This lead to a marked improvement of situation >”Entspannung”< in
the Old Serbia around the new year.
KTB OKW,b.7/I,p.637
Quote:
…Possibly under impression made by these German countermeasures,
Mihailovic-this time personaly-tried to make conntact with
German posts,at the end of March-beggining of April. According to the
information the Sp.envoy had,Mihailovic was faced with an ultimatum
by the exile-government and the Soviets,in which his subordination to
Tito was demanded.Sp. envoy was expecting that Mihailovic,faced
with unacceptable requests,would try to approach Nedic,i.e. the
occupation forces. In agreement with Sp.envoy Neubacher, OB Südost
showed no interest for a new round of negotiations,mostly because of
what was in the background: Uncertainty toward the Allies,recognition
of inferiority to Tito and the unsettled relation to the Nedic´s
government.
KTB OKW,b.7/I,p.640-641
Quote:
…So,the operation got bigger and more important for both sides;and a
new factor has arrisen,namely the involvement of Serbian
chetniks.They formed a strong battle group,allegedly under the
command of Mihailovic himself,and went into combat against the
“eastern group” of the Communist forces which were advancing from
Dreiländer-Ecke >Bosnia,Montenegro,Sandzak< to the north-west.
(Lagebuch 29.4.).
KTB OKW,b.7/I,p.651
Quote:
…The Führer approved of the plan,although it would cause new wave
of unrest and would make troubles to the German leadership in the
South-east, which was employing more and more Orthodox-chetnik
groups and had good experience with them.
KTB OKW,b.7/I,p.703
Quote:
During the month of May, the action of Djurisic in Montenegro which
had made a promising start,took a sharp turn;at the middle of the month
it had to be considered as a failure.According to the report made by the
representative of the Foreign ministry in Cetinje,and related by OB
Südost, several things stood in the way of succeseful usage of still
strong domestic forces (including the chetniks) against the
communists: absence of a definite goal,minimum of material support
and the most important: the lack of a clear military leadership;the
domestic groups were split in divisonal commandos,the
Feldkommandatur and the police.
KTB OKW,b.7/I,p.708
Quote:
During the defense against the incursion of the Red divisions in
March,April and May,Serbian units proved themselves well, notably
the Serbisches Freiwilligen Korps but also more or less illegal groups
of Chetniks,allegedly under the personal command of Mihailovic.
KTB OKW,b,7/I,p.706
Quote:
The Serbian Chetniks and Draza Mihailovic,who (along from Ustasha
and EDES) were the only serious anti-communist movement in the
South-east,were biding their time during the summer and were
occasionaly willing to negotiate. Tense situation existed in their
relations to Nedic government,whose power grew stronger (connected
to the strengthening of SFK).In order to make the recruitment
harder,they took reprisals against the inhabitants.OB South-east,in this
context hinted again at the Dr. Neubacher’s propostion on
strengthening the Nedic government. However,as the Allied offensive
was opened,as the Turkey changed sides,as Bulgaria changed it’s
attitude and as Tito’s forces appeared to be endangering the German
positions n the South-east,Mihailovic and Nedic started to approach
each other and to seek contacts with the Germans.This fact had a
thoroughgoing meaning. Up until now the German leadship thought
that in a moment when the occupation force gets into trouble,all the
uprising movements would join hands and call for a general
uprising.Now it showed that-quoted in the OB order dated 2nd of
August-“Draza Mihailovic,as well as leaders of all other bands believe
that (on the basis of a general situation) the invader is the Enemy nr.2;
Enemy nr.1 became Communism at home and abroad.”
On August 17th (OB message of August 20th) Nedic offered the
unification of all Serbian forces for the defense of communistendangered
Serbdom.He underlined that he was officialy speaking for
Mihailovic too,after the meeting they had.He asked for a immediate
shippment of 3 million small-arms rounds and a approval for creating
of a 50,000 strong Serbian army made mostly of Mihailovic’s units. OB
South-east,after consulting with Mil.Bef. Suedsot,quickly reached a
conclusion that a turning down this offer meant antagonising all of the
Serbs,new Tito’s succeses,cuting all the comunications (especially to
Greece) and to the stopping of economical exploitation.
KTB OKW,b,7/I,p.709
Quote:
During the visit to the FHQ on August 22nd,GFM v. Weichs pointed
out the fact that with further advance ot Tito and the awaited pull-out
of Bulgarian Occupation Corps,the situation in Serbia will grow
worse,and that the forces at hand won’t be up to it.Chetniks,who in the
period March-August lost 5,000 men fighting the communists are lately
not hostile towards the Germans….8-10,000 of them are curently
fighting the communists alongside the German forces in Southern
Serbia under German major Weyel.The Mihailovic-Nedic agreement
means unification of all Serbs and 90% support of the people…He
proposed the forming of three regiments from proven chetniks, 6,000
men in all,for which necessary weapons should be shipped and officers
sent to provide German leadership…
Quote:
…Fuehrer’s decission was relayed by teleprinter
>“Fernschriftlich“<:Only single,proven chetnik groups are to be placed
under German control and command for use in tacticaly small local
actions.
KTB OKW,b,7/I,p.710
Quote:
As Serbia quickly became eastern front of the OB Suedost,and as Titoforces
advanced from the west,the chetniks continued seeking
contections with the Germans;some even offered hostages. In the same
time,they were showing their dissapointment with small or non-existent
arms shippments…
Quote:
…At the end of September,resistance notwithstanding,chetniks were
pushed out of important parts of Serbia.Only those who stuck closely
with German forces held out. >“soweit sie sich nicht eng an die
deutsche Wehrmacht anlehnten“<
KTB OKW,b,7/I,p.711
Following lines are translated from “Das Ende auf dem Balkan” ie Operationen der
Heeresgruppe E von Griechenland bis zu den Alpen”,Kurt Vowinckel Verlag,Heidelberg
1955, by Erich Schmidt-Richberg >He was the Chieff of staff of HG “E” from 3/15/44<
Quote:
It is known that the German attitude towards the chetniks changed
several times.As Tito and the communists finaly gained the upper hand
in the Yugoslav Resistance,chetniks and Germans reached some kind
of neutrality arrangement. This arrangement was not strongly adherred
to by the chetniks;apart from that,it lead to troubles with the Croats.The
OB of HG “E” had to take a clear stand in regard to disputes between
various Yugoslav groups.The interests and mentality of the Croats
came in the first place,because the OB had to work with them in the
future. Directives on the troops had to be clear and simple. OB
reminded on their unreliability and has forbidden offical pacting with
the chetniks,as well as supporting them with arms and
ammunition.Envoys were to be sent to the OB. It was percieved that
only local arrangements with “Heimat-Cetniks” were
advantageous.These guidelines payed off.Ccourse of events from the
near past played a role in forming of the attitude of the OB. Not so long
time ago have chetniks attacked an SS column east of Sarajevo,causing
hundred deaths. The attitude of chetniks from Ibar valley (some of
them were present near Krusevac when Col. v.d. Chevallerie was
captured) and Novipazar was unclear. The night attack on a German
company-sized (altough of weak combat strength) column on the old
Turkish road Mitrovica-Novipazar was probably made by the chetniks.
However,it is not ruled out that the attcak was made by partisans who
were sppoted around Tutin,where they promptly retreated.
p.55-56
Quote:
The leader of the chetniks ,this nationalistic Serbian resistance
movement,Draza Mihailovic was in Vares. In his name general
Trifunovic demanded the right to use the Drina crossings at
Gorazde;he was turned down. Later,a large number of his men
gradualy made it across the river.Anticipated directive of OB came
>”Es sei noch vorweggenommen dass bald der Auftrag von OB
kam…”< ,which instructed the handing out of ammunition to the
chetniks. The V.SS Corps then pointed out that the chetniks ambushed
their column,causing 100 deaths.Apart from that,own units were low
on ammunition,so the handing out was hardly possible. It was basicaly
percieved that the co-operation with this group could hardly yield any