Не ложите се, скупили снимке ко зна од кад и направили компилацију. Пола приказаног сам видео што овог пролећа што ранијих година.
Now, an unnamed U.S. intelligence official has
told to the New York Times that these items are a “previously unknown decoy.”
Н ложим се ја него УС интелиџенс.
The decoys are deployed by the 9K720 I
skander-M’s solid-fuel 9M723 ballistic missiles that, according to official figures, have a range of 310 miles, although there is evidence that they can fly further than that. The decoys, according to the U.S. intelligence officials, help the missiles evade air defense systems since they are able to “trick air defense radars and fool heat-seeking missiles.”
The Iskander-M uses highly mobile launchers, each carrying two missiles, which are located across the Ukrainian border in Russia and in Belarus, and there is evidence they began to be
moved into position well ahead of the invasion being launched. The missile has so far seen extensive use in the conflict, the Pentagon having assessed that as many as 100 were launched in only
the first hours of fighting on February 24.
Apparently, a single 9M723 can be loaded with at least six of the decoys, which slot into tubes located at the base of the missile body:
A Ukrainian Armed Forces SA-12a Gladiator (S-300V1).,
VOIDWANDERER/WIKIMEDIA COMMONS
Compounding these difficulties, the Iskander-M can launch its missiles using depressed quasi-ballistic trajectories and they are reportedly capable of significant maneuvering in flight, presenting major challenges even for opponents with more robust missile defense capabilities.
Speaking to
The War Zone, Dmitry Stefanovich, a Research Fellow at the Center for International Security,
IMEMO RAS, observed that the decoys were likely “overkill against Ukrainian air defenses, although under some conditions the S-300V might be capable [of downing Iskanders].”
With that in mind, it is probably more likely that the Iskander-M systems have been releasing these decoys in response to being illuminated by air defense radars. Also, one would think that multiple decoy programs could be available, depending on the target, with automatic release at predetermined points during the missile's flight also being an option. Moreso, releasing no decoys at all and even unloading them for use against targets that are not highly defended by modern ABM systems, such as those in Ukraine, should also be an option. But this clearly was not the case, either by choice or by restraints on the flexibility of the system.
