Patata Caliente
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https://www.politico.eu/article/nord-stream-2-gas-energy-prices-europe-germany-russia-gazprom/amp/
The International Energy Agency confirms that gas storage levels in Europe are currently well below their five-year average — but this is mainly the case for Gazprom’s storages. As a main supplier to the European Union, Gazprom has market power and isn’t shy of exercising it. The Russian exporter has been supplying less gas and has not been filling its storages to achieve adequate levels before heating season. It has also limited capacity bookings on the Yamal and Brotherhood pipelines, which have always transported gas from the East, and reduced gas volumes on spot markets.
Kremlin’s spokesperson has openly stated that quick regulatory approval of Nord Stream 2 and its operation would reduce gas prices — the pressure is barely covert. Particularly given that even without Nord Stream 2, there is more available gas transport capacity from Russia to Europe than could ever be needed.
Europe has previously experienced gas crises in 2009 and 2014. And both times, Russia limited gas supplies to politically pressure Ukraine, putting European economies at significant risk. While the EU mainly remembers these two events, however, Poland has experienced seven gas supply disruptions since 2004. We know that Gazprom is not willing to play along with the EU’s gas market rules and has a history of abusing its dominant position.
In 2015, the European Commission had already prepared an extensive Statement of Objections, identifying Gazprom’s breaches of competition rules, which undermined the EU gas market. Regrettably, in practice, the agreed commitments between the Commission and Gazprom did not lead to improvements in the functioning of the market. Since then, however, arbitration tribunals have confirmed the Commission’s findings on the excessiveness of Gazprom’s prices, requiring it to repay $1.5 billion to our Polish oil and gas company PGNiG and $2.9 billion to Ukraine’s Naftogaz.
This clearly shows that non-market pricing had — and still has — an important role in Gazprom’s toolbox. Given its track record and the way the pipeline is being used even before it is operational, Nord Stream 2 will only offer additional instruments to exert pressure. And as rightly stated by Poland’s late President Lech Kaczyński in the beginning of Russian aggression in Georgia in 2008, this will undermine the security of Ukraine, the Baltic states and the whole Europe.
Dakle kao sto vidimo, Gasprom je manipulacijama poremetio trziste i vestacki stvorio krizu, a osim Evropljana, i Srpska sirotinja mora da placa zadnju crkavicu jer zavisi od tog gasa, ako je i ima, da napuni dzep rusolopovima
Moramo pojacati sankcije Rusima dok ne otplate sve pare nazad drugim kanalima. I kamatu.
https://www.politico.eu/article/nord-stream-2-gas-energy-prices-europe-germany-russia-gazprom/amp/
The International Energy Agency confirms that gas storage levels in Europe are currently well below their five-year average — but this is mainly the case for Gazprom’s storages. As a main supplier to the European Union, Gazprom has market power and isn’t shy of exercising it. The Russian exporter has been supplying less gas and has not been filling its storages to achieve adequate levels before heating season. It has also limited capacity bookings on the Yamal and Brotherhood pipelines, which have always transported gas from the East, and reduced gas volumes on spot markets.
Kremlin’s spokesperson has openly stated that quick regulatory approval of Nord Stream 2 and its operation would reduce gas prices — the pressure is barely covert. Particularly given that even without Nord Stream 2, there is more available gas transport capacity from Russia to Europe than could ever be needed.
Europe has previously experienced gas crises in 2009 and 2014. And both times, Russia limited gas supplies to politically pressure Ukraine, putting European economies at significant risk. While the EU mainly remembers these two events, however, Poland has experienced seven gas supply disruptions since 2004. We know that Gazprom is not willing to play along with the EU’s gas market rules and has a history of abusing its dominant position.
In 2015, the European Commission had already prepared an extensive Statement of Objections, identifying Gazprom’s breaches of competition rules, which undermined the EU gas market. Regrettably, in practice, the agreed commitments between the Commission and Gazprom did not lead to improvements in the functioning of the market. Since then, however, arbitration tribunals have confirmed the Commission’s findings on the excessiveness of Gazprom’s prices, requiring it to repay $1.5 billion to our Polish oil and gas company PGNiG and $2.9 billion to Ukraine’s Naftogaz.
This clearly shows that non-market pricing had — and still has — an important role in Gazprom’s toolbox. Given its track record and the way the pipeline is being used even before it is operational, Nord Stream 2 will only offer additional instruments to exert pressure. And as rightly stated by Poland’s late President Lech Kaczyński in the beginning of Russian aggression in Georgia in 2008, this will undermine the security of Ukraine, the Baltic states and the whole Europe.
Dakle kao sto vidimo, Gasprom je manipulacijama poremetio trziste i vestacki stvorio krizu, a osim Evropljana, i Srpska sirotinja mora da placa zadnju crkavicu jer zavisi od tog gasa, ako je i ima, da napuni dzep rusolopovima
Moramo pojacati sankcije Rusima dok ne otplate sve pare nazad drugim kanalima. I kamatu.
