Sukobi u Iraku

Na koju zemlju vam Iraq najvise lici?

  • Siriju?

  • Ukrajinu?

  • Libiju?

  • Kosovo?

  • Srbiju?

  • Venecuelu?

  • Pakistan?

Rezultati ankete su vidlјivi nakon glasanja.
njofra:
Na primer pustili su one zarobljne monahinje iz Malaule, dok bi ih ISIS zive razapeli na krst. Ne kazem ni da su Al Nusra cvecke, niti ih podrzavam. Ali od ISIL nema gore, i svakog ko se bori protiv njih treba podrzati.
Kliknite za proširenje...

Na islamistickim forumima BIH muslimana kazu za borce ISILa da su alahovi ratnici pod CIA zastavom..ali za nas je potpuno nebitno ko se bori jel to anasr al sunah,al nusra,Islamska drzava ili su simpatizeri biveseg sadamovog rezima i bass partije,bitno je da Ameri gube
 
GolubBabic:
Ti si nesto propustio.Pobuna protiv Amerianaca i njihovih domacih slugu u Iraku traje od njihove okupacije

Dovolno je da odes na zvanicni sajt o Americkim gubicima u Iraku,a koje priznaju pa da vidis po godinama gubitke

http://icasualties.org/
Kliknite za proširenje...

Znam ja dobro sta se radilo i Iraku, ogranak Al Kaide za Irak predstavljao je Al Zarkavi mada on oko sebe nije imao vise od 1000 ljudi. Danas ISIL ima preko 10 000 vojnika a po svemu podsecaju na Zarkavijev ogranak Al Kaide samo sto ih je sada mnogo vise.
 
TheCountoffVendettaa:
Znam ja dobro sta se radilo i Iraku, ogranak Al Kaide za Irak predstavljao je Al Zarkavi mada on oko sebe nije imao vise od 1000 ljudi. Danas ISIL ima preko 10 000 vojnika a po svemu podsecaju na Zarkavijev ogranak Al Kaide samo sto ih je sada mnogo vise.
Kliknite za proširenje...

Nisi bas najbolje upucen,pusti tu zapadnu propagandu.....ovde se radi o sveopstoj sunitskoj pobuni protiv Amerikanaca i njihovih domacih slugu Irackih sijita a koju predvode simpatizeri bivseg Sadamovog rezima ali sa njima u pobuni ucestvuju i razne islamisticke grupe kao sto je ovaj ISIL ili Ansar al-Sunna itd
 
Forum sa infomacijama iz iraka

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?234173-Al-Qaeda-linked-force-captures-Fallujah-amid-rise-in-violence-in-Iraq/page128

- - - - - - - - - -

Lesandar:
Razmišlja se i o scenariju vazdušnih napada SAD i kopnenog udara Irana ? Ovakvu saradnju niko nije očekivao ali je već na terenu s obzirom da su Iranci ušli prekjuče sa tri bataljona Nacionalne garde da pomognu iračkoj vojsci.
Kliknite za proširenje...

Nije potvrden ulazak iranaca. To je nepotvrdena infomacija i najvjerojatnije netocna.
 
wizardofOZ:
To nije istina. Assad se bori protiv njih i ISIS se bori protiv assada. Stovise, sad im je uspio unistiti konvoj sa naoruzanjem koji su prebacivali iz iraka u siriju.

Cinjenicno stanje je da ISIS ratuje u siriji protiv assada.
Kliknite za proširenje...

Чим се залажу за оно што си поставио на мапама...
Можда су тренутно фокусирани на друге ствари, али да нема Ал-нустре и осталих, сигурно би се тукли са Асадом. Јер они би да се туку и да кољу није важно, само да се рока...
 
wizardofOZ:
Forum sa infomacijama iz iraka

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?234173-Al-Qaeda-linked-force-captures-Fallujah-amid-rise-in-violence-in-Iraq/page128

- - - - - - - - - -



Nije potvrden ulazak iranaca. To je nepotvrdena infomacija i najvjerojatnije netocna.
Kliknite za proširenje...

Southern Provinces of Iraq have been building up volunteer brigades to join the army.

A total of 155,000 volunteers have joined in the past 2 days.

In Basra alone 13,000 volunteers joined. :think:
 
Заплењени тенкови у Мосули :dash:
M1A1
attachment.php
 
ISIS je objavio izjavu stanovnicima bagdada da se vrate u svoje kuce i udu u sklonista.

Bitka za bagdad pocinje.


Prije dva mjeseca americka vlada je optuzila katar i saudijsku arabiju da financira ISIS


Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen before the Center for a New American Security on "Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing"

3/4/2014

I am grateful to be invited to speak here at the Center for a New American Security. In just a few years, CNAS has established itself as a leader in fostering thoughtful discussion and cutting-edge scholarship on critical security issues confronting the United States, and I appreciate the opportunity to contribute to that conversation this evening.



Before I turn to the focus of my remarks, let me say a few words about the situation in Ukraine. We are deeply concerned and are closely monitoring ongoing developments in Ukraine.



As the President has said, Russia’s clear violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity is a breach of international law. In the coming days, we will continue to monitor Russian actions in Ukraine and respond appropriately. We are looking into a wide range of options, including sanctions and ways to increase Russia’s political and economic isolation.

We are also working to assist the Government of Ukraine. In fact, Secretary Lew announced earlier today that we have been working with international partners to develop an assistance package that will help the Ukrainian government implement the reforms needed to restore financial stability and return to economic growth. We are working with Congress and our international partners on $1 billion in loan guarantees aimed at helping insulate vulnerable Ukrainians from the effects of reduced energy subsidies. As part of this package, we also hope Congress approves IMF reforms, which would support the Fund’s capacity to lend additional resources to Ukraine. Of note, Ukraine has identified combatting corruption and recovering stolen assets as a pressing need and our assistance package seeks to support this goal, among others.



Introduction



The focus of my remarks this evening will be the evolving landscape of terrorist financing, the challenges we face, and the steps we are taking to meet these challenges.



As this audience knows, since the attacks of September 11, the United States has undertaken an unprecedented effort to protect the homeland and our interests and allies abroad from the scourge of terrorism, and as part of this effort has focused as never before on detecting, disrupting, and dismantling the financial infrastructure of terrorist organizations.



Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) has been at the forefront of this effort. By developing and deploying innovative financial tools, and marshaling the support of the domestic and international private sectors, multilateral fora, foreign regulators, and foreign ministries, we have made it harder than ever for terrorists to raise, move, store, and use funds.



There is no doubt that we have made significant progress over the past 12 years. Most dramatically, al-Qa’ida today is far less well-funded than it was a dozen years ago. But I am not here to recount our successes; rather, I want to describe the new challenges we face and open a dialogue on how we should adapt to address them. Because despite our progress, one need only open a newspaper to see that terrorist threats and, more specifically, terrorist financing threats, persist.



The Dollars and Cents of Terrorist Financing



Just as we are focused on undermining the financial wherewithal of terrorist organizations, terrorists, of course, also remain focused on their finances.

Recently discovered documents belonging to al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) perfectly illustrate the almost mundane financial reality for many of these groups. Among the documents found were receipts, scribbled on post-it notes: $6,800 for “workshops,” $330 for ammunition and $1.80 for a bar of soap. Documents recovered during the 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan illustrate the same reality. Meticulously kept records detailed expenditures on everything from salaries for fighters and their families to floppy disks, and even included receipts for explosives.

A focus on finances has also provided propaganda value for terrorists. In 2010, the English language magazine of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) featured a cover image with the figure “$4,200” superimposed over a UPS plane, the target of a failed plot to use bombs concealed in printer cartridges to destroy the aircraft in U.S. airspace.



The message AQAP was trying to send was clear: By its accounting, attacking the United States could cost as little $4,200.



On one level, that message is borne out in reality. The recent attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi reportedly cost less than $5,000 to execute, and the materials used in the Boston Marathon bombings last spring reportedly cost about $500.



But while organizing ­a single terrorist attack may be relatively inexpensive, managing a terrorist organization capable of conducting an attack – particularly a sophisticated, mass casualty attack on the scale of 9/11 or the Westgate Mall – remains costly, complex, and bureaucratic.

Substantial funds are required to finance each component of the terrorist life cycle: communications, logistics, recruitment, salaries, training, travel, safe havens, bribes, weapons acquisition, payments to the families of the deceased fighters, and support to other groups. This is especially true for terrorists who aspire to strike from a distance, and even more so to strike targets that are well-defended. Their sizable operating budgets and global supply chains create vulnerabilities for even the most nimble and methodical terrorist group.

We focus our efforts on exploiting these vulnerabilities by severing terrorist financing and support. To do so effectively requires a nuanced understanding of the different methods terrorists use to raise and move funds so that we can best tailor our efforts, and try to stay one step ahead of our adversaries.

From Global to Local: How Terrorists Raise Funds Today

Externally Generated Capital: State Sponsors, Deep Pocket Donors, and Charities



Now traditionally, terrorist groups relied on a variety of external funding sources to meet their needs and had comparatively easy access to the global financial system to move and store their funds. It was a rather simple system: Terrorist groups, appealing to the misbegotten sympathy of foreign states, organizations, and individuals alike, collected contributions to fund their activities, and then placed those funds into the financial system, taking advantage of unwitting and poorly defended financial institutions.



Over the past decade, powerful financial sanctions at the national and international levels, coupled with close cooperation among governments and the private sector, have helped combat these traditional methods of terrorist financing. Focusing on the potent combination of legal risk and reputational risk has proven particularly effective.



Efforts to enhance financial transparency have also made it harder than ever for terrorists and other illicit actors to exploit the international financial system. At the core of these efforts is the work of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the inter-governmental body that sets the international standards for anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) safeguards and works for their global adoption and implementation. Through a peer review process to evaluate compliance with its AML/CFT standards, the FATF has been extraordinarily successful in improving global capacity to combat the full range of illicit financial activity, including terrorist financing.



Turned away by banks and other reputable financial institutions, terrorist groups have increasingly turned to less regulated channels – including hawaladars, exchange houses, and cash couriers – to transfer funds. None of this is new, of course, but these channels are decidedly less effective than transacting through the global financial system. Using these alternative transfer mechanisms carries greater transaction costs; higher risk of loss and theft; logistical complications – cash is bulky and heavy; and its own legal risk, as terrorists are forced to navigate border controls to transfer funds. These mechanisms also require terrorist groups to rely on more people and larger networks than simple wire transfers, making these financing channels and the terrorists who stand to benefit from them more vulnerable to discovery.



While improved international counter-terrorism cooperation and steadily improving implementation of financial transparency standards have forced terrorist groups to alter their funds transfer patterns and diversify their revenue sources, some of the traditional fundraising and transfer practices persist and still require our attention.

Vise na linku

http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2308.aspx
 
Poslednja izmena:
od kuda ISIS dolazi i sto zeli

EXPERT: Here's Where The ISIS Extremists Came From And What They Want In Iraq


After months of violence, unrest and a rising death toll, Iraq is now disintegrating.
Within a matter of days, the Sunni militant group Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and its allies have overrun the second largest city in Iraq — Mosul — and several other towns. They now have their sights set on Baghdad.

Several reports suggested Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's security forces discarded their uniforms and weapons, fleeing cities without even engaging ISIL, despite the fact that they far outnumber the militants.

An off-shoot of Al Qaeda, ISIL evolved from Al Qaeda in Iraq and has been active in Syria since last year, fighting not just Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's forces but other more moderate Syrian rebels as well.

Al Qaeda and ISIL went through an acrimonious break-up earlier this year, when ISIL refused to withdraw from Syria as ordered by Al Qaeda's high command. After seizing Mosul this Tuesday, the militants reportedly looted the equivalent of over $420 million from the city's central bank and also seized American-made Iraqi equipment, including Humvees.

GlobalPost asked Charles Lister, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center, about the current events, ISIL's goals and its shadowy leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The United States, it should be noted, has a $10 million bounty on Baghdadi (listed here under his birth name).

For people who haven't been following the breakdown of security in the country: What's happening in Iraq?

[After Iraq's parliamentary elections at the end of April], ISIS knew that conditions on the ground were ripe for an all-out push on the Iraqi government's weak points. The organization's extensive underlying roots in Mosul afforded it probably the best potential and it seems highly likely that a deal was struck with Sunni security forces to tacitly exchange control overnight.

ISIL, of course, evolved out of Al Qaeda in Iraq, but earlier this year the two groups split due to ISIL's extremism and involvement in Syria. What is ISIL's current relationship with Al Qaeda? Do you foresee them becoming rivals or adversaries like the rebel groups within Syria fighting each other?

Ever since mid-2012, the ISI (the Islamic State of Iraq) — and from April 2013, ISIS [as the group changed its name when it began fighting in Syria] — has been on a steady period of recovery and its military potential has increased substantially. From mid-2012 to mid-2013, a key focus was placed upon re-strengthening the senior leadership and building up the younger recruitment base.

By mid-2013, ISIS had become a military organization capable of carrying out intensive operations across Iraq, including in key urban areas seemingly at will.

Over the past 12 months, ISIS seems to have been putting into practice what it has always aimed to achieve — acquiring territorial control, governing populations and posing genuine threats to the legitimacy of localized and national government. Taking control of the second largest city in Iraq sends a very serious message to the Maliki government in Baghdad and it now seems quite likely that Baghdad itself could be the next main target.

ISIS and Al Qaeda are total rivals, with both organizations frequently accusing the other of being illegitimate and not sufficiently religious. After all, Al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS are actively fighting each other in Syria and that dynamic, which has been active for several months already, has fundamentally shaken the state of jihadism across the world.

What is known about ISIL's leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and his goals in the Middle East? There were photos reportedly showing ISIL fighters bulldozing the boundary between Iraq and Syria. Does ISIL's goal of creating an Islamic caliphate in territory seized from those countries actually seem like a possibility at this point?

Baghdadi was born in Samarra in 1971 as Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarri. He claims to be a direct descendant of the prophet Mohammed. Unconfirmed information, much from jihadist sources, claims he has considerable religious familial roots and that he is a student of Islamic history.

It seems likely that Baghdadi held a position within the Islamic community when the US invaded Iraq in 2003 and some time later he became involved in the Islamist insurgency in eastern Iraq, possibly Anbar.

Sometime in the mid-2000s — likely in 2006 — he was detained by US forces and held in Camp Bucca, where it appears he established relationships with Al Qaeda. Following his release, Baghdadi rose in prominence within the organization, eventually acceding to leader, or emir, in 2010. As far as I’m aware, there is no evidence that Baghdadi has ever fought abroad, apart from in Syria since 2013.

Before the current events in Iraq, President Barack Obama was considering sending more weapons to moderate rebels in Syria. If ISIL can snatch equipment from the Iraqi army, which is theoretically more organized than Syrian moderates, is there really any way of assisting the Syrian rebels safely?

Ironically, these ISIS gains in Iraq may help push the US to definitively enhance its level of military assistance to the moderate Syrian opposition.

An emboldened ISIS, which appears now to have almost established a mini-state across the Iraq-Syria border will pose an increased threat to the capacity of Syrian opposition forces to fight on two fronts: against ISIS and against the regime. Without additional support, the chances of them maintaining an effective fight against the government will reduce somewhat.

izvor infomacije

 
Prijavite se ili registrujte da biste poslali poruku.

Slične teme

Neno
Bruka u Podgorici
2 3
Odgovora
72
Pregleda
1.395
kapetanmark
kapetanmark
Paula
Prijavnica u ćacilendu
2 3 4
Odgovora
93
Pregleda
1.599
Belgradeboy
Belgradeboy
adelaidea
Islamofobija u Evropi
23 24 25
Odgovora
621
Pregleda
7.824
Casual Observer
Casual Observer

Back
Top