U tri smene rade na razbijanju pravoslavlja, kao da nemaju drugih problema.
Rade. Izvesni “Russia influence”, tj Russian Orthodox Church workshops su ohrabrili i podstakli Đukaja Milogorca da krene na SPC, i tako potkopa samog sebe kao idiota.
Mogu tačno da ti pokažem timine “akcije” “borbe” protiv Russian soft power, počelo je, kao i mnogo toga drugog, u Vašingtonu. Eksksperti za Orthodox Christianity - dve ne baš mnogo bistre katolikinje napisale seminal paper, posle je krenulo, ideju usvojile druge NGO, pa onda Đukajev Atlantski Savet/Savez CG načuo, i onda pao i predlog “zakona”, naravno, ljudi se videli u ekonomskom delu, doći do Miločera i sl.
Kad tamo Đukaj objavio tat SPC, i našao se u najobranijem zelenom grožđu, pa još u sred mera protiv korone, i ljudima malo trebalo. I posle kažu NGO nemaju uticaja, ljudi njegovom Faraonastvu podmetnuli nogu kojekakvim savetima i idejama, sram ih bilo.
Uporedi ovo sa datumima onih “predloga” zakona po CG, kako je zanimljivo, može da se prati nit od priglupe ideje iznesene u Vašingtonu, pa do režima koji je sebi na ubacivao onolike klipove u točkove.
Počelo sa isterivanjem ruskih malignih uticaja, i završilo katastrofom Đukaja. Krajnje loše ga savetovali ljudi.
Brief by Heather A. Conley and Matthew Melino
Published May 14, 2019
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The Issue
- Russian malign influence in the Western Balkans is proving to have a political impact in Montenegro through the exploitation of the Orthodox faith, Pan-Slavic identity, and economics.
- The coup attempt in October 2016 was influence in action as it sought to foment political chaos and prevent Montenegro from joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Introduction
Russian malign influence seeks to exploit every weakness and societal division within in a respective country. An adviser to Russian president Vladimir Putin, Vladislav Surkov, recently stated that “Foreign politicians talk about Russia’s interference in elections and referendums around the world. In fact, the matter is even more serious: Russia interferes in your brains, we change your conscience, and there is nothing you can do about it.” It must be understood that everything from religion, history, facts, information, racial and ethnic tensions, illicit financing, and institutional and economic weakness, can be weaponized.
The mobilization of the Orthodox Church (in Montenegro through the Serbian Orthodox Church) is one such weapon in the Kremlin’s effort to resuscitate pan-Slavism and unite the Slavic world under Russian patronage. Doing so supports the Kremlin’s narrative that only Russian president Vladimir Putin is the true “defender of the faith,” and all that is culturally traditional and conservative. In effect, the Russian and Serbian Orthodox churches “
interfere in [one’s] brain and alter an individual’s conscience” because the church touches many aspects of daily life, from the blessing of cars and homes to encouraging followers to fight against the decadence and liberalism of the West. The intermingling of financial support and the creation of outlets for the church’s charitable works can often be traced back to Russian ultra-nationalist oligarchs with close political and financial ties to the Kremlin. One particularly active figure in this space is
Konstantin Malofeev who created the Charitable Foundation of St. Basil the Great, which is in part charged with spreading the Russian Orthodox faith. Mr. Malofeev’s spiritual adviser, Orthodox priest Bishop Tikhon, is also President Putin’s spiritual adviser. It is
reported that Mr. Malofeev and Mr. Surkov also closely coordinate their activities.
The Kremlin is also weaponizing history as it attempts to revitalize the historical role of the Russian Empire as the true defender and “protector” of its Slavic brethren in Montenegro from its clashes with the Ottoman Empire. Today, Russia defends its Slavic brethren from the West and makes powerful appeals to a common Slavic identity and Orthodox culture to wield greater influence in Montenegro.
The Orthodox Church
The Kremlin exploits religious and cultural leverage through the Orthodox Church. A large majority of Montenegrins are Christian Orthodox, and the country’s religious authorities (the Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral) are still ecumenically attached to the Serbian Orthodox Church. There is, however, a Montenegrin Orthodox Church that has declared autocephaly (similar to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church), but it has not been recognized by Eastern Orthodox Churches.1 The Serbian patriarch has also served as a conduit for Russian influence in Montenegro. For example, on one of his recent visits to the country, he was escorted by the infamous pro-Putin bikers’ club, the Night Wolves.2
Today, Russia defends its Slavic brethren from the West and makes powerful appeals to a common Slavic identity and Orthodox culture to wield greater influence in Montenegro.
The Kremlin has tapped the Orthodox Church to influence Montenegro’s foreign policy decisions on two occasions: Montenegro’s 2006 push for independence and its 2016 accession to NATO.
As World War I drew to a close, Montenegro became part of a union of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which later became Yugoslavia.3 As Yugoslavia collapsed and dissolved into ethnic warfare, eventually an EU-mediated accord established the new state of Serbia and Montenegro in 2002. Calls for greater independence in Montenegro followed, and Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic advocated for independence and eventual membership into the European Union. In 2006, following a referendum in which a 55 percent validity threshold was marginally met, Montenegro declared independence. Tensions flared in the run-up to the referendum as a majority of Montenegrin Serbs were strong advocates for a joint state with Serbia. During the campaign, the Serbian Orthodox Church served as
an amplifier of and supporter of a unified state, playing on the fears that independence would have economic and political consequences for Montenegrins living in Serbia. Despite its passage, many still do not accept the results of the referendum, fueling the narrative of a divided state susceptible to Russian influence that pits one side of the population against another. The Kremlin is critical of any effort in the region that fragments a unified Slavic and Orthodox entity which is why it is against an independent Kosovo.