still continues hereditary, and descendible to the next heir, on the death of the last king. All regal governments must be either hereditary or elective ; and as there is no instance, wherein the crown of England has ever been asserted to be elective (except the short interval, when Cromwell usurped, the authority under a different name, between the reigns of Charles I, and II.) it must of consequence be hereditary. Yet, in asserting this right, a jure-diviao title to the throne is by no means intended. Such a title may be allowed to have snbsisted under the theocratic establishments of Israel, in Palestine, but it never yet subsisted in any other country ; save only so far as kingdoms, like other human fabrics are subjected to the general and ordinary dispensations of Providence. Nor indeed have a jure-divino and hereditary right any necessary connexion with each other, as some have very weakly imagined.
The hereditary right which the lawn of Britain acknowledge, owes its origin to the founders of our constitution, and to them only. This has been acquiesced in, by general consent ; and ripened by degrees into common law : it is the very same title that every private man has to his own estate, for lands are not naturally descendable, any more than thrones ; but the law has, for the benefit and peace of the public, established hereditary succession in the one, as well as in the other.
It must be owned, an elective monarchy seems to be the most obvious and best suited of any, to the rational principles of government, and the freedom of human nature ; and accordingly we find from history, that, in the infancy and first rudiments of almost every state, the leader, chief magistrate, or prince, has usually been elective ; and if the individuals who compose that state, could always continue true to first principles, uninfluenced by passion or prejudice, anaseailed by corruption, and unawed by violence, elective succession would be as desirable in a kingdom, as it is in other inferior communities. The best, the wisest, and the bravest man would then be sure of receiving that crown which his endowments merited ; and the sense of an unbiassed majority would be dutifully acquiesced by the few, who were of different opinions. But history and observations inform us, that elections of every kind are too often brought about by influence, partiality, and artifice ; and even where the case is otherwise, these practices will be often suspected, and as constantly charged upon the successful, by a disappointed minority. This is an evil, to which all societies are liable, as well those of a private and domestic kind, as of the great community of the public, which regulates and includes the rest. But, in the former, there is this advantage, that such suspicions, if false, proceed no further, than jealousies and murmurs, which time will effectually suppress; or justice may remedy it by legal means, by an appeal to those tribunals, to which every member of society has virtually engaged to submit. Whereas, is the great and indepeudent society, which every nation composes, there is no superior to resort to, but the law of nature : no method to redress the infringement of that law, but the actual exertion of force. As, therefore, between two nations complaining of mutual injuries, the quarrel can only be decided by the law of arms ; so is one and the same nation, when the fundamental principles of their common union are supposed to be invaded, and more especially when the appointment of the chief magistrate is alleged to be unduly made, the only appeal that can be made, is to the sword ; and the only process by which the appeal can be carried on, is that of a civil and intestine war. A hereditary succession to the crown is, therefore, now established in this, and most other countries, to prevent the periodical bloodshed and misery, which the history of ancient imperial Rome, and the modern experience of Poland. show us to be the consequence of elective kingdoms. The doctrine of hereditary right does by no means imply an iudefeisible right to the throne. It is unquestionably in the power of the supreme legislative. authority of this kingdom, the king and both houses of parliament, to defeat this hereditary right ; and by particular entails, limitations, land provisions, to exclude the immediate heir, and vest the inheritance in any one else. This is strictly consonant to our laws and constitution ; as may be gathered from the expressions so frequently used in our statute book, of "the king's majesty, his heirs, and successors." In which we may observe, that, as the word heirs necessarily implies an inheritance, or hereditary right generally subsisting in the royal person ; so the word successors, distinctly taken, must imply, that this inheritance may sometimes be broken through, or that there may be a successor, without being the heir of the kiug. And this is extremely reasonable ; for without such a power lodged somewhere, our polity would be very defective. Let us barely suppose so melancholy a case, as that the heir apparent should be a lunatic, an idiot, or otherwise incapable of reigning ; how miserable would the condition of the nation be, if he were also incapable of being set aside ! It is therefore necessary that this power be lodged somewhere ; and it can be placed nowhere so properly, as in the two houses of parliament, by and with the consent of the reigning king ; who, it is supposed not agree to any thing prejudicial to the rights of his own descendants. And, therefore, in the king, lords, and commons, in parliament assembled, our laws have expressly lodged it. However the crown may be limited or transferred, it still retains its descendible quality, and becomes hereditary in the wearer of it. Hence, in our law, the king is said never to die in his political capacity ; though in common with other men, he is subject to mortality in his natural. On this principle, that the king commences his reign from the death of his predecessor, it hath been held, that compassing his death before coronation, or even before proclamation (he being king presently, and the proclamation and coronation only honourable ceremonies for the future notification thereof) is treason.
The principal duty of the king is, to govern the people according to law. The King ought not to be subject to man, but to God and the law ; for the law maketh the king. Let the king therefore render to the law, what the law has invested in him with regard to others—dominion and power ; for he is not truly a king, where will and pleasure rules, and not the law. The laws of England are the birthright of the people thereof; and all the kings and queens, who shall ascend the throne of this realm, ought to administer the government of the same according to the said laws ; and all their officers and ministers ought to serve them respectively, according to the same. And therefore ail the other laws and statutes of this realm, for securing the established religion, and the liberties of
the people thereof; and all other laws and statutes of the same now in force, are, by his majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and the commons, and by the authority of the same, ratified and confirmed.