Pa ja to i kažem. Poenta je da to suprotna strana mora nadoknaditi ili bunkerima i utvrđenjem ili tehnologijom.
Ako ne nadoknadi strada ljudstvo.
Sad koliko su uspešni je pitanje ofc. I jedni i drugi.
Znaće se kad stvar bude gotova. Mada, eto na primer što se tiče ’99., po ovom dokumentu RAND Corp ispada da npr čak ni onaj dosta oholi engleski general Majkl Džekson nije baš bio siguran da je VJ baš bila vojno poražena koliko su bili drugi faktori oko Zlobe (Jeljcin, struja, tadašnji SPS tajkuni) koji su ga naterali da onako nonšalantno kaže da se samo šalio. A drugi kuju avijaciju u zvezde, pa ti vidi, ni oko toga ne možeš da nađeš jedinstveno mišljenje.
“On the other hand, there was the more skeptical view offered by the commander of the international peacekeeping forces in Kosovo, British Army Lieutenant General Sir Michael Jackson, who suggested that “the event of June 3 [when the Russians backed the West’s position and urged Milosevic to surrender] was the single event that appeared to me to have the greatest significance in ending the war.” Asked about the effects of the air attacks, Jackson, an avowed critic of air power, replied tartly: “I wasn’t responsible for the air campaign; you’re asking the wrong person.”
We may never know for sure what mix of pressures and inducements ultimately led Milosevic to admit defeat, at least until key Serb archival materials become available or those closest to Milosevic during the air war become disposed to offer first-hand testimony. Asked by a reporter why Milosevic folded if the bombing had not defeated him militarily, Clark, who knew the Serb dictator well from previous negotiating encounters, replied: “
You’ll have to ask Milosevic, and he’ll never tell you.” Yet why Milosevic gave in and why he did so when he did are by far the most important questions about the air war experience, since the answers, insofar as they are knowable, will help to lay bare the coercive dynamic that ultimately swung the outcome of Allied Force.
NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1365/RAND_MR1365.pdf