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RAT U LIBIJI
- Začetnik teme Paganko
- Datum pokretanja
- stanje
- Poruka
- 204.607
Ja sam očekivao odgovor, ne opis onoga šta se javlja Vidovitom Milunu. Mada si donekle u pravu, nisam bio tada rođen, ali recimo da sam"samo" malo pre toga. Tužno je čitati kad neko ovako neargumentovano uđe u raspravu. Zanima me na osnovu čega si napisao ovo, ali takođe i zašto nisi odgovoria na pitanja?
Ipak mislim da Libija treba biti demokratska i da treba se osloboditi diktature jer to tako zeli Zapad i Amerika.Libija je jedna zemlja kojom trebaju upravljati ljudi koji ce biti u dobrim odnosima sa Amerikom bas kao sto je to slucaj sa Saudijskom Arabijom.
akomoze
Poznat
- Poruka
- 7.255
Na ovom pješačkom prelazu postaviti Minga da reguliše saobraćaj .
crni lepotan
Elita
- Poruka
- 21.393
Na ovom pješačkom prelazu postaviti Minga da reguliše saobraćaj .
jes i da maltretira kamile
nema nista od toga
sloboda za kamile
znaci LDP-ovci odbili mir, zele rat
Gadafi treba da ih sprzi bez milosti 
Добро дошли
Buduća legenda
- Poruka
- 27.854
znaci LDP-ovci odbili mir, zele rat
Juppe: NATO ne uspjeva zaštiti civile u Libiji
12.04.2011
Francuski ministar vanjskih poslova Alain Juppe u intrevjuu za Francuski radio izjavio je da NATO ne radi dovoljno kako bi zaštitio civile u Libiji od napada Gadafijevih snaga.
Šefovi dilomacija NATO saveza sastati će se krajem tjedna u Berlinu, a važna tema tih razgovora biti će stanje u Libiji.
Usprkos zračnim udarima Alijanse opozicijski borci ne uspijevaju spriječiti napredovanje režimskih snaga.
U ponedjeljak su predstavnici Prijelaznog vijeća odbacili plan Afričke unije o primirju ponavljajući da je uvjet za pregovore odlazak Gadafija s vlasti.
http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/archive/news/20110412/500/500.html?id=3554613
Пржи их Гадафи и НАТО. Мораће да се смире и признају ко их је наговорио на побуну.
"NATO nije ispunio zadatak"
Pariz -- Ministar spoljnih poslova Francuske Alan Žipe optužio je NATO da se povlači u Libiji i ocenio da taj vojni savez nije na pravi način ispunio osnovni zadatak.
B92 pre 24 minuta | FoNet
B92
Zadatak za NATO je , po Žipeu, bio uništenje teškog oružja kojim raspolažu snage lojalne Moameru Gadafiju. "NATO mora u potpunosti da ispuni svoju ulogu", reko je Žipe u intervjuu za francuski Info radio. Na pitanje da li to sada radi, on je odgovorio: "Ne u dovoljnoj meri". Prema rečima Žipea, Francuska želi da vidi da je NATO uništio teško oružje iz kojega je bombardovana Misurata.
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2011&mm=04&dd=12&nav_id=505649
Pariz -- Ministar spoljnih poslova Francuske Alan Žipe optužio je NATO da se povlači u Libiji i ocenio da taj vojni savez nije na pravi način ispunio osnovni zadatak.
B92 pre 24 minuta | FoNet
B92
Zadatak za NATO je , po Žipeu, bio uništenje teškog oružja kojim raspolažu snage lojalne Moameru Gadafiju. "NATO mora u potpunosti da ispuni svoju ulogu", reko je Žipe u intervjuu za francuski Info radio. Na pitanje da li to sada radi, on je odgovorio: "Ne u dovoljnoj meri". Prema rečima Žipea, Francuska želi da vidi da je NATO uništio teško oružje iz kojega je bombardovana Misurata.
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2011&mm=04&dd=12&nav_id=505649
gost 261081
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- 7.081
ma pusti ga lupa gluposti nikad se to nije desilo.
gost 261081
Poznat
- Poruka
- 7.081
jes i da maltretira kamile
nema nista od toga
sloboda za kamile
znaci LDP-ovci odbili mir, zele rat
ne mora da ide cak do Libije, moze da ode i do Beo Zoo Vrta.
sumnjivo lice
Buduća legenda
- Poruka
- 44.833
ko zna sta je tu istina,Misrata je duboku u teritoriji pod kontrolom vladinig snaga.Kako je inace moguce da pobinjenici drze mesec dana jedan grad totalno izolovan i pun civila.Nista me nebi izenenadilo da Misrata do kraja sukoba nebude osvojena jer NATO ubacuje pomoc u ljudstvu i opremi putem mora.
Inace NATO je dobrim delom uspeo u svojim ciljevim Libija je defakto podeljena zamlja u kojoj do pomirenja nikada nece doci.Istocni deo je vec pod njihovim primatom
akomoze
Poznat
- Poruka
- 7.255
Ne vjerujem da će mu ove naše pasovati zbog radi toga što ne nose burke .
- Poruka
- 16.622
ma to je za domacu konzumaciju.
itekako je ispunio zadatak. NATO-ov poso je podela i stvaranje kriznih zarista.
da NATO nije intervenisao, ova pobuna bi bila ugusena jos odavno.
kako tumacis cinjenicu da natovci cas bombarduju cas stanu, sve nesto ne dajuci ni jednima ni drugima prednost?
Moračanin
Veoma poznat
- Poruka
- 11.434
Da, tako je.
Zavadili su libijski narod i tu pomirenja više neće biti bar za sledećih nekoliko generacija.
Nešto slično kao što su zavadili Srbe i Hrvate (nekad Južne Slovene) u bivšoj Kraljevini.
gost 261081
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http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=sr&sl=sr&tl=en&u=http://cryptome.org/mi5-lis-uk.htm
Zna li neko sta je ovo?Nabasao sam na nesta?
Zna li neko sta je ovo?Nabasao sam na nesta?
gost 261081
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Libyan Army
The Army is charged with border protection and acting as a rapid deployment force depending on operational circumstances. Doctrine is a mixture of Egyptian doctrine which was adopted after the 1969 coup and socialist principles derived from the concepts of a People's Army. The Libyan Army is the largest and most developed branch of the armed forces. The Libyan Army is generally regarded as neither efficient nor well trained. Limited combat experience includes a rather disastrous showing in operations against Chad, which highlighted its many weaknesses. Over 4.000 Libyan soldiers were killed by Chad's armed forces between January and March 1987th
The pattern of the troop concentrations could not be determined precisely from published sources. Some troops were at the operational sites, including Tripoli, Misratah, Az Zawiyah, Surt, Benghazi, darn, and Tobruk, that were established at strategic points along the Mediterranean coast during World War II. Others were at inland sites at desert oases, such as Sabha, and farther south, at Al Kufrah, which became the main base for operations in Chad. Areas adjacent to the Egyptian border, particularly along lines of movement, were also well defended. Many army units were scattered throughout populated areas, owing in part to their responsibility for training the People's Militia units.
Few details were available on Army training. The military academy at Benghazi, established before independence with British assistance, offered its cadets courses in higher education and military subjects to prepare them for active duty as junior officers. Qadhafi and other members of the RCC attended the institution, but it was closed after the coup. Later a military academy opened at Tripoli.
In 1985 a military engineering college (at an unspecified location) to provide training in all technical military specialties was proposed. The college was to have a four-year program leading to a bachelor's degree. At about the same time, the establishment of a college reserves with a one-year program leading to the rank of second lieutenant in the reserves was announced. Admission would be contingent on the attainment of a university degree or its equivalent and a demonstration of "adherence to the great Fatah revolution." Because Libya is not known to have an active reserve program, it remained unclear how the graduates of this institution would be used. By the late 1980s, the Libyan army was well outfitted with modern armaments, including rocket systems, armored vehicles for its infantry and artillery, engineering equipment, up-to-date Soviet infantry weapons, sophisticated fire-control systems, flame throwers and chemical munitions , and antitank guided missiles. Libya's more than 3.000 tanks gave it the tenth largest tank force in the world. Its range of tracked and wheeled armor, tank transporters, and air transport ensured it the necessary mobility to bring its forces to bear rapidly against any threat to its territorial integrity and enabled it to intervene in ventures far beyond its borders.
The army was nevertheless confronted by grave deficiencies. The high technological level of its equipment demanded a corresponding level of technical competence in operation and maintenance that the army lacked. Maintenance and repair problems were exacerbated by the diversity of arms sources - British, American, Französisch, Soviet, Italian, and Brazilian. The numerous foreign advisers and technicians were insufficient to overcome low standards of support and logistics. To judge from the ability demonstrated the Libyans in Chad to sustain modern combat operations over extended supply lines, some progress was being made in correcting these problems.
Recent years saw the Army undermined by the embargo, which deprived it of new weapons. International sanctions against Libya caused major problems with equipment maintenance, making an accurate assessment difficult. In the 1990s European and U.S. agencies intercepted numerous shipments of spare parts and dual-use materials being smuggled to Libya, but it must be assumed that some clandestine shipments did get through. It was aanticipated that the ending of sanctions and the procurement of new equipment, as well as new training opportunities, may herald an improvement in the capabilities of the army.
After many years of sanctions, Libya had a requirement for a wholesale modernization of its vehicle fleet. All major areas of the land forces equipment need improvment, especially the replacement of obsolete Soviet main battle tanks and artillery. Over half of Libya's armored forces were thought to be in storage following the chronic shortage of spare parts for Soviet-era equipment, which in any event was rapidly becoming obsolete. Much of the Soviet-era equipment needed to be replaced including main battle tanks and land vehicles. Libya was looking to France to bolster the anti-armor capabilities of the land forces, concluding a U.S. $ 218.4 million deal in August 2007 with MBDA for the supply of Milan ADT-ER anti-tank missiles. The UK may also become a supplier of defense materiel. Probably the largest number of vehicles to be procured will be wheeled tactical vehicles as these can perform a wide range of roles in all types of warfare. In February 2009 the Bin Jabr Group received a contract to provide 120 Nimri 4 x 4 vehicles, specifically developed for operating in desert conditions, featuring a custom cooling system.
The Army is charged with border protection and acting as a rapid deployment force depending on operational circumstances. Doctrine is a mixture of Egyptian doctrine which was adopted after the 1969 coup and socialist principles derived from the concepts of a People's Army. The Libyan Army is the largest and most developed branch of the armed forces. The Libyan Army is generally regarded as neither efficient nor well trained. Limited combat experience includes a rather disastrous showing in operations against Chad, which highlighted its many weaknesses. Over 4.000 Libyan soldiers were killed by Chad's armed forces between January and March 1987th
The pattern of the troop concentrations could not be determined precisely from published sources. Some troops were at the operational sites, including Tripoli, Misratah, Az Zawiyah, Surt, Benghazi, darn, and Tobruk, that were established at strategic points along the Mediterranean coast during World War II. Others were at inland sites at desert oases, such as Sabha, and farther south, at Al Kufrah, which became the main base for operations in Chad. Areas adjacent to the Egyptian border, particularly along lines of movement, were also well defended. Many army units were scattered throughout populated areas, owing in part to their responsibility for training the People's Militia units.
Few details were available on Army training. The military academy at Benghazi, established before independence with British assistance, offered its cadets courses in higher education and military subjects to prepare them for active duty as junior officers. Qadhafi and other members of the RCC attended the institution, but it was closed after the coup. Later a military academy opened at Tripoli.
In 1985 a military engineering college (at an unspecified location) to provide training in all technical military specialties was proposed. The college was to have a four-year program leading to a bachelor's degree. At about the same time, the establishment of a college reserves with a one-year program leading to the rank of second lieutenant in the reserves was announced. Admission would be contingent on the attainment of a university degree or its equivalent and a demonstration of "adherence to the great Fatah revolution." Because Libya is not known to have an active reserve program, it remained unclear how the graduates of this institution would be used. By the late 1980s, the Libyan army was well outfitted with modern armaments, including rocket systems, armored vehicles for its infantry and artillery, engineering equipment, up-to-date Soviet infantry weapons, sophisticated fire-control systems, flame throwers and chemical munitions , and antitank guided missiles. Libya's more than 3.000 tanks gave it the tenth largest tank force in the world. Its range of tracked and wheeled armor, tank transporters, and air transport ensured it the necessary mobility to bring its forces to bear rapidly against any threat to its territorial integrity and enabled it to intervene in ventures far beyond its borders.
The army was nevertheless confronted by grave deficiencies. The high technological level of its equipment demanded a corresponding level of technical competence in operation and maintenance that the army lacked. Maintenance and repair problems were exacerbated by the diversity of arms sources - British, American, Französisch, Soviet, Italian, and Brazilian. The numerous foreign advisers and technicians were insufficient to overcome low standards of support and logistics. To judge from the ability demonstrated the Libyans in Chad to sustain modern combat operations over extended supply lines, some progress was being made in correcting these problems.
Recent years saw the Army undermined by the embargo, which deprived it of new weapons. International sanctions against Libya caused major problems with equipment maintenance, making an accurate assessment difficult. In the 1990s European and U.S. agencies intercepted numerous shipments of spare parts and dual-use materials being smuggled to Libya, but it must be assumed that some clandestine shipments did get through. It was aanticipated that the ending of sanctions and the procurement of new equipment, as well as new training opportunities, may herald an improvement in the capabilities of the army.
After many years of sanctions, Libya had a requirement for a wholesale modernization of its vehicle fleet. All major areas of the land forces equipment need improvment, especially the replacement of obsolete Soviet main battle tanks and artillery. Over half of Libya's armored forces were thought to be in storage following the chronic shortage of spare parts for Soviet-era equipment, which in any event was rapidly becoming obsolete. Much of the Soviet-era equipment needed to be replaced including main battle tanks and land vehicles. Libya was looking to France to bolster the anti-armor capabilities of the land forces, concluding a U.S. $ 218.4 million deal in August 2007 with MBDA for the supply of Milan ADT-ER anti-tank missiles. The UK may also become a supplier of defense materiel. Probably the largest number of vehicles to be procured will be wheeled tactical vehicles as these can perform a wide range of roles in all types of warfare. In February 2009 the Bin Jabr Group received a contract to provide 120 Nimri 4 x 4 vehicles, specifically developed for operating in desert conditions, featuring a custom cooling system.
gost 261081
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People's Militia
The concept of universal military service is embodied in Statute 3 for 1984, approved by the GPC in March 1984th This law declared that all Libyans coming of age, whether male or female, were to receive regular military training, as long as they were physically able. Military studies were to be among the basic subjects of the educational curriculum at all stages above the elementary level. Military studies and training in regular military establishments of "specialized cadres in warfare" were to be restricted for the present to males.
The statutes provided for Libya to be divided into regions defense, the responsibility for defending each region being that of its inhabitants. Defense regions were to regard themselves as strategic reserves for each other. The new law did not supersede the provisions of the Compulsory Military Service Statute of 1978, which made all males between the ages of seventeen and thirty-five subject to a draft commitment of three years of active service in the army or four years in the navy or air force. Students could defer service until completion of their studies. The actual application of conscription laws in 1987 was not entirely clear. In one case, a young man called up for two years' service was required to serve six years. In 1986, of 936,000 men in the 15 to 59 age category, about 550,000 were fit for military service. About 39.000 Libyans reach military age each year, many, however, lack the basic education needed to absorb training in the use and servicing of modern weaponry.
The implementing regulations for the 1984 statute stipulated that all secondary schools and equivalent institutions were to be assigned to various military units. Each student was to devote two days each month to training with the nearest military element having a specialization approximating that of the unit to which the student had been assigned. One month each year was to be spent with the student's original military unit.
Members of all government and business enterprises as well as artisans, professionals, and farmers, were also to train for two days a week and one month a year. At some factories, the military commitment was more onerous. When the work day finished at 2:00 am, employees were obliged to spend three to four hours with their military units five days each week. Such periods of intensive training continued for six months or more at intervals of every few years.
To a Considerable extent, the new law reinforced Merely a program in existence for some years to Mobilize the entire population of physically fit students and working people into local militia units centered on schools, communities, and Workplaces. The number of individuals organized into paramilitary units has been estimated at 45.000 but may have increased with the application of the new law. In 1987 the People's Militia was headed by Major Khuwayldi al Hamidi, one of the original members of the RCC. The militia units reportedly were generously equipped with arms, transport, and uniforms. In November 1985, it was announced that the first contingent of "armed people" trained as paratroopers had made a demonstration drop.
In early 1986, Western reporters were shown military training at a high school in Tripoli at which a minimum of two out of thirty-six class hours a week were devoted to military studies. In addition, one of three summer months was spent at a military camp. Graduates either entered the army or went directly on to college. Those entering college had to continue reserve training at their former high schools. The weekly lessons included hand-grenade throwing, signals and codes, and machine-gun maintenance. High schools concentrated on designated specialties, which in the case of the institution visited was the operation of the Soviet truckmounted Katyusha rocket launcher.
The mission of the People's Militia was territorial defense, and it was to function under the leadership of local military commanders. Qadhafi contended that it was the People's Militia that met the Egyptian incursions during the border clash of 1977, although the Egyptians insisted that their successful raids had been contested by regular army units. The militia forces are not known to have faced any other test that would permit an appraisal of their performance in home defense or as auxiliaries to the regular army. There was some evidence that local commanders had not responded energetically to their responsibility for supervising and training militia units.
Women in the Armed Forces
Qadhafi has persistently sought to usher in a policy of direct participation by women in national defense. His efforts, which have been resisted by conservative elements of Libyan society and apparently by most young women as well, derived from his argument that women of the Arab world live in a subjugated state and must be liberated from oppression and Feudalism. Qadhafi viewed practices governing a woman's role in society and her legal rights as disrespectful, Reactionary, and contrary to the Quran.
Speaking at a rally in Tripoli in 1978, Qadhafi said that the goal of a totally armed people would be fully realized "when all Libyans - men and women - have been trained in an organized, modern fashion." Addressing the same speech in the political and religious problems that a full-fledged military role for women presented in Islamic Libya, Qadhafi declared that this "is not against religion, not against marriage, not against ethics."
Shortly thereafter, it was announced that women were to be conscripted along with men, but this plan was apparently not fully implemented. A women's army college opened in Tripoli in 1979, training volunteers aged thirteen to seventeen in basic military subjects and the use of various weapons. A total of 7.000 students had passed through the academy by the 1983rd Some female pilots and naval recruits had reportedly also been enlisted. Nevertheless, the notion of women as soldiers remained unpopular. Some observers believed that many of the students had been coerced into entering the academy. The institution was closed in November 1983, reportedly after students ripped down fences to escape and return to their homes.
Nonetheless, the new legislation introduced in February 1984 covering universal military service specifically included women. When the GPC took the almost unprecedented step of rejecting the proposal, Qadhafi saw this as evidence of lingering Reactionary attitudes in a society that had not whole-heartedly accepted the revolution. "Spontaneous demonstrations" of young women demanding the right to engage in military service were organized. In a speech on June 12, 1984, Qadhafi announced that popular demand made it necessary to introduce compulsory military service for all in spite of the CPC's action. After the Libyan retreat from Chad in March 1987, there were indications that women had served there in administrative positions.
The women's military academy was not reopened, however, and no immediate steps were taken to institute full-time military service for women. Training was apparently to remain an adjunct to high school and university studies. Even so, there was evidence that the program was not being resolutely enforced. As late as April 1986, the Libyan press mentioned complaints over the delays and Haphazard nature of the training programs at the Zlitan Women Teachers' Institute, apparently owing to the indifference of local military authorities.
The concept of universal military service is embodied in Statute 3 for 1984, approved by the GPC in March 1984th This law declared that all Libyans coming of age, whether male or female, were to receive regular military training, as long as they were physically able. Military studies were to be among the basic subjects of the educational curriculum at all stages above the elementary level. Military studies and training in regular military establishments of "specialized cadres in warfare" were to be restricted for the present to males.
The statutes provided for Libya to be divided into regions defense, the responsibility for defending each region being that of its inhabitants. Defense regions were to regard themselves as strategic reserves for each other. The new law did not supersede the provisions of the Compulsory Military Service Statute of 1978, which made all males between the ages of seventeen and thirty-five subject to a draft commitment of three years of active service in the army or four years in the navy or air force. Students could defer service until completion of their studies. The actual application of conscription laws in 1987 was not entirely clear. In one case, a young man called up for two years' service was required to serve six years. In 1986, of 936,000 men in the 15 to 59 age category, about 550,000 were fit for military service. About 39.000 Libyans reach military age each year, many, however, lack the basic education needed to absorb training in the use and servicing of modern weaponry.
The implementing regulations for the 1984 statute stipulated that all secondary schools and equivalent institutions were to be assigned to various military units. Each student was to devote two days each month to training with the nearest military element having a specialization approximating that of the unit to which the student had been assigned. One month each year was to be spent with the student's original military unit.
Members of all government and business enterprises as well as artisans, professionals, and farmers, were also to train for two days a week and one month a year. At some factories, the military commitment was more onerous. When the work day finished at 2:00 am, employees were obliged to spend three to four hours with their military units five days each week. Such periods of intensive training continued for six months or more at intervals of every few years.
To a Considerable extent, the new law reinforced Merely a program in existence for some years to Mobilize the entire population of physically fit students and working people into local militia units centered on schools, communities, and Workplaces. The number of individuals organized into paramilitary units has been estimated at 45.000 but may have increased with the application of the new law. In 1987 the People's Militia was headed by Major Khuwayldi al Hamidi, one of the original members of the RCC. The militia units reportedly were generously equipped with arms, transport, and uniforms. In November 1985, it was announced that the first contingent of "armed people" trained as paratroopers had made a demonstration drop.
In early 1986, Western reporters were shown military training at a high school in Tripoli at which a minimum of two out of thirty-six class hours a week were devoted to military studies. In addition, one of three summer months was spent at a military camp. Graduates either entered the army or went directly on to college. Those entering college had to continue reserve training at their former high schools. The weekly lessons included hand-grenade throwing, signals and codes, and machine-gun maintenance. High schools concentrated on designated specialties, which in the case of the institution visited was the operation of the Soviet truckmounted Katyusha rocket launcher.
The mission of the People's Militia was territorial defense, and it was to function under the leadership of local military commanders. Qadhafi contended that it was the People's Militia that met the Egyptian incursions during the border clash of 1977, although the Egyptians insisted that their successful raids had been contested by regular army units. The militia forces are not known to have faced any other test that would permit an appraisal of their performance in home defense or as auxiliaries to the regular army. There was some evidence that local commanders had not responded energetically to their responsibility for supervising and training militia units.
Women in the Armed Forces
Qadhafi has persistently sought to usher in a policy of direct participation by women in national defense. His efforts, which have been resisted by conservative elements of Libyan society and apparently by most young women as well, derived from his argument that women of the Arab world live in a subjugated state and must be liberated from oppression and Feudalism. Qadhafi viewed practices governing a woman's role in society and her legal rights as disrespectful, Reactionary, and contrary to the Quran.
Speaking at a rally in Tripoli in 1978, Qadhafi said that the goal of a totally armed people would be fully realized "when all Libyans - men and women - have been trained in an organized, modern fashion." Addressing the same speech in the political and religious problems that a full-fledged military role for women presented in Islamic Libya, Qadhafi declared that this "is not against religion, not against marriage, not against ethics."
Shortly thereafter, it was announced that women were to be conscripted along with men, but this plan was apparently not fully implemented. A women's army college opened in Tripoli in 1979, training volunteers aged thirteen to seventeen in basic military subjects and the use of various weapons. A total of 7.000 students had passed through the academy by the 1983rd Some female pilots and naval recruits had reportedly also been enlisted. Nevertheless, the notion of women as soldiers remained unpopular. Some observers believed that many of the students had been coerced into entering the academy. The institution was closed in November 1983, reportedly after students ripped down fences to escape and return to their homes.
Nonetheless, the new legislation introduced in February 1984 covering universal military service specifically included women. When the GPC took the almost unprecedented step of rejecting the proposal, Qadhafi saw this as evidence of lingering Reactionary attitudes in a society that had not whole-heartedly accepted the revolution. "Spontaneous demonstrations" of young women demanding the right to engage in military service were organized. In a speech on June 12, 1984, Qadhafi announced that popular demand made it necessary to introduce compulsory military service for all in spite of the CPC's action. After the Libyan retreat from Chad in March 1987, there were indications that women had served there in administrative positions.
The women's military academy was not reopened, however, and no immediate steps were taken to institute full-time military service for women. Training was apparently to remain an adjunct to high school and university studies. Even so, there was evidence that the program was not being resolutely enforced. As late as April 1986, the Libyan press mentioned complaints over the delays and Haphazard nature of the training programs at the Zlitan Women Teachers' Institute, apparently owing to the indifference of local military authorities.
gost 261081
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Libyan Navy
The navy has always been the stepchild of the Libyan armed forces, although its Soviet-supplied submarines and fast-attack craft with missiles have endowed it with the potential for Inflicting damage on other naval powers in the Mediterranean. The enormous Firepower available to small vessels armed with missiles and sophisticated electronic guidance systems has enabled Qadhafi to assemble a modern flotilla at relatively low cost and with few personnel. The navy consisted of no more than 200 officers and men when the first warship was delivered to the Idris regime in the 1966th Under Qadhafi, naval personnel had increased to 6.500 by 1986 and was expected to rise still further to meet the staffing needs of additional ships on order.
Traditionally, the navy's primary mission has been to defend the coast and to assist the other services in maintaining internal security and public order. After the previously separate customs and harbor police were joined with the navy in a single command under the Ministry of Defense in 1970, the mission was extended to include responsibilities for curbing smuggling and customs for Enforcing laws.
The rapid naval buildup that occurred during the 1970s was intended to enforce Qadhafi's claim of sovereignty over the Gulf of Sidra with its sponging and fishing grounds as well as potential unexploited mineral wealth. The navy could also deter landings or raids Aimed against the country's oil fields and vulnerable oil transport network. The purpose of acquiring amphibious landing ships for tanks and infantry was less obvious. One explanation might be to present a threat to Egyptian forces near the border with Libya. The Egyptians' sole land supply route is the coastal road from Alexandria.
Little information was available on the navy's organizational structure, but Tripoli was known to be the site of the naval command headquarters at Al Khums and of the principal naval base. Other bases were located in the ports of Tripoli, Darnah (Dern) and Benghazi, with other Naval bases at Al Khums and Tobruq. A repair base was located at Al Khums east of Tripoli, and a submarine base was constructed at Ras al-Hilal. The Naval Air Station at Al Girdabiyah, and the Naval Infantry Battalion is stationed at Sidi Bilal.
As of early 1987, the Libyan navy had faced no hostile actions except for the encounter with the American fleet in March 1986 in which one missile boat and a corvette were destroyed and others possibly damaged. Earlier, it was reported that the small Libyan vessels were experiencing difficulty in obeying Qadhafi's order to remain at sea to avoid the risk of being bombed in port by American planes. The fleet reported breakdowns of engines and electronic failures as well as shortages of food and fuel.
On 11 October 2008 a naval task force from Russia's Northern Fleet, led by the nuclear-powered missile cruiser Pyotr Veliky, arrived in the Libyan capital, Tripoli. After training at sea and some visits to other foreign ports, the Russian warships will head for the Caribbean to hold exercises in November 2008 with Venezuela's navy. The Neustrashimy (Fearless) missile frigate from Russia's Baltic Fleet has also called at Tripoli to replenish supplies. The frigate would after leaving Tripoli continue its tour of duty via the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. The Neutrashimy went to Somalia where it ensured the safety of Russian vessels passing through this area against pirate attacks.
On 16 January 2009 RIA Novosti reported that the deputy chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces said Russia believed it was too early to name any countries where its Navy would like to deploy "basing points". Russian media previously reported that Russia was looking at a possible naval facilities in Yemen, Syria and Libya, among other countries. The Soviet-era Navy maintenance site in Syria named Tartus is the only Russian foothold in the Mediterranean. Russian media reports earlier said the facility could be turned into the base. About 10 Russian warships and three floating piers are reported to be currently deployed there, and Russia is expanding the port and building a pier in nearby El-Latakia.
Qaddafi may think Russia's military presence would protect Libya from possible attacks by the United States, which is not willing to embrace the colonel despite numerous conciliation gestures. Russia may still decide to establish a naval base at Benghazi, because it will cost a lot and Libya needs the money. But Russia can do it in conditions of the global financial crisis, when its international reserves are decreasing by the day and once full flow of petrodollars is dwindling into a small creek?
By the late 1980s it was considered probable that the Libyan navy was overextended, having carried out a rapid buildup without sufficient trained personnel. More than one-third of the entire naval complement of 6.500 would be required to supply a single crew for each of the ships in commission in 1986. In addition, personnel would have to be found to staff a number of other vessels on order. Aggravating the problem of reaching a satisfactory level of operation, training, and maintenance was the need to become familiar with a variety of modern weapons systems from numerous supplier countries, among them Britain, France, Italy, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.
Many vessels are not operational and seldom go to sea. Serviceability has improved, thanks to Ukrainian assistance and with the lifting of sanctions may accelerate this process. Naval helicopters are all shore based, with the Russian-built helicopters in one squadron and French types in a second. As of 2007 the Libyan navy had one operational Koni class corvette, and a pair of light Nanuchka Corvettes and half a dozen FACS (a mix of Combattante II and Axis II) and a pair of LSTs used for training. The overall operational effectiveness of the navy is very low and by 2010 the operational status of the Koni-class frigate Al Hani 212 is doubtful.
By 2001 the six Foxtrot class submarines were non-operational. One was trapped in Lithuania due to sanctions on Libya and was eventually scrapped, they sank in port and has been hulked. Only recent activity was use of two units as patrol ships surfaced circa 1995th These two Foxtrot-class (Project 641) submarines - Al Khyber and Al Hunain 315 316 - have a capacity of 44 mines in place of torpedoes. However, the overall operational effectiveness of the navy is very low and by 2010 the operational status of the submarines is doubtful.
There are reports of six two-man small-class SDVs, which can carry 250 kg of limpet mines, equipping Libya's naval infantry battalion stationed at Sidi Bilal. Two units were transferred from Yugoslavia in each of the years 1977, 1981 and 1982nd By 2010 their operational status was doubtful and all were probably non-operational.
A 2010 of the Libyan Navy operated four Natya (Project 266m)-class ocean minesweepers, though these were mostly used for coastal patrols and had never been observed minesweeping. Ras Al Fulaijah 117, Ras Al Qula 119, Ras Al Massad 123 and Ras Al Hani 125 were part of a batch transferred from the USSR between 1981 and 1986 with a further four of the class of non-operational. Despite their lack of activity in the minesweeping role, the vessels are equipped with contact, magnetic and acoustic sweeps. Ras Al Massad has been used for training cruises. Most Libyan vessels can lay mines with the Natya-class minesweepers able to carry 10, the two Koni (Project 1159) class frigates-(Al Hani Al Qirdabiyah 212 and 213) having a capacity for 20 mines. The Libyan Navy is known to possess a number of Russian supplied MYaM shallow water moored contact mines.
The navy has always been the stepchild of the Libyan armed forces, although its Soviet-supplied submarines and fast-attack craft with missiles have endowed it with the potential for Inflicting damage on other naval powers in the Mediterranean. The enormous Firepower available to small vessels armed with missiles and sophisticated electronic guidance systems has enabled Qadhafi to assemble a modern flotilla at relatively low cost and with few personnel. The navy consisted of no more than 200 officers and men when the first warship was delivered to the Idris regime in the 1966th Under Qadhafi, naval personnel had increased to 6.500 by 1986 and was expected to rise still further to meet the staffing needs of additional ships on order.
Traditionally, the navy's primary mission has been to defend the coast and to assist the other services in maintaining internal security and public order. After the previously separate customs and harbor police were joined with the navy in a single command under the Ministry of Defense in 1970, the mission was extended to include responsibilities for curbing smuggling and customs for Enforcing laws.
The rapid naval buildup that occurred during the 1970s was intended to enforce Qadhafi's claim of sovereignty over the Gulf of Sidra with its sponging and fishing grounds as well as potential unexploited mineral wealth. The navy could also deter landings or raids Aimed against the country's oil fields and vulnerable oil transport network. The purpose of acquiring amphibious landing ships for tanks and infantry was less obvious. One explanation might be to present a threat to Egyptian forces near the border with Libya. The Egyptians' sole land supply route is the coastal road from Alexandria.
Little information was available on the navy's organizational structure, but Tripoli was known to be the site of the naval command headquarters at Al Khums and of the principal naval base. Other bases were located in the ports of Tripoli, Darnah (Dern) and Benghazi, with other Naval bases at Al Khums and Tobruq. A repair base was located at Al Khums east of Tripoli, and a submarine base was constructed at Ras al-Hilal. The Naval Air Station at Al Girdabiyah, and the Naval Infantry Battalion is stationed at Sidi Bilal.
As of early 1987, the Libyan navy had faced no hostile actions except for the encounter with the American fleet in March 1986 in which one missile boat and a corvette were destroyed and others possibly damaged. Earlier, it was reported that the small Libyan vessels were experiencing difficulty in obeying Qadhafi's order to remain at sea to avoid the risk of being bombed in port by American planes. The fleet reported breakdowns of engines and electronic failures as well as shortages of food and fuel.
On 11 October 2008 a naval task force from Russia's Northern Fleet, led by the nuclear-powered missile cruiser Pyotr Veliky, arrived in the Libyan capital, Tripoli. After training at sea and some visits to other foreign ports, the Russian warships will head for the Caribbean to hold exercises in November 2008 with Venezuela's navy. The Neustrashimy (Fearless) missile frigate from Russia's Baltic Fleet has also called at Tripoli to replenish supplies. The frigate would after leaving Tripoli continue its tour of duty via the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. The Neutrashimy went to Somalia where it ensured the safety of Russian vessels passing through this area against pirate attacks.
On 16 January 2009 RIA Novosti reported that the deputy chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces said Russia believed it was too early to name any countries where its Navy would like to deploy "basing points". Russian media previously reported that Russia was looking at a possible naval facilities in Yemen, Syria and Libya, among other countries. The Soviet-era Navy maintenance site in Syria named Tartus is the only Russian foothold in the Mediterranean. Russian media reports earlier said the facility could be turned into the base. About 10 Russian warships and three floating piers are reported to be currently deployed there, and Russia is expanding the port and building a pier in nearby El-Latakia.
Qaddafi may think Russia's military presence would protect Libya from possible attacks by the United States, which is not willing to embrace the colonel despite numerous conciliation gestures. Russia may still decide to establish a naval base at Benghazi, because it will cost a lot and Libya needs the money. But Russia can do it in conditions of the global financial crisis, when its international reserves are decreasing by the day and once full flow of petrodollars is dwindling into a small creek?
By the late 1980s it was considered probable that the Libyan navy was overextended, having carried out a rapid buildup without sufficient trained personnel. More than one-third of the entire naval complement of 6.500 would be required to supply a single crew for each of the ships in commission in 1986. In addition, personnel would have to be found to staff a number of other vessels on order. Aggravating the problem of reaching a satisfactory level of operation, training, and maintenance was the need to become familiar with a variety of modern weapons systems from numerous supplier countries, among them Britain, France, Italy, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.
Many vessels are not operational and seldom go to sea. Serviceability has improved, thanks to Ukrainian assistance and with the lifting of sanctions may accelerate this process. Naval helicopters are all shore based, with the Russian-built helicopters in one squadron and French types in a second. As of 2007 the Libyan navy had one operational Koni class corvette, and a pair of light Nanuchka Corvettes and half a dozen FACS (a mix of Combattante II and Axis II) and a pair of LSTs used for training. The overall operational effectiveness of the navy is very low and by 2010 the operational status of the Koni-class frigate Al Hani 212 is doubtful.
By 2001 the six Foxtrot class submarines were non-operational. One was trapped in Lithuania due to sanctions on Libya and was eventually scrapped, they sank in port and has been hulked. Only recent activity was use of two units as patrol ships surfaced circa 1995th These two Foxtrot-class (Project 641) submarines - Al Khyber and Al Hunain 315 316 - have a capacity of 44 mines in place of torpedoes. However, the overall operational effectiveness of the navy is very low and by 2010 the operational status of the submarines is doubtful.
There are reports of six two-man small-class SDVs, which can carry 250 kg of limpet mines, equipping Libya's naval infantry battalion stationed at Sidi Bilal. Two units were transferred from Yugoslavia in each of the years 1977, 1981 and 1982nd By 2010 their operational status was doubtful and all were probably non-operational.
A 2010 of the Libyan Navy operated four Natya (Project 266m)-class ocean minesweepers, though these were mostly used for coastal patrols and had never been observed minesweeping. Ras Al Fulaijah 117, Ras Al Qula 119, Ras Al Massad 123 and Ras Al Hani 125 were part of a batch transferred from the USSR between 1981 and 1986 with a further four of the class of non-operational. Despite their lack of activity in the minesweeping role, the vessels are equipped with contact, magnetic and acoustic sweeps. Ras Al Massad has been used for training cruises. Most Libyan vessels can lay mines with the Natya-class minesweepers able to carry 10, the two Koni (Project 1159) class frigates-(Al Hani Al Qirdabiyah 212 and 213) having a capacity for 20 mines. The Libyan Navy is known to possess a number of Russian supplied MYaM shallow water moored contact mines.
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Libyan Air Force
Libya has the largest Air Force in North Africa, but has not demonstrated any capability of effective employment and has struggled to maintain air and ground crews capable of flying and servicing the aircraft. With Soviet assistance, the air force was organized into medium bomber, fighter-bomber (ground attack), fighter-interceptor, reconnaissance, transport, training, and helicopter Squadrons. The fighter-interceptor, medium bomber, and reconnaissance Squadrons are located at bases along Libya's coast and along its border with Egypt. The helicopter Squadrons are probably based to support ground troops, but overall command apparently rests with air force headquarters in Tripoli.
Last of the military services to be established, the air force has been obliged to struggle to develop trained air and ground crews to match the rapid acquisition of modern planes and weaponry. As a result, in spite of the significant inventory of combat aircraft, amounting to more than 500 as of early 1987, Libyan air units have been committed only reluctantly and have not acquitted themselves impressively in air-to-air engagements. However, the air transport fleet Considerable, has apparently been employed capably in Chad and elsewhere. Although the air force was used extensively in support of Libyan ground units in the fighting in Chad, it does not seem to have played a decisive role.
The Air Force is organized into an Air Command which is subdivided into Squadrons and regiments which attention paid to close air support and ground attack. Eight close battlefield support nine Squadrons and Air Defence Squadrons exist. The size of the Air Force in 1990 was 22.000 persons including 15.000 conscripts. It had 426 combat aircraft and 52 armed helicopters with many more in store.
At the time of the Overthrow of the monarchy in 1969, the roster of personnel was only about 400 officers and enlisted men. A recruitment drive undertaken in 1970 eventually brought a Tenfold increase in the force by the 1978th As of 1986, its strength was estimated at 10,000.
It appears that the Air Defense Command may have been merged into the Air Force in the late 1980s or early 1990s, but information is not clear on this. Air Defense units were equipped with a variety of Soviet supplied surface-to-air missiles (SAM), antiaircraft guns (AAA), and radar, but as was shown in the U.S. raid in 1986, the Libyans have not shown an ability to integrate these systems into any comprehensive air defense network. Organization of the Air Defense Command is unclear.
With Soviet assistance, the air force was organized into one medium bomber squadron, three fighter interceptor Squadrons, five forward ground attack Squadrons, one counterinsurgency squadron, nine Helicopter Squadrons, and three air defense brigades deploying SA-2, SA-3, and crotale missiles. The three SA-5 launch sites may have been operated by army units.
Libya has the largest Air Force in North Africa, but has not demonstrated any capability of effective employment and has struggled to maintain air and ground crews capable of flying and servicing the aircraft. With Soviet assistance, the air force was organized into medium bomber, fighter-bomber (ground attack), fighter-interceptor, reconnaissance, transport, training, and helicopter Squadrons. The fighter-interceptor, medium bomber, and reconnaissance Squadrons are located at bases along Libya's coast and along its border with Egypt. The helicopter Squadrons are probably based to support ground troops, but overall command apparently rests with air force headquarters in Tripoli.
Last of the military services to be established, the air force has been obliged to struggle to develop trained air and ground crews to match the rapid acquisition of modern planes and weaponry. As a result, in spite of the significant inventory of combat aircraft, amounting to more than 500 as of early 1987, Libyan air units have been committed only reluctantly and have not acquitted themselves impressively in air-to-air engagements. However, the air transport fleet Considerable, has apparently been employed capably in Chad and elsewhere. Although the air force was used extensively in support of Libyan ground units in the fighting in Chad, it does not seem to have played a decisive role.
The Air Force is organized into an Air Command which is subdivided into Squadrons and regiments which attention paid to close air support and ground attack. Eight close battlefield support nine Squadrons and Air Defence Squadrons exist. The size of the Air Force in 1990 was 22.000 persons including 15.000 conscripts. It had 426 combat aircraft and 52 armed helicopters with many more in store.
At the time of the Overthrow of the monarchy in 1969, the roster of personnel was only about 400 officers and enlisted men. A recruitment drive undertaken in 1970 eventually brought a Tenfold increase in the force by the 1978th As of 1986, its strength was estimated at 10,000.
It appears that the Air Defense Command may have been merged into the Air Force in the late 1980s or early 1990s, but information is not clear on this. Air Defense units were equipped with a variety of Soviet supplied surface-to-air missiles (SAM), antiaircraft guns (AAA), and radar, but as was shown in the U.S. raid in 1986, the Libyans have not shown an ability to integrate these systems into any comprehensive air defense network. Organization of the Air Defense Command is unclear.
With Soviet assistance, the air force was organized into one medium bomber squadron, three fighter interceptor Squadrons, five forward ground attack Squadrons, one counterinsurgency squadron, nine Helicopter Squadrons, and three air defense brigades deploying SA-2, SA-3, and crotale missiles. The three SA-5 launch sites may have been operated by army units.
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Libyan Missiles
Libya is the land and sea-launched short range anti-ship cruise missiles bought from the Soviet and European sources. Many systems are old and likely to suffer from maintenance problems. Libya has had a theoretical possibility to deliver weapons of mass destruction in the form of Scud and Frog missiles and missiles supplied by medium-range Tu-22 bombers. Libya also has a number of combat aircraft, some old bombers, helicopters, artillery, rockets and available as a potential method of delivery for NBC weapons. Libya used transport aircraft in its attempt to deliver chemical agents against Chadian troops in 1987.
Despite UN sanctions, Libya continues to aggressively seek ballistic missile related equipment, materials and technology from various sources in Europe, former Soviet Union, and Asia. The imposition of UN sanctions impeded Libyan efforts to obtain foreign assistance for its longer-range program.
Libya wants more range, even beyond the No Dong class missile. Tripoli is likely to continue to try to longer range systems to increase the number of U.S. and NATO targets may hold in danger. If the missile were offered with range sufficient to strike 2,500 kilometers into Europe, Libya would try to get it. Libya's paths to obtaining an ICBM of 15 years would probably be to purchase a complete missile system or to adjust the support arrangements in which scientists and technicians went to Libya, developed infrastructure and developed rocket right there.
According to Rumsfeld Commission report, Colonel Gaddafi said in his opponents in the 1990 speech. "If they know that you are able to attack U.S. forces, they would not be able to click if we possessed a deterrent - missiles that could reach New York - we would hit it at the same time [as the 1986 U.S. air strikes on Libya] Accordingly, the should build this force so that others will not think about the attack .. Then in late 1995, Colonel Gaddafi said: "As things stand now, I would attack at any place where aggression against Libya had been planned would even be ready to hit Naples, where a NATO base.".
On 19 December 2003 Libya agreed to destroy all its chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons. Notice surprise after nine months of secret talks between Libyan, American and British officials. Libya agreed to allow for immediate inspections and monitoring, and to eliminate ballistic missiles traveling more than 300 kilometers with 500 pounds of cargo.
A team of U.S. and British intelligence officers spent about two weeks of Libya in October and again in December 2003. During the visit, the team of American and British inspectors went to 10 sites related to Libya's nuclear efforts, chemical stockpiles and missile program [other accounts suggested that the team was taken dozens of sites.] Inspectors have found out that Libya was supplying ballistic missiles Scud-C in North Korea. Libya agreed to eliminate North Korea's Scud-Cs, but not Scud-BS, with 300 km range.
Scud-B / SS-21 Scarab / Frog-7
Libya received the Scud-B and Frog-7 missiles from the Soviet Union in mid-1970th Libya's ballistic missile inventory consists of some 80 Scud B TELs SRBM and 40 FROG-7 missile TELs artillery. It is believed that Libya has at least three times as many missiles and rockets. Libya has continued to maintain a Scud missile force, although the force is aging and suffers from maintenance problems. Some reports indicate that Libya can not successfully operate Scud B system, and that many of the launchers and missiles sold to Iran. Russian-made SS-21 Scarab SRBM has a 70 km range and 480 kg payload, and Frog-7 has a range of 40km.
On 15 April 1986, Libya fired two or three Scuds at U.S. Coast Guard navigation station on the Italian island of Lampedusa, in retaliation for an attack on the U.S. bombing of Tripoli. The rockets landed in the water short of the island, and do not cause damage.
Scud-C
Libya is reported that North Korean Scud-C short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) version of the 550 km range and 500kg payload. Scud-B has a 300 km range and payload 985 kg. CIA, reported in August 2000 that Libya has continued its efforts to obtain ballistic missile related equipment, materials, technology and expertise from foreign sources.
One example is the attempt to deliver the 1999 Scud related parts as "auto parts from companies in Taiwan that are intercepted in the UK. In January 2000, 32 crates of missile parts disguised as car parts were discovered in London Gatwick Airport on British Airways flight bound for Tripoli via Malta. Libya is believed to be a big buyer of delivery missile related technology aboard North Korean flagged freighter Kuvolsan, intercepted by Indian customs officials in June 1999 in the port of Kandla. The ship carried hundreds of missile components, Machine tools, and detailed plans for variations of Scud-B and Scud-C missiles.
Orbital Transport-und-Raketen AG (rear)
West German firm Orbital Transport und Raketen AG (back) moved its development of a commercial rocket launch area of Zaire in Libya in 1979 and apparently had one or two failed, and tests there in 1981. First flight was reported from any Sebha oasis or oasis Jarma pada 01 Mar 1981, when back announced that dozens of modules are currently in production in the manufacturing facility near Munich / Germany. Back claimed that he worked on nonmilitari think that would allow Third World countries to launch satellites cheaply. Rear become inactive in late 1984, and this effort soon failed. While the Germans formally withdrew under pressure from the government in Bonn in 1981, the latest test occurred in 1987. This can be explained by other reports that the head back, Luc Kaiser, remained in Libya until the mid-1980s. Belgrade report further states that, in October 1989, there were about 100 German engineers who work at 500-750-km missile system, code named "Ittisalt" camp in the desert about 100 miles from Sebha, site earlier back operation, and location of the second alleged Libyan chemical weapons complex. The rocket was reported to work in research and development stage.
Libya is the land and sea-launched short range anti-ship cruise missiles bought from the Soviet and European sources. Many systems are old and likely to suffer from maintenance problems. Libya has had a theoretical possibility to deliver weapons of mass destruction in the form of Scud and Frog missiles and missiles supplied by medium-range Tu-22 bombers. Libya also has a number of combat aircraft, some old bombers, helicopters, artillery, rockets and available as a potential method of delivery for NBC weapons. Libya used transport aircraft in its attempt to deliver chemical agents against Chadian troops in 1987.
Despite UN sanctions, Libya continues to aggressively seek ballistic missile related equipment, materials and technology from various sources in Europe, former Soviet Union, and Asia. The imposition of UN sanctions impeded Libyan efforts to obtain foreign assistance for its longer-range program.
Libya wants more range, even beyond the No Dong class missile. Tripoli is likely to continue to try to longer range systems to increase the number of U.S. and NATO targets may hold in danger. If the missile were offered with range sufficient to strike 2,500 kilometers into Europe, Libya would try to get it. Libya's paths to obtaining an ICBM of 15 years would probably be to purchase a complete missile system or to adjust the support arrangements in which scientists and technicians went to Libya, developed infrastructure and developed rocket right there.
According to Rumsfeld Commission report, Colonel Gaddafi said in his opponents in the 1990 speech. "If they know that you are able to attack U.S. forces, they would not be able to click if we possessed a deterrent - missiles that could reach New York - we would hit it at the same time [as the 1986 U.S. air strikes on Libya] Accordingly, the should build this force so that others will not think about the attack .. Then in late 1995, Colonel Gaddafi said: "As things stand now, I would attack at any place where aggression against Libya had been planned would even be ready to hit Naples, where a NATO base.".
On 19 December 2003 Libya agreed to destroy all its chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons. Notice surprise after nine months of secret talks between Libyan, American and British officials. Libya agreed to allow for immediate inspections and monitoring, and to eliminate ballistic missiles traveling more than 300 kilometers with 500 pounds of cargo.
A team of U.S. and British intelligence officers spent about two weeks of Libya in October and again in December 2003. During the visit, the team of American and British inspectors went to 10 sites related to Libya's nuclear efforts, chemical stockpiles and missile program [other accounts suggested that the team was taken dozens of sites.] Inspectors have found out that Libya was supplying ballistic missiles Scud-C in North Korea. Libya agreed to eliminate North Korea's Scud-Cs, but not Scud-BS, with 300 km range.
Scud-B / SS-21 Scarab / Frog-7
Libya received the Scud-B and Frog-7 missiles from the Soviet Union in mid-1970th Libya's ballistic missile inventory consists of some 80 Scud B TELs SRBM and 40 FROG-7 missile TELs artillery. It is believed that Libya has at least three times as many missiles and rockets. Libya has continued to maintain a Scud missile force, although the force is aging and suffers from maintenance problems. Some reports indicate that Libya can not successfully operate Scud B system, and that many of the launchers and missiles sold to Iran. Russian-made SS-21 Scarab SRBM has a 70 km range and 480 kg payload, and Frog-7 has a range of 40km.
On 15 April 1986, Libya fired two or three Scuds at U.S. Coast Guard navigation station on the Italian island of Lampedusa, in retaliation for an attack on the U.S. bombing of Tripoli. The rockets landed in the water short of the island, and do not cause damage.
Scud-C
Libya is reported that North Korean Scud-C short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) version of the 550 km range and 500kg payload. Scud-B has a 300 km range and payload 985 kg. CIA, reported in August 2000 that Libya has continued its efforts to obtain ballistic missile related equipment, materials, technology and expertise from foreign sources.
One example is the attempt to deliver the 1999 Scud related parts as "auto parts from companies in Taiwan that are intercepted in the UK. In January 2000, 32 crates of missile parts disguised as car parts were discovered in London Gatwick Airport on British Airways flight bound for Tripoli via Malta. Libya is believed to be a big buyer of delivery missile related technology aboard North Korean flagged freighter Kuvolsan, intercepted by Indian customs officials in June 1999 in the port of Kandla. The ship carried hundreds of missile components, Machine tools, and detailed plans for variations of Scud-B and Scud-C missiles.
Orbital Transport-und-Raketen AG (rear)
West German firm Orbital Transport und Raketen AG (back) moved its development of a commercial rocket launch area of Zaire in Libya in 1979 and apparently had one or two failed, and tests there in 1981. First flight was reported from any Sebha oasis or oasis Jarma pada 01 Mar 1981, when back announced that dozens of modules are currently in production in the manufacturing facility near Munich / Germany. Back claimed that he worked on nonmilitari think that would allow Third World countries to launch satellites cheaply. Rear become inactive in late 1984, and this effort soon failed. While the Germans formally withdrew under pressure from the government in Bonn in 1981, the latest test occurred in 1987. This can be explained by other reports that the head back, Luc Kaiser, remained in Libya until the mid-1980s. Belgrade report further states that, in October 1989, there were about 100 German engineers who work at 500-750-km missile system, code named "Ittisalt" camp in the desert about 100 miles from Sebha, site earlier back operation, and location of the second alleged Libyan chemical weapons complex. The rocket was reported to work in research and development stage.
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Libyan chemical weapons
Italian leader Benito Mussolini reportedly approved the use of gas bombs against Libyan rebels 1929th Possible one report claims that 24 tear gas grenades were thrown at the Libyan oasis in 1930. He Libyans were probably victims of mustard gas attacks.
Libya has limited success with its program of chemical warfare. Libya has experienced major setbacks in its chemical weapons program, first as a result of intense public scrutiny focused on the Rabta facility in the late 1980s and recently in their underground facility Tarhunah. Nevertheless, Libya retains the small inventory of chemical weapons, as well as CV agent production capability.
U.S. efforts reversing the direction of Libya's programs ten years focusing international attention on the Rabta and Tarhunah facilities and by preventing Libya from obtaining needed chemicals, equipment and experts. Libya, after spending a great deal of money, has only a small number of representatives and the two objects can not be used for their purposes. If Kadahafi remained calm, could be thousands of tons of various chemical agents and the ability to produce much more casually.
During the 1980s, Libya has succeeded in producing up to 100 tons of blister and nerve agent at its Rabta facility, built with foreign aid.
Libyan leader Muammar Kadhafi has shown that he is ready and capable of using chemical weapons and missiles against its enemies. In 1986 and 1987, the Government of Chad accused Libya of using poison gas and napalm against central government forces and rebel forces in opposition. Libya can be used tear gas [possibly Iran supplied] delivered in bombs by 26 aircraft in the final phase of the war against Chad in September 1987. Wind blew the agent back to the Libyan forces.
In the early 1990s, Kadhafi turned private entrepreneurs from Thailand and other countries to construct facilities for the storage of various chemical weapons, including nerve gases. Government of Thailand moved in 1993 to prevent its citizens to help the Libyan chemical weapons build. The United States welcomed this action by the Thai government.
Kadhafi has not abandoned the goal of establishing its own offensive chemical weapons capability and Libya continued to lead an independent production capability for weapons. Kadhafi did not appear likely to sign or ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, Libya remains heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals and other key equipment. UN sanctions have seriously limited that support. Finally, while Libya's ability to deliver any of the existing stocks of chemical agents is not great, threat to Egypt, the U.S. forces in the region, and NATO can not be dismissed out of hand.
Libya saw the United States as its primary external threat, owing in particular U.S. support for UN sanctions against Tripoli for its refusal to hand over suspects in the terrorist bombing of Pan Am 103rd Although Libya's ability to use chemical agents and missiles are limited, Kadhafi could provide these arms to countries or terrorist groups it supports and which support him in return.
Kadhafi main limiting factor is a lack of Libya's technology infrastructure to support domestic development of NBC weapons and missiles. All Libyan programs must rely on significant infusions of foreign equipment, technology and expertise. Only Libya's chemical warfare program has made notable progress in the development of any facilities to support major domestic programs.
Despite the current embargo and unsettled domestic situation, Kadhafi support the development of NBC weapons and missile capabilities. His view is obvious that these weapons advance its international status, can serve as deterrents against the sophisticated weaponry of the West, can be used to intimidate neighboring states, and can serve as a cheaper alternative to expensive conventional systems.
In addition to inadequate infrastructure, Libya has serious economic problems that threaten the regime and complicate its long-term goal of establishing a domestic production capacity. Libya's economic problems are the consequence of economic growth outside the oil sector, economic and financial mismanagement, lack of private enterprises, and corruption.
After the suspension of UN sanctions in April 1999, Libya reestablished contacts with illegal foreign sources of expertise, parts, and precursor chemicals in the Middle East, Asia and Western Europe.
Libya publicly expressed its intention to join the CVC. Under CVC, Libya will have to declare and destroy all chemical weapons production facilities and warehouses, to declare any dual-use chemical industry, undertake not to research or produce any chemical weapons, and not to export certain chemicals to countries that are not signed by CVC. Libya will also be subject to challenge inspection of any facility, declared or not.
On 19 December 2003 Libya agreed to destroy all its chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons. Notice surprise after nine months of secret talks between Libyan, American and British officials. Libya has agreed to abide by the Chemical Weapons Convention, and to the emergency inspection and monitoring.
A team of U.S. and British intelligence officers spent about two weeks of Libya in October and again in December 2003. U.S. and UK experts have been invited to Libya said they found few surprises in Libya chemical arms programs. U.S. and UK found that Libya has dozens of tons of mustard agent produced about a decade earlier, and hundreds of 250-pound aircraft bombs capable of dispersing the mustard agent in combat. During the visit, the team of American and British inspectors went to dozens of sites related to Libya's nuclear efforts, chemical stockpiles and missile programs. Libya revealed the existence of precursor materials used for the development of nerve agents. Libya has also conducted experiments on the nerve agents Sarin and Soman.
Mali Desert Ranch near Tripoli, described as a turkey farm, is actually a hideout for hundreds of chemical bombs. Mustard gas and nerve agents are stored separately. Libyans, U.S. inspectors are entitled to them, but it was not a place in the U.S. would look like.
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons oversaw the destruction of about 3,000 chemical bombs and warheads, which was completed in March 2004.
Italian leader Benito Mussolini reportedly approved the use of gas bombs against Libyan rebels 1929th Possible one report claims that 24 tear gas grenades were thrown at the Libyan oasis in 1930. He Libyans were probably victims of mustard gas attacks.
Libya has limited success with its program of chemical warfare. Libya has experienced major setbacks in its chemical weapons program, first as a result of intense public scrutiny focused on the Rabta facility in the late 1980s and recently in their underground facility Tarhunah. Nevertheless, Libya retains the small inventory of chemical weapons, as well as CV agent production capability.
U.S. efforts reversing the direction of Libya's programs ten years focusing international attention on the Rabta and Tarhunah facilities and by preventing Libya from obtaining needed chemicals, equipment and experts. Libya, after spending a great deal of money, has only a small number of representatives and the two objects can not be used for their purposes. If Kadahafi remained calm, could be thousands of tons of various chemical agents and the ability to produce much more casually.
During the 1980s, Libya has succeeded in producing up to 100 tons of blister and nerve agent at its Rabta facility, built with foreign aid.
Libyan leader Muammar Kadhafi has shown that he is ready and capable of using chemical weapons and missiles against its enemies. In 1986 and 1987, the Government of Chad accused Libya of using poison gas and napalm against central government forces and rebel forces in opposition. Libya can be used tear gas [possibly Iran supplied] delivered in bombs by 26 aircraft in the final phase of the war against Chad in September 1987. Wind blew the agent back to the Libyan forces.
In the early 1990s, Kadhafi turned private entrepreneurs from Thailand and other countries to construct facilities for the storage of various chemical weapons, including nerve gases. Government of Thailand moved in 1993 to prevent its citizens to help the Libyan chemical weapons build. The United States welcomed this action by the Thai government.
Kadhafi has not abandoned the goal of establishing its own offensive chemical weapons capability and Libya continued to lead an independent production capability for weapons. Kadhafi did not appear likely to sign or ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, Libya remains heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals and other key equipment. UN sanctions have seriously limited that support. Finally, while Libya's ability to deliver any of the existing stocks of chemical agents is not great, threat to Egypt, the U.S. forces in the region, and NATO can not be dismissed out of hand.
Libya saw the United States as its primary external threat, owing in particular U.S. support for UN sanctions against Tripoli for its refusal to hand over suspects in the terrorist bombing of Pan Am 103rd Although Libya's ability to use chemical agents and missiles are limited, Kadhafi could provide these arms to countries or terrorist groups it supports and which support him in return.
Kadhafi main limiting factor is a lack of Libya's technology infrastructure to support domestic development of NBC weapons and missiles. All Libyan programs must rely on significant infusions of foreign equipment, technology and expertise. Only Libya's chemical warfare program has made notable progress in the development of any facilities to support major domestic programs.
Despite the current embargo and unsettled domestic situation, Kadhafi support the development of NBC weapons and missile capabilities. His view is obvious that these weapons advance its international status, can serve as deterrents against the sophisticated weaponry of the West, can be used to intimidate neighboring states, and can serve as a cheaper alternative to expensive conventional systems.
In addition to inadequate infrastructure, Libya has serious economic problems that threaten the regime and complicate its long-term goal of establishing a domestic production capacity. Libya's economic problems are the consequence of economic growth outside the oil sector, economic and financial mismanagement, lack of private enterprises, and corruption.
After the suspension of UN sanctions in April 1999, Libya reestablished contacts with illegal foreign sources of expertise, parts, and precursor chemicals in the Middle East, Asia and Western Europe.
Libya publicly expressed its intention to join the CVC. Under CVC, Libya will have to declare and destroy all chemical weapons production facilities and warehouses, to declare any dual-use chemical industry, undertake not to research or produce any chemical weapons, and not to export certain chemicals to countries that are not signed by CVC. Libya will also be subject to challenge inspection of any facility, declared or not.
On 19 December 2003 Libya agreed to destroy all its chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons. Notice surprise after nine months of secret talks between Libyan, American and British officials. Libya has agreed to abide by the Chemical Weapons Convention, and to the emergency inspection and monitoring.
A team of U.S. and British intelligence officers spent about two weeks of Libya in October and again in December 2003. U.S. and UK experts have been invited to Libya said they found few surprises in Libya chemical arms programs. U.S. and UK found that Libya has dozens of tons of mustard agent produced about a decade earlier, and hundreds of 250-pound aircraft bombs capable of dispersing the mustard agent in combat. During the visit, the team of American and British inspectors went to dozens of sites related to Libya's nuclear efforts, chemical stockpiles and missile programs. Libya revealed the existence of precursor materials used for the development of nerve agents. Libya has also conducted experiments on the nerve agents Sarin and Soman.
Mali Desert Ranch near Tripoli, described as a turkey farm, is actually a hideout for hundreds of chemical bombs. Mustard gas and nerve agents are stored separately. Libyans, U.S. inspectors are entitled to them, but it was not a place in the U.S. would look like.
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons oversaw the destruction of about 3,000 chemical bombs and warheads, which was completed in March 2004.
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tacno. da ne poverujes da nesto tako moze da se desi. ciste gluposti.........................u koje ni tada najveci deo srpskog naroda nije poverovao. nisam ni ja.
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Libyan biological warfare
Libya acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention [clinic] in 1982. But Libya never filed a confidence-building data with the Declaration of the United Nations.
Although Libya is believed to have had a biological weapons program for many years, it remains in the early stages of research and development, primarily because Libya does not have adequate scientific and technical base. The program also suffers from difficulties Libya foreign acquisition of necessary equipment and technical expertise, in part because of the current UN sanctions. However, Libya is trying to develop local capability and be able to produce laboratory quantities of agent. Given the overall constraints of the program, it is unlikely that Libya will be able to transition from laboratory work on the production of militarily useful quantities of biological warfare agent until well after the turn of the century.
U.S. believes that Libya has continued its biological warfare program. Although the program is in research and development stage, Libya may be able to produce small quantities of biological agents. Libya BV program has been hindered, in part, a poor country scientific and technological base, equipment shortages, and lack of skilled staff, as well as UN sanctions in place from 1992 to 1999.
Libya's biological weapons may be in the center of General Health laboratory, medical facility in the Tripoli area. reportedly has been updated with Iraqi help, as well as former employees of South African scientists. Unconfirmed reports suggest that in 1997 about a dozen Iraqi BW experts arrived in Libya to help the development of BU complex under the guise of medical facility called General Health Laboratories. Secret program code named "Ibn Haian," he said aims to produce bombs and warheads filled with anthrax and botulinum toxin [in the 9th century, Jabir ibn Haian established chemistry as an experimental science.] The number of organizations, including universities and laboratories attached to the ministries of agriculture and health, were engaged in a seemingly innocent purchase of dual-use diagnostic and laboratory materials.
On 19 December 2003 Libya agreed to destroy all its chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons. Notice surprise after nine months of secret talks between Libyan, American and British officials. Libya has agreed to abide by biological weapons, and that emergency inspections and monitoring.
A team of U.S. and British intelligence officers spent about two weeks of Libya in October and again in December 2003. During the visit, the team of American and British inspectors went to 10 sites related to Libya's nuclear efforts, chemical stockpiles and missile program [other accounts suggested that the team was taken dozens of sites], but it seems that no biological weapons facilities visited. U.S. and UK experts called that Libya has not found specific evidence of existing biological weapons effort. The team received access to medical and pharmacological scientists and facilities, and the Libyans were tested on the equipment and research that could be applied to biological warfare, but the Libyans denied that BU program has ever existed.
Libya acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention [clinic] in 1982. But Libya never filed a confidence-building data with the Declaration of the United Nations.
Although Libya is believed to have had a biological weapons program for many years, it remains in the early stages of research and development, primarily because Libya does not have adequate scientific and technical base. The program also suffers from difficulties Libya foreign acquisition of necessary equipment and technical expertise, in part because of the current UN sanctions. However, Libya is trying to develop local capability and be able to produce laboratory quantities of agent. Given the overall constraints of the program, it is unlikely that Libya will be able to transition from laboratory work on the production of militarily useful quantities of biological warfare agent until well after the turn of the century.
U.S. believes that Libya has continued its biological warfare program. Although the program is in research and development stage, Libya may be able to produce small quantities of biological agents. Libya BV program has been hindered, in part, a poor country scientific and technological base, equipment shortages, and lack of skilled staff, as well as UN sanctions in place from 1992 to 1999.
Libya's biological weapons may be in the center of General Health laboratory, medical facility in the Tripoli area. reportedly has been updated with Iraqi help, as well as former employees of South African scientists. Unconfirmed reports suggest that in 1997 about a dozen Iraqi BW experts arrived in Libya to help the development of BU complex under the guise of medical facility called General Health Laboratories. Secret program code named "Ibn Haian," he said aims to produce bombs and warheads filled with anthrax and botulinum toxin [in the 9th century, Jabir ibn Haian established chemistry as an experimental science.] The number of organizations, including universities and laboratories attached to the ministries of agriculture and health, were engaged in a seemingly innocent purchase of dual-use diagnostic and laboratory materials.
On 19 December 2003 Libya agreed to destroy all its chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons. Notice surprise after nine months of secret talks between Libyan, American and British officials. Libya has agreed to abide by biological weapons, and that emergency inspections and monitoring.
A team of U.S. and British intelligence officers spent about two weeks of Libya in October and again in December 2003. During the visit, the team of American and British inspectors went to 10 sites related to Libya's nuclear efforts, chemical stockpiles and missile program [other accounts suggested that the team was taken dozens of sites], but it seems that no biological weapons facilities visited. U.S. and UK experts called that Libya has not found specific evidence of existing biological weapons effort. The team received access to medical and pharmacological scientists and facilities, and the Libyans were tested on the equipment and research that could be applied to biological warfare, but the Libyans denied that BU program has ever existed.
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Libyan Nuclear Weapons
Tripoli joined the IAEA 1963rd At one point, some observers have been classified among the most dangerous countries of Libya from the standpoint of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. However, in recent years, concerns about Libyan nuclear ambitions have faded, although fears about Libyan chemical weapons efforts remain very much alive. Libya is in a position to gain access to nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future, given the very limited domestic technical base in the country.
Over the years, the Libyan nuclear program, progress has suffered from mismanagement, lack of spare parts, as well as the reluctance of foreign suppliers to provide assistance, particularly from the UN embargo in force in 1992. However, Kadhafi has not abandoned its goal of acquiring nuclear weapons. He continued to try to develop nuclear weapons Libyan infrastructure. Despite the 25-year effort to acquire or develop nuclear weapons, Libya's nuclear program is still in embryonic stage. Prior to 2003, the U.S. intelligence community estimates that Libya has weapons deployable by 2007. Subsequent reviews have since disproved that belief. succeeded in providing some training students and technicians and the establishment of a nuclear research center, which includes a small nuclear research reactors in IAEA protection. This facility, located in Tajur, southeast of Tripoli, has provided the former Soviet Union. Since it is unlikely to produce Tripoli weapons without significant and sustained foreign technical assistance, Kadhafi allegedly attempted to recruit nuclear scientists to assist in the development of nuclear weapons.
Tripoli joined the IAEA 1963rd At one point, some observers have been classified among the most dangerous countries of Libya from the standpoint of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. However, in recent years, concerns about Libyan nuclear ambitions have faded, although fears about Libyan chemical weapons efforts remain very much alive. Libya is in a position to gain access to nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future, given the very limited domestic technical base in the country.
Over the years, the Libyan nuclear program, progress has suffered from mismanagement, lack of spare parts, as well as the reluctance of foreign suppliers to provide assistance, particularly from the UN embargo in force in 1992. However, Kadhafi has not abandoned its goal of acquiring nuclear weapons. He continued to try to develop nuclear weapons Libyan infrastructure. Despite the 25-year effort to acquire or develop nuclear weapons, Libya's nuclear program is still in embryonic stage. Prior to 2003, the U.S. intelligence community estimates that Libya has weapons deployable by 2007. Subsequent reviews have since disproved that belief. succeeded in providing some training students and technicians and the establishment of a nuclear research center, which includes a small nuclear research reactors in IAEA protection. This facility, located in Tajur, southeast of Tripoli, has provided the former Soviet Union. Since it is unlikely to produce Tripoli weapons without significant and sustained foreign technical assistance, Kadhafi allegedly attempted to recruit nuclear scientists to assist in the development of nuclear weapons.
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Kadhafi stance on nuclear weapons is contradictory. Unconfirmed but persistent press begins shortly after the revolution in 1969 indicate that Libya wants to buy nuclear weapons or components for such devices. According to one report, Kadhafi sent his deputy, Jallud, to Beijing in an unsuccessful attempt to buy tactical nuclear weapons. Kadhafi has expressed concern over Israel's nuclear capability and publicly expressed his desire to obtain nuclear weapons. However, in Libya in 1975 reaffirmed its commitment to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, originally signed by the monarchy 1968th Kadhafi also said in interviews in 1981 and 1984 that Libya was only interested in peaceful use of nuclear energy, and he scoffed at the idea of "Islamic bomb."
In 1975, Libya has ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed by Idris regime in 1968. In 1980, an agreement was reached with the International Atomic Energy Agency placing all nuclear facilities under international inspection of Libya. Despite these steps, mid and late 1970s, Kadhafi times declared his country's determination to acquire nuclear weapons, primarily because he was convinced that his greatest enemy, Israel, which has achieved a military capacity.
No doubt, however, that Libya has taken extensive bilateral negotiations to secure nuclear facilities for research and power plants, and many Libyan students in the field of nuclear energy have been sent to the U.S., Western and Eastern European universities on the study. Under the terms of the contract in 1974 nuclear cooperation with Argentina, Libya provided with equipment and technical training. Argentina agreed to send a senior geologist in Libya to advise on uranium exploration and uranium enrichment. One of the alleged reasons Aouzou Strip occupied Libya in Chad in 1975 was that the area was considered rich in uranium deposits. When inspections began after the December 2003 Kuadafi the decision to disarm, it was determined that Libya has given "yellow cake" from Nigeria in 1978, and U.S. intelligence has long believed. Libya and India agreed in July 1978 to cooperate in peaceful use of nuclear energy, according to India's "atoms for peace" policy. France agreed in 1976 to build a nuclear power plant in Libya, research designed to power water desalination plant.
In 1975, Libya has ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed by Idris regime in 1968. In 1980, an agreement was reached with the International Atomic Energy Agency placing all nuclear facilities under international inspection of Libya. Despite these steps, mid and late 1970s, Kadhafi times declared his country's determination to acquire nuclear weapons, primarily because he was convinced that his greatest enemy, Israel, which has achieved a military capacity.
No doubt, however, that Libya has taken extensive bilateral negotiations to secure nuclear facilities for research and power plants, and many Libyan students in the field of nuclear energy have been sent to the U.S., Western and Eastern European universities on the study. Under the terms of the contract in 1974 nuclear cooperation with Argentina, Libya provided with equipment and technical training. Argentina agreed to send a senior geologist in Libya to advise on uranium exploration and uranium enrichment. One of the alleged reasons Aouzou Strip occupied Libya in Chad in 1975 was that the area was considered rich in uranium deposits. When inspections began after the December 2003 Kuadafi the decision to disarm, it was determined that Libya has given "yellow cake" from Nigeria in 1978, and U.S. intelligence has long believed. Libya and India agreed in July 1978 to cooperate in peaceful use of nuclear energy, according to India's "atoms for peace" policy. France agreed in 1976 to build a nuclear power plant in Libya, research designed to power water desalination plant.
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