Rat u Ukrajini (22)

Šta je cilj Rusije?

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e sada i je izmenjen malko zakon , pa tako one firme koje su inostrane a jos i pripadaju "neprijateljskim drzavama" ako i hoce da prodaju svoje , pored toga sto i moraju dati za nominalnu cenu , prodaju , tako i
sada moraju da i plate u budzet drzave rusije 10 %posto od vrednosti..
i opet , ijjjebiga Rusija iijebe , te i takve firme ..
i da ima firmi koje su se i uprodaji i ugradili da cese i vratiti na Rusko trziste a ove druge..
izgubili su milijarde dal eura , dal usra dolara.

Reuters
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Russia forces foreign firms to pay into budget as they leave​

Story by Reuters • 5h ago

MOSCOW (Reuters) - Foreign investors from "unfriendly" countries selling assets in Russia will be obliged to donate at least 10% of the sale price to the Russian budget, making life even harder for Western companies leaving Russia over the conflict in Ukraine.
FILE PHOTO: A view shows Russia's Finance Ministry building in Moscow
FILE PHOTO: A view shows Russia's Finance Ministry building in Moscow© Thomson Reuters
Departing firms are already being forced to sell their Russian operations at huge discounts, with several selling for a nominal fee and many incurring large write-downs, although some have added buyback clauses that could one day let them return.
According to a note published on the Finance Ministry's website late on Monday, the government commission that monitors foreign investment updated the requirements for asset sales involving foreigners from countries that have imposed sanctions against Russia, which Moscow labels "unfriendly".
The ruling included "an obligation to make a voluntary cash contribution to the federal budget of at least 10% of half of the market value of the relevant assets, as indicated in the asset valuation report".


Related video: A creative legal approach: the Ukrainian company taking Russia to court... via Europe (Dailymotion)


Measures introduced in late December stipulated that asset sales are permitted only provided a 50% discount is given to the buyer following an independent valuation.
Sellers were previously permitted to choose between paying 10% of the overall transaction value to Russia's federal budget immediately, or paying in instalments over one to two years. That choice has now been withdrawn.
A bill that would have enabled authorities to seize Western assets did not make it through parliament last summer.
But a decree signed by President Vladimir Putin on Aug. 5 banned investors from "unfriendly" countries from selling shares in the most significant and transferable investments - key energy projects and banks - unless Putin issued a waiver.
 

Prilozi

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    68 bajtova · Pregleda: 6
Reefer:
Ta humanitarna katastrofa je započela kad je NATO gurunuo Ukrajinu pod okupaciju, otimanjem vlasti od legalno izabranih i ubijanjem Rusa po Ukrajini, zabranom ruskog jezika, rušenejm ruskih spomenika. Sve ono što inače razni fašisti i komunisti rade, tako američki.
Kliknite za proširenje...
To te je Putin ubedio da je Moskvič bolji od BMW-a...

Ali nije.

To znaju i (svi normalni) Rusi, a znaju i Ukrajinci. Znamo i ti i ja.

Niko neće da bude pod Staljinovom čizmom u opresivnom društvu.
 
I rat u Ukrajini je imao svoju predistoriju, počele su prvo ideje po štampi o “obuzdavanju Rusije”, onda lamentiranja o njenom preteranom jačanju, čak i ekonomskom - i to je jadne Estonce i Litvance zastrašivalo, pa su onda krenuli razni “paneli”, “forumi”, “dijalozi” i diskusije, sve dok Nulandovka nije postavljena gde treba u Stejt Departmentu, pa se onda pripucalo.

Ali, koga briga što se u Ukrajini već puca? Na redu je Kina, zar da se propusti takva zlatna prilika?! Ako Tajvan zbog toga bude nastradao, njihov problem, toliko o tome.


AD8DDB20-089C-4899-85A5-62BB5708E01A.jpeg
21F68912-C7F2-42A3-AD8A-10B3536F25C0.jpeg


By Elbridge Colby
March 2023

Proceedings
Vol. 149/3/1,441
THE AMERICAN SEA POWER PROJECT
VIEW ISSUE
FacebookTwitterRedditEmailShare
COMMENTS
The primary threat to core U.S. interests is that China could dominate Asia, and from that position atop more than half the global economy, undermine Americans’ prosperity, freedom, and even security. This is not a merely speculative fear. Beijing is pursuing regional hegemony over Asia, and if successful, it will very likely pursue the kind of global preeminence that would enable it to directly intervene in and exercise a domineering influence over Americans’ lives.
map of china


As a result, nothing else in the international system is as fundamentally dangerous to U.S. interests as Chinese hegemony over Asia. Accordingly, U.S. policy must prioritize avoiding that outcome, but must do so in ways that correlate the risks and costs the American people incur in doing so with the stakes, which are vital but not genuinely existential. In practice, this requires working together with Asian states in an antihegemonic coalition focused on denying Beijing dominance over the region.
Contrary to some commentary that suggests the military dimension in this dynamic is not that important, the U.S. military’s role in this strategy is central. This is because Beijing will likely not be able to dominate Asia without resorting to military force. While China has enormous and growing economic and other nonmilitary forms of influence, it is finding it difficult to use its leverage to get neighboring countries to accept what would essentially be a tributary relationship. Its efforts to do so have largely backfired—as demonstrated in places such as Australia, India, Japan, and Taiwan—and an increasingly aggressive China’s standing (as reflected in global polling) has declined precipitously.1
The bad news is China has another option: military force. Unlike economic sanctions, decisive and direct military force can compel other countries to do things they really do not want to do.

Coalition: The Center of Gravity​

If China can gain sufficient military advantage over its neighbors, it may convince them to accept its hegemony given the plausible alternatives they will face. And the best way for Beijing to operationalize such advantage is not to fight all its potential opponents at once, but to pursue a focused and sequential strategy against the antihegemonic coalition arraying against it, seeking to pick it apart or short-circuit it.

USS Annapolis (SSN-760)


The USS Annapolis (SSN-760) loads a Mk 67 sub-launched mobile mine in Apra Harbor, Guam, in May 2022. Naval mines would contribute directly to a defense of Taiwan by denying the PLA Navy sea control and the ability to project power across the Taiwan Strait. U.S. Navy
The key for Beijing is to strike at the coalition’s center of gravity: perceptions of Washington’s willingness to come to the stout defense of those to which it has committed. Only if they believe Washington can and will stand with them will Asian countries judge it prudent to take the risks necessary to check Beijing’s ambitions. If they do not have this confidence, they will fear being isolated and punished by China and thus will likely cut a deal with Beijing. If Beijing can pick off enough countries in this fashion, it could achieve regional hegemony without having to fight World War III. Indeed, given how sensitive Asian countries are to China’s strength and how lucrative it is to be in its good graces, Beijing may not have to fight many—or even any—wars to attain regional dominance.

A Denial Defense​

To prevent this, Washington needs to ensure an effective denial defense along the first island chain, one that includes Taiwan within its perimeter. Denial defense is a military strategy derived from the nation’s geopolitical goal, which is to provide sufficient defense for our allies that they believe it prudent to stand up to China together with us—and thus prevent Chinese domination of Asia. If the United States can succeed in this military strategy, the coalition should stand strong and resist attempts by Beijing to crack it apart. Even better, Beijing might see this strength and never try to break it apart in the first place.
Taiwan plays an especially salient role in this strategy. Washington’s credibility in Asia is, practically speaking, linked to Taiwan’s defense. If Beijing could take Taiwan, it would break out of the first island chain that currently constrains its military power projection. As the recent Congressional Research Service report to Congress on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) points out, China’s “military strategy focuses primarily on preparing for a conflict involving the United States over Taiwan.” The report also highlights the PLA Navy’s 340-ship fleet, its air forces with several hundred fourth-generation fighters, and a large, advanced conventional missile force.2 Thus, if the United States and its allies can prevent China from subordinating Taiwan, they can protect other U.S. allies in Asia, enabling the coalition to stand strong, checking Beijing’s ambition to regional hegemony.
In practical terms, a denial defense strategy generates a minimum military standard of being able to prevent China from seizing and holding the key territory of our allies—essentially, the core political and economic areas of a country. If China cannot seize and hold these areas, it will not be able to bring enough coercive pressure on a resolute ally to abandon the coalition. History and logic indicate that most countries are prepared to hold on even in the face of bombardment, blockade, and harassment if it is a matter of their independence and autonomy, especially if they believe relief will arrive. Crucially, this creates a need for a forward defense for U.S. allies against China.
 
Casual Observer:
I rat u Ukrajini je imao svoju predistoriju, počele su prvo ideje po štampi o “obuzdavanju Rusije”, onda lamentiranja o njenom preteranom jačanju, čak i ekonomskom - i to je jadne Estonce i Litvance zastrašivalo, pa su onda krenuli razni “paneli”, “forumi”, “dijalozi” i diskusije, sve dok Nulandovka nije postavljena gde treba u Stejt Departmentu, pa se onda pripucalo.

Ali, koga briga što se u Ukrajini već puca? Na redu je Kina, zar da se propusti takva zlatna prilika?! Ako Tajvan zbog toga bude nastradao, njihov problem, toliko o tome.


Pogledajte prilog 1317835Pogledajte prilog 1317836

By Elbridge Colby
March 2023

Proceedings
Vol. 149/3/1,441
THE AMERICAN SEA POWER PROJECT
VIEW ISSUE
FacebookTwitterRedditEmailShare
COMMENTS
The primary threat to core U.S. interests is that China could dominate Asia, and from that position atop more than half the global economy, undermine Americans’ prosperity, freedom, and even security. This is not a merely speculative fear. Beijing is pursuing regional hegemony over Asia, and if successful, it will very likely pursue the kind of global preeminence that would enable it to directly intervene in and exercise a domineering influence over Americans’ lives.
map of china


As a result, nothing else in the international system is as fundamentally dangerous to U.S. interests as Chinese hegemony over Asia. Accordingly, U.S. policy must prioritize avoiding that outcome, but must do so in ways that correlate the risks and costs the American people incur in doing so with the stakes, which are vital but not genuinely existential. In practice, this requires working together with Asian states in an antihegemonic coalition focused on denying Beijing dominance over the region.
Contrary to some commentary that suggests the military dimension in this dynamic is not that important, the U.S. military’s role in this strategy is central. This is because Beijing will likely not be able to dominate Asia without resorting to military force. While China has enormous and growing economic and other nonmilitary forms of influence, it is finding it difficult to use its leverage to get neighboring countries to accept what would essentially be a tributary relationship. Its efforts to do so have largely backfired—as demonstrated in places such as Australia, India, Japan, and Taiwan—and an increasingly aggressive China’s standing (as reflected in global polling) has declined precipitously.1
The bad news is China has another option: military force. Unlike economic sanctions, decisive and direct military force can compel other countries to do things they really do not want to do.

Coalition: The Center of Gravity​

If China can gain sufficient military advantage over its neighbors, it may convince them to accept its hegemony given the plausible alternatives they will face. And the best way for Beijing to operationalize such advantage is not to fight all its potential opponents at once, but to pursue a focused and sequential strategy against the antihegemonic coalition arraying against it, seeking to pick it apart or short-circuit it.

USS Annapolis (SSN-760)


The USS Annapolis (SSN-760) loads a Mk 67 sub-launched mobile mine in Apra Harbor, Guam, in May 2022. Naval mines would contribute directly to a defense of Taiwan by denying the PLA Navy sea control and the ability to project power across the Taiwan Strait. U.S. Navy
The key for Beijing is to strike at the coalition’s center of gravity: perceptions of Washington’s willingness to come to the stout defense of those to which it has committed. Only if they believe Washington can and will stand with them will Asian countries judge it prudent to take the risks necessary to check Beijing’s ambitions. If they do not have this confidence, they will fear being isolated and punished by China and thus will likely cut a deal with Beijing. If Beijing can pick off enough countries in this fashion, it could achieve regional hegemony without having to fight World War III. Indeed, given how sensitive Asian countries are to China’s strength and how lucrative it is to be in its good graces, Beijing may not have to fight many—or even any—wars to attain regional dominance.

A Denial Defense​

To prevent this, Washington needs to ensure an effective denial defense along the first island chain, one that includes Taiwan within its perimeter. Denial defense is a military strategy derived from the nation’s geopolitical goal, which is to provide sufficient defense for our allies that they believe it prudent to stand up to China together with us—and thus prevent Chinese domination of Asia. If the United States can succeed in this military strategy, the coalition should stand strong and resist attempts by Beijing to crack it apart. Even better, Beijing might see this strength and never try to break it apart in the first place.
Taiwan plays an especially salient role in this strategy. Washington’s credibility in Asia is, practically speaking, linked to Taiwan’s defense. If Beijing could take Taiwan, it would break out of the first island chain that currently constrains its military power projection. As the recent Congressional Research Service report to Congress on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) points out, China’s “military strategy focuses primarily on preparing for a conflict involving the United States over Taiwan.” The report also highlights the PLA Navy’s 340-ship fleet, its air forces with several hundred fourth-generation fighters, and a large, advanced conventional missile force.2 Thus, if the United States and its allies can prevent China from subordinating Taiwan, they can protect other U.S. allies in Asia, enabling the coalition to stand strong, checking Beijing’s ambition to regional hegemony.
In practical terms, a denial defense strategy generates a minimum military standard of being able to prevent China from seizing and holding the key territory of our allies—essentially, the core political and economic areas of a country. If China cannot seize and hold these areas, it will not be able to bring enough coercive pressure on a resolute ally to abandon the coalition. History and logic indicate that most countries are prepared to hold on even in the face of bombardment, blockade, and harassment if it is a matter of their independence and autonomy, especially if they believe relief will arrive. Crucially, this creates a need for a forward defense for U.S. allies against China.
Kliknite za proširenje...
Pa da, nemoj održavati tamo nekakve panele koje Moskva ne odobrava jer inače udara ruska čizma.
Ako nisi u NATO, naravno.
 
Maks od crnog luka:
Нико не говори овде о колима, већ о животима мале деце
Kliknite za proširenje...
Valjda imaš toliko pameti da ukapiraš da ni ja ne govorim o kolima, već o životu uopšte.

Niko ne želi da živi u opresivnom društvu.

U Nemačkoj najjača opoziciona partija ima svoje novine, javno nastupa, ne plaši se da će ostati kraći za glavu. Imaš sva moguća glasila, od krajnje levice do krajnje desnice. U Rusiji ako si opozicija Putinu, imaš svaki razlog da se plašiš za svoj život. Ako si gej, imaš razlog da se plašiš za svoj život. Ako kažeš nešto protiv vladajuće stranke, imaš razloga da se plašiš za svoj život. Dobro prolaziš samo i jedino ako si "podoban". To je zaostatak još iz vremena Staljina.

Ogromna je razlika između Putinovog staljinizma i demokratije.

Zato nemam šta da zamerim ljudima koji žele da pobegnu od toga.
 
Ratovi obično traju do 4 godine.
Dovoljno vremena da Rusija oslobodi ceo Kijev.
..................................................................................
Sa druge strane , Rusija može da javno povuče ( ŠTO SE KAŽE '' OBNARODUJE'' ) jasne ,mada ne precizne granice , dokle je Ruska Federacija i da svaki napad bilo koje zemlje ili oružijem te zemlje smatra ratnim napadom na Rusiju i naravno braniti se svim sredstvima.
..............................................................................................................................................................................................
Pa ako se gleda paralela - nisu US postale odjednom, već su takodje odredjene teritorije i države vremenom postale članice US.
..........................................................................................................................................................................................
Na Rusiji je da pronikne šta ''zapad'' namerava , jer ovo što se sad dešava , nato već decenijama polako opkoljava Rusku Federaciju .
Bilo je samo pitanje godine ili dana kada bi eventualno Rusija bila u bezizlaznoj situaciji opkoljena sa svih strana.

...........................................................................................................................................................................................
nato je našao pogodno tlo u Ukrajini , Ukrajinci nisu bili svesni da su proksi zemlja umesto da su u federaciji sa Rusijom, i došlo je do kršenja ''crvenih linija''. Mada su i pribaltičke bivše članice Sovjetskog saveza prešle te linije.
.......................................................................................................................................................................................
Proces je verovatno nepovratan i Ukrajinci ne verujem da će moći da se ''iskobeljaju'' iz kandži zapada .
To je vrlo teško, jedino narod da izabere novo Ukrajinsko mirovno rukovodstvo.
 
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