Against the wall
Zainteresovan član
- Poruka
- 224
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U uvodnom clanku pariskog “Le Monde” (Svijeta) od 12. juna 1946. godine, sa naslovom “Sudjenje generalu Mihailovicu”, napisano je ovo:
“Proslog ponedjeljka u Beogradu je poceo sudski proces generalu Jugoslovenske vojske Mihailovicu, veliki proces ciji se tok prati sa velikim interesovanjem ne samo u cijeloj Jugoslaviji vec svuda skoro u svijetu. Sve to ipak ne moze da izbrise divne stranice herojizma, koje su sopstvenom krvlju ispisali cetnici. I Saveznici su priznali da je cetnicko dejstvo odlozilo dolazak nemackog pojacanja i tako imalo vaznu ulogu u uspjesima na Africkom frontu. O tome svjedoce poruke koje su slali generali Okinlek, Ajzenhauer i drugi. General Mihailovic je cak odlikovan Ordenom ratnog krsta sa palmom 2. februara 1943. od strane generala De Gola. Zatim, cetnici su spasli stotine saveznickih avijaticara. I, najzad, mogu se smatrati oslobodiocima velikog dijela Srbije”........17…
Haski list “De Nieuwe Eeuw” (Novi vijek), u broju od 16. juna 1946. godine, u clanku sa naslovom Sud ili pozoriste, pored ostalog komentarisao je ovako:
“Tito i njegove pristase optuzile su jugoslovenskog borca za oslobodjenje Mihailovica za izdaju i sada on u Beogradu ocekuje presudu. Jednostavno saopstenje iza kojeg se, zapravo, skriva radnja drame klasicnog stila… Sudjenje u Beogradu je naravno mnogo vise od sudjenja u pravnom smislu. To je prijeki sud jugoslovenskom nacionalizmu, olicenom u liku Mihailovica, i jacanje sovjetskog uticaja u balkanskim zemljama”…18
........Monday, Jun. 24, 1946
YUGOSLAVIA: Too Tired
"When I am too tired," said Draja Mihailovich, "I say yes."
Last week, in the stifling summer heat of a makeshift courtroom outside Belgrade, the onetime hero of
Yugoslav resistance was very tired. Prison-pale and peering myopically through his thick-lensed glasses, he
tried wearily to turn aside the charges of his Partisan accusers. Seven hours a day, for three days, fortified
by a breakfast of rum and tea, the bushy-bearded Chetnik answered their hammering questions and
returned to his cell for a dinner of ham & cabbage, topped off by tall schooners of beer. But neither rum nor
beer nor the efforts of two of Yugoslavia's best defense lawyers could lift his pessimism. "I wish you
wouldn't torture me with rhetoric," Mihailovich begged the court. "I am a soldier too weary to remember."
Time & again all that he could say was "I don't know" or "I'm not sure."
For three days he sought refuge in scapegoats. He said his aides and subordinates, over whom he had had
no control, had collaborated with the Nazis and received money from the Italians. "With Serbs it is not rare
if every man carries out his own policy," said Mihailovich. But by the fourth day he was too tired. "You
collaborated with the enemy. Is that right?" asked the prosecutor. Mihailovich hung his head and
whispered, "Yes, that is right."
Good Intentions. A low, satisfied murmur swept the crowded, orderly courtroom. But for the rest of the
world the truth was not so easy to distill out of the steaming cauldron of hatred, feuds and rivalries that was
Yugoslavia when Hitler struck. To millions outside who remembered his early heroism, his rescue of U.S.
and British flyers, it was hard to believe Mihailovich a traitor. What, then, was he guilty of?
Conservative, Communist-hating Draja Mihailovich had been the one representative of the Serbian ruling
class strong enough to fight back against Yugoslavia's Nazi invader. But when Hitler turned his guns against
Soviet Russia, Josip Broz, the Communist toolmaker who called himself "Tito," appeared on the scene. To
Mihailovich, the exiled government's official military leader, Tito may have seemed no more than a
rabble-rouser leading a pack of bandits. Mihailovich clearly felt it his duty to unify Yugoslav resistance under his
leadership and to hold his forces in readiness for the day when the Allies struck at the Germans from outside the
country. But Mihailovich failed to liquidate Tito, whose power waxed as the Serb's waned.
As the day approached for Allied invasion, Britain and the U.S. looked in vain to Mihailovich for a unified
resistance. By 1944, wrote British former liaison officer Fitzroy MacLean last week, Tito "was carrying out a
widespread and effective resistance to the Germans, and Mihailovich, however good his intentions, was not. In
those days the military effectiveness of our allies was a far more important consideration than their political
complexion."
When the U.S. and Britain threw their support to Tito, Mihailovich, too weak or too weary to control his
subordinates, turned more & more toward collaboration. His major crime—unpardonable in war and
politics—was failure. "Partisan troops," said Draja Mihailovich last week, "turned out better than I expected."
Find this article at:
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,852848,00.html
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Najljigaviji fasisticki sljam.


IZVORI za sve navedeno
1. Sluzbene novine Kraljevine Jugoslavije, br. 7, 18. jun 1942.
2. Isto, br. 8, 8. avgust 1942.
3. PRO, telegram komandanta jugoslovenskih trupa na Bliskom Istoku, br.
1231. od 16. avgusta 1942.
4. Sluzbene novine Kraljevine Jugoslavije, br. 10,24. novembar 1942.
5. PRO, radiogram Ziroa Mihailovicu od 11. novembra 1942.
6. isto, radiogram Bruka Mihailovicu od 1. decembra 1942.
7. isto, radiogram Velsa Mihailovicu od 4. januara 1943.
8. isto, radiogram Ajzenhauera Mihailovicu od 13. januara 1943.
9. isto, pohvalna Naredba De Gola za sve francuske suvozemne, pomorske vazduhoplovne jedinice od 2. februara 1943.
10. isto, str. pov. 37. od 9. februara 1943.
11. isto, str. pov. 55. od 16. marta 1943.
12. State Depatment Admits Award to World War II yugoslav Hero General Mihailovich.
13. Time and Tide, 15 Mey 1942, 2.
14. PRO, FO 371/37587, bp. 52.
15. Albert Seitz, Mihailovic: Hoax or Hero?, Columbs, 1953, 128.
16. NAW, SD, RG. 226, 38328.
17. Comittete for a Fair Trial for Draja Mihailovich, Report of Commision of Inqiry, New York, 1946,the record from hearing of Walter Mansfield from 15. May.
18. isto, the rceord from hearing of George Musilin from 16. May.
19. isto, the record from heraing of John P.Devlin from 16. May.
20. isto, the record from hearing of Ellswort Kramer from 17. May.
21. isto, the writing statement given on July, 10 th, Robert H. McDowell.
22. New York Herald Tribune, May, 14, 1946, 2.
23. Ocland Post Enquirerer, March 27, 1946, 3.
24. New York Journal-American, March 31, 1946, 2.
25. Congresional Record, May 2, 1946, remarks of Senator W. Lee O’Daniel bp. 4320
..noz je uglavnom imao svrhu prigusivaca na vatrenom oruzju, o tome svedoci i americki porucnik Kramer, u slucaju oslobodjenja Krusevca od strane cetnika Draze Mihailovica....
......
Specijalni izvjestac londonskog lista “The Times” (Vrijeme), za broj od 12. jula 1946. godine, o zavrsnoj Mihailovicevoj rijeci na kraju sudjenja je rekao: “On nije govorio govornickim tonom; niti sa ukorijenjenom mrznjom prema politickim protivnicima ili privatnim neprijateljima. Govorio je lucidno i podrobno. Bio je to profesionalni vojnik koji podnosi vojnicki izvjestaj, koji je osvajao svojom jednostavnoscu. On se cijelim tokom odnosio s postovanjem prema sudu ne obaziruci se na gomilu u sudnici, koja je najednom zaboravila da zvizdi i slusala u potpunoj tisini.”
,,,,,,,,,, As regards connections with neighbouring countries,
I had already organized from Serbia a joint action with the neighbouring
countries.
I had connections with Bulgaria, a country which I know very
well. The indictment cites my contact with Damj an Velcev nd Ginovski
against me, regarding it as representing a struggle against the
communists,
I had contact with Gemet. I tried to form a secret committee
of Bulgars and Serbs for action against the Germans. These contacts
were maintained through Ika Panic and General Draskic, but the
project miscarried, for Ika Panic diid not want to carry it through.
I founded a committee from Gemet's group, headed by Srbakov.
Through Grozni, a reserve officer who fled from Bulgaria to
join me, I organized propaganda against Boris. I established
contact with Colonel Ivanov. I knew that he belonged to the Military
League. I wrote a letter to Velcev, My whole aim with regard to
Bulgaria, was to turn Bulgaria against the Coburgs. I established
contacts through the Bulgarian Military League and through the followers
of Protogerov. I informed the Government in London of these
contacts.
I established contact with Zervas. But the British did not permit
this contact to be maintained. I sent Captain Mihailo Vemid to Greece.
He went, but did not succeed in reporting to me. My intention was to
create a union in the Balkans, which would be joined by Greece, Bulgaria
and Albania. I considered that it was a sound idea, -although It
woiuld be difficult to realize it today. Small states can, by uniting,
create a greater -state commonwealth, more capable of the struggle
for existence. I did not succeed with Zervas.
Contact with Gani-Bej Crnoglavifi. He wrote to me, but my
corips commander, 2ika Markovid, who was conducting a policy of
antagonism toward the Albanians, censored my letters, and prevented
their delivery.
Contact with Pren Pajo, leader of Northern Albania, was in my
interest, but the Albanians desired to annex certain parts of Yugoslavia
and Montenegro. My letter to Sarkovic shows my desire that
the fighting between the Serbs and Moslems should stop. I did not
consider that a Partisan movement was possible in Albania.
The Government instructed me to work, in cooperation with
the British Mission, on establishing this contact also. I remember
that it wais made possible for me to send to Ro-umania Captain Kornelije
Filiipovic of the airforce, whom I instructed to establish contact
with Maniu. But he went to Bucharest and established contact with
the Iron Guard, and not with Maniu; he did this in order that he
might stay in that country as an agent. I again ordered him to establish
contact with M,aniu. From the investigation material I see that
contact was established with a representative of the Roumanian General
Staff. Piletic was frustrating these attempts; he wanted to
utilize this contact for local purposes. In due time a message came
from Roiumania offerring me help in arms, and 'asking me to come
to agreement with Nedic. This agent forged a letter about my agreement
with Nedic. I consider all this :a game played by agents. I
wanted contact with Maniu. I was acquainted with the Roumanian
losses at the Eastern Front, which had caused dissatisfaction in that
country. I remember sending detachments into Roumania. I know that
the Serbian population, especially round Turn Severin, was for us.
I informed the Government and the British Mission of all this. We
even had a special code, 707.
Contact with Hungary was also established at the order of
the Government My agent was Captain Urosevic. The Hungarians
sought contact with me through Turkey, but they were told there to
seek contact here, on the terrain. General Ujszaszy told Urosevic to
establish contact with me. That contact was established and I sent
Urosevic to Budapest. He discharged his role there very well. The
Hungarians communicated through him that they were preparing
action against the Germans, but that at present they had to wait for
an opportunity. They requested me not to undertake any reprisals
in Backa. They set up false trials, after which they allowed the condemned
to flee. Urosevic masked his position well. He observed their
work. The chief British channel for Poland was also in Budapest. And
there also was my link with Macek. My contact with Mafiek, or
rather Zagreb, was through Budapest. A group of Macek's men, who
had fled from Pavelic, was in Budapest. Torza, an agent of the British
Intelligence Service, was there, and he wished to join my staff. Torza
even promised to establish contact between me and Maniu. The Hungarians
promised to send me supplies secretly by ship from the Ger-
. mans. It was clear to me that this was not a German but a Hungarian
action. And they -said that later they would' send me 'material secretly
to Bulgaria in a railway truck That proved that there existed a
secret link which was being hidden from me. UroSevic then left
Budapest for Backa to carry out the organization. He sent me some
French officers and N.C.O-'S. I sent them to Cairo. He also attempted
once to send us material through the Red Cross. The Germans then
entered Hungary, and arrested Ujszaszy, and I lost contact with Urosevid.
I think that the Government and the British Mission were informed
of this.
Those were my connections with the neighbouring countries.
I was representative of the government in the country. I
received messages though delegates. The government was in a position
to know what was happening in the country. The Western Powers
had their men with me. Hudson came with a message, then Bailey
came with a message, and then there was the report of Voja Luka-
2eviid and the work of McDowell. All this influenced my whole work
and attitude.
I found myself in a whirl of events and intrigues. I found myself
in a whirl of events and strivings. I was confronted with the aims and
tendencies of my own goverment. I was surrounded with all possible^
inteligence services, the British Intelligence Service, the Gestapo and
all the intelligence services of the world.
Destiny was merciless towards me when it threw me into the
most difficult whirlwinds. I wanted much, I began much, but the
whirlwind, the world whirlwind, carried me and my work away.
I beg the Court to judge my statements justly.
ocigledno me nisi razumeo...mozda sam trebao da napisem ulogu prigusivaca...nema neikakve veze sa puskom ili stavljanja na pusku, vec sam hteo da kazem da se koristio kada je trebalo izbeci zvuk pucnja...nista posebno...
slika ima svoje ime....Dakle ko je na slici, kad i gde?
Kako mislis da dokazes da su na slici cetnici Draze Mihailovica...ja kazem da su na slici partizani hrvati....ne vidim nikakve oznake, a zar cetnici nisu masni i bradati, ovo bre neki sredjeni momci...
Cetnici su klali ....
Ne postoji ni jedna slika na kojoj cetnici kolju, dakle da se ne radi o vojnickoj sali nego o stvarnom klanju....
:

koja ej poenta tvog pitanja i postavljanja ove slike![]()
Poenta je da su cetnici bili IZDAJNICI.
Ako ne verujes, pogledaj donju sliku, a ako zelis, naci cu ja tebi JOS takvih slika..:
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Joj, postavljate slike, a nemate pojma o čemu se radi.....
Dakle, četnici nisu bili izdajnici kao Ljotićevci lii Nedićevci, ili ustaše......
Gore navedeni su bili saradnici okupatora od prvog dana rata. A četnici, prvo samo neki odredi su stupili u vezu sa Nemcima, a zašto? Prvo, moralo se boriti protiv jednog po jednog neprijatelja, drugo Nemci su bili suviše jaki za veće akcije, treće napadi na Nemce bi izazvali odmazde, četvrto od Nemaca se izvlačila municija, peto komunisti su prvi započeli građanski rat, te četnici nisu imali snage, ljudi, i oružja za borbu protiv svih. Sa ustašama su se tuklu svuda, sporazume koje navodite su potpisali sa domobranima, i vlastima NDH, a i tim sporazumima je narod zaštićen od pokolja.
Koliko su partizani vodili brigu o narodu govori dovoljno Kozara. E, Drenović i Radić su spašavali narod, a ne kao partizani na Kozari vodili ga u propast.
I da, ako su neki odredi bili sa Nemcima u nekoj vezi, oni nisu ratovali za Nemačke ciljeve već za svoje, i nisu bili pod nemačkom komandom.
To je samo iskorištavanje jednog neprijatelja, ili neutralizacija jednog dok se obračuna sa drugim..... A i trebalo je spašavati narod, a ne vodiit glupavu revoluciju.
A četnici, prvo samo neki odredi su stupili u vezu sa Nemcima, a zašto? Prvo, moralo se boriti protiv jednog po jednog neprijatelja, drugo Nemci su bili suviše jaki za veće akcije, treće napadi na Nemce bi izazvali odmazde, četvrto od Nemaca se izvlačila municija, peto komunisti su prvi započeli građanski rat, te četnici nisu imali snage, ljudi, i oružja za borbu protiv svih.
Sa ustašama su se tuklu svuda,

Da, da, lakse je bilo UBIJATI SRBE levicare nego Nemce...
Svaka cast na logici!
Evo OVAKO su se tukli sa ustasama:
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Nemas koje poravdanje zasto nikada nisu napali Jasenovac?
To su prepustili partizanima?
dosta dugo se probavam držati vvan ovih prepucavanja, ali ovoliko gluposti na jednom mjestu traži neki odgovor:
Ad Prvo: svi su se morali boriti protiv jednog po jednog neprijatelja, jer i npr. partizani su imali sve protiv sebe, ako ne računamo onaj kratkotrajni savez sa Mihailovićem
Ad Drugo: Njemci su bili jednako snažni za sve, a ne samo za četnike (vidi odgovor za Prvo)
Ad Treće: izvan Srbije (kao okupacijske zone) nije bilo pravila za odmazdu, pa se baš nešto nisu proslavili ti tvoji četnici??
Ad Četvrto: znači, teorija o "legalizovanim" kod Njemaca i njihovih suradnika je sasvim opravdana? Naravno da nije - a sad ti možeš na šest strana obrazložiti i to ne znači baš ništa!
Ad Peto: A kao komunisti su imali ljudi, oružja i opreme za borbu kad su započeli rat? Pa ne znam tko je baštinio uniformu, opremu i tradiciju Vojske Kraljevine - partizani ili JVuO???
Ad ostale gluposti: Drenović spašavao narod??? Drenović je pokušao samo spasiti svoju kožu, a da iša o tome znaš ne bi ovako lupao!!!!
I još: .. nisu sporazum potpisali sa ustašama, nego sa domobranima i tzv. NDH??? pa koji si ti lik????!!!!
I za kraj: .. neki su odredi bili u kontaktu sa Njemcima, ali nisu ratovali za njihove ciljeve??? elem, što reći, nego.... SAPIENTI SAT!!
Pavle ti je rekao istinu, Njemci su bili prejaki za vece akcije, samo sto to nije smetalo partizanima da ih na kraju savladaju, i ne samo njih vec i sve ostale.
Jedni su se drzali one "bolje grob nego rob", a drugi one "koga ne mozes pobijediti pridruzi im se", jedino je "nejasno" kako su to ustase mogle biti prejake pa da se cetnici i njima pridruze? I onda isti ti prigovaraju partizanima zasto nisu oslobodilio Jasenovac? Pa naravno, ko nema nimalo ljudskosti za vrijeme rata nece ga imati ni poslije, zar ne?

, kao vrhunac reci da su partizani savladali Nemce 

......usput naravno preskociti parolu ''Sloboda ili smrt''......