Vidi ti ovo Đuro, ostavi se Rusa i Ukro pitanja, gle šta radi Kina, koliko još imaju do Australije? Čovek lamentira da Kina ne dira neutralni Vijetnam al zato hebe Bajdenove Filipine samo tako. Isto kao i sa Ukrima - Bajdenovi saveznici uvek nahebu.
Tensions between China and the Philippines have escalated
dramatically in recent months around Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged reef in the eastern Spratly Islands. The Chinese Coast Guard has repeatedly attempted to block delivery of food, water, and building supplies to the Philippine marine detachment aboard the BRP Sierra Madre, a World War II–era warship
grounded on the shoal since 1999. In at least
two incidents since March, China’s use of coercion has injured Philippines sailors. The risks of escalation are serious. The United States has said its defense
obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty extend “to armed attacks on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft — including those of its Coast Guard — anywhere in the South China Sea.”
But while China has been escalating with the Philippines at unprecedented levels around Second Thomas Shoal, it has exercised striking restraint toward Vietnam’s far
larger and more
militarizedexpansion of its South China Sea outposts. There is no record of China using paramilitary or military forces to disrupt Vietnam’s land reclamation in the Spratly Islands. As Zack Cooper and Greg Poling have recently
noted, China’s assertiveness toward the Philippines and restraint toward Vietnam is especially puzzling given that the former is a U.S. treaty ally while the latter is not. Alliances with great powers are supposed to deter aggression, not to invite it. This is a puzzle that warrants scrutiny not just to help illuminate the nature of Chinese strategy in one of the world’s leading flashpoints. Deciphering the logic behind China’s conduct also has direct implications for how the United States and its allies can best defend their interests in the South China Sea and beyond.