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A mozda da pocnes citat i iz drugih izvora a ne samo iz jednog koji tebi odgovara .Ipak Srbija je demokratska zemlja
 
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Considering Stalin’s Genocides
Posted: September 21, 2010 by kenbaker in A Level History, Communism, Lenin, Russian revolution, Stalin, USSR
Tags: A Level History, Communism, History, Russia, Stalin 0
Norman M. Naimark is a Professor in Eastern European Studies at Stanford University. His latest book is “Stalin’s Genocides”.

Dmitri Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, has repeatedly pointed to the “massive crime Stalin committed against his own people,” and the fact that Russians still offer unacceptable excuses for them. Still, in anticipation of the sixty-fifth anniversary of the end of World War II on May 9, 2010, the mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov, announced that posters of Stalin would be plastered around the city as testimony to the Soviet victory in the “Great Patriotic War.” Protests by civil rights group and liberals forced Luzhkov to cancel his plans. Indeed, all over Russia, in conjunction with the sixty-fifth anniversary, there were arguments and political clashes about what to do with the figure of Stalin. Was he a hero, as most Russians continue to believe, or a criminal, as President Medvedev has asserted?

The Russians cannot be said to be engaging in the public “memory wars” of the sort that continue to roil the political landscapes of countries like Germany, Poland, and Spain. In fact, liberal opponents have criticized Medvedev’s statements because, they insist, there have been no concrete actions taken by the government to back up the president’s anti-Stalin rhetoric. The government-controlled television and radio stations, as well as the print media, do not allow an open discussion of Stalin’s crimes. At the same time, if Russians wanted unalloyed information about Stalin’s crimes, they could get it. Important scholarly studies are readily available in Russian bookstores. The one “free” Russian radio station, Ekho Moskvy (Moscow Echo) has broadcast a marvelous and lengthy series of interviews with Russian and Western specialists that openly explore diverse aspects of the history of Stalin and Stalinism in the country. For more than two decades, the Russian human rights group “Memorial” has engaged in the crucial work of collecting data and publishing materials relating to the history of Stalin’s repressions. Unfortunately, however, the products of their labors have been confined to narrow circles of interested liberals and families of victims. No attempts have been made in Russia to place perpetrators on trial; school textbooks continue to evade the issue of Stalin’s crimes; and the reputation of Stalin as a great Russian leader, if somewhat stained in some quarters, remains on the whole intact.

Certainly very few Russians or even observers in the West would accept the judgment that Stalin’s crimes of the 1930s amounted to genocide. The definition of genocide in the December 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of genocide confined the term to coordinated murderous assaults on national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups. But this was very much a politicized definition; the Soviets insisted that social and political groups be left out of the convention and the Americans and others agreed as a way to get it passed unanimously. If one includes social and political groups in the definition, the genocidal crimes of Stalin come into clearer focus.

For example, the Soviet regime openly trumpeted the “elimination of the kulaks [a group of allegedly wealthy peasants] as a class.” Tens of thousands were shot and another two million exiled to “special settlements,” where they died in the hundreds of thousands from hunger, exposure, or disease. Recent research in the former Soviet archives has demonstrated that these settlements rarely had the provisions necessary to sustain the lives of the deportees. The Soviet leadership understood that they were sending the exiles to their deaths.

Ukrainians claim, no doubt correctly, that the Ukrainian “killer famine” of 1932-1933, should be considered genocide. The lowest reasonable estimate of the number who died is some 3-5 million. Other parts of the Soviet Union suffered from famine, as well. But only in Ukraine were peasants systematically prevented by Stalin’s leadership from seeking relief in the cities and from traveling to other parts of the country to find food. Order no. 00447 of July 1937, about which we knew very little until the last decade of archival research and publishing, authorized the arrests and summary trials of close to 800,000 allegedly “socially harmful people” —”asocials”—the chronically unemployed, prostitutes, vagrants, homeless, and “former people,” ex-landlords, noblemen, tsarist government servants, and kulaks. In a shocking example of the genocidal character of Stalin’s leadership, according to quotas set in Moscow and arbitrarily raised by the police in the provinces nearly half were shot and the others exiled to special settlements, where many died in horrible conditions.

Stalin and his lieutenants also attacked nationality groups, which are traditionally considered the primary objects of genocide. Over 170,000 Koreans were exiled from the Far East region in October 1937; Soviet Poles and Germans were arrested, deported, and executed in large numbers beginning in 1934; the entire Chechen-Ingush and Crimean Tatar nations were forcibly deported from their homelands to Central Asia in 1944, which was the cause of a huge number of deaths, by some estimates up to forty percent of their total populations. In one of the best-documented cases of mass murder, Stalin and Beria ordered the execution of 22,000 Polish officers and administrative personnel in early 1940, the so-called “Katyn Forest Massacre.” During the “Great Terror” of 1937-38, the major leaders of Bolshevism were tried publicly and executed. With them tens of thousands of party and state officials, military officers, administrative personnel, and their families, friends, and alleged associates were arrested, sometimes tortured, and executed, incarcerated or exiled.

The total number of people who died “prematurely” during Stalin’s reign has been estimated at 15-20 million, meaning Stalin literally decimated the population of his own country of some 170 million. By thinking more broadly about the category of genocide and looking at Stalin’s crimes cumulatively rather than as discrete episodes, there can be little question that the Soviet leader should be held accountable for genocide. The sooner the Russian population honestly confronts this reality, the sooner the country can heal the wounds of the past and move on to a more hopeful future. Medvedev is right; there can be no excuses for the crimes Stalin committed against his own people.

NOTE: This is from http://hnn.us/articles/131242.html
 
http://katyncrime.pl/Fragments,from,Berias,note,to,Stalin,348.html


Fragments from Beria's note to Stalin

Currently, the camps of USSR's NKVD for prisoners of war and prisons of the western districts of Ukraine and Belarus hold great numbers of former officers of Polish army, former employees of Polish police and intelligence services, members of Polish nationalistic c-r [counterrevolutionary] parties, members of the counterrevolutionary insurrectionist organizations, fugitives and others.

They all are relentless enemies of the Soviet power, full of hatred for the Soviet system.
The prisoners of war, officers, and policemen staying in the camps try to continue the counterrevolutionary activity and carry on an anti-Soviet campaigning. All of them look forward to liberation only to be able to actively participate in the fight against the Soviet power. [...] Also, they detected that the detained fugitives and persons who trespassed the state borders included a considerable number of persons, members of counterrevolutionary spy and insurrectionist organizations.

March 5, 1940

Katyń. Dokumenty zbrodni, t.1, Jeńcy nie wypowiedzianej wojny. Sierpień 1939-marzec 1940, Warszawa 1995.
 
Skydancer:
Prostacino, to je fotografija iz Staljinovog Gulaga. Ako umes da koristis Google, slobodno proveri.
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Ma,ne kaki mnogo....
ti će mi kažeš?
Mrsomudiš o ozbil
jnim temama,
a nisam siguran da znaš gde si sve šuplja....
Kome bi to Rusi,kokoško,dozvolili da to snimi....?
Kome,pitam...?
Kod njih ti ne dozvoljavaju da snimaš baš sve i
kad si turista u Sankt Peterburgu....
ne laprdaj gluposti....
 
http://www.katyncrime.pl/From,a,diary,kept,by,Adam,Solski,who,was,murdered,in,Katyn,351.html

From a diary kept by Adam Solski who was murdered in Katyn

April 8, 1940

3:30 a.m. Departure from the railway station in Kozelsk in the westerly direction.

April 9, 1940

At a quarter or so to five in the morning - the rouse aboard the prison train cars and preparations to disembark. We are to travel somewhere by c[ar]. What will happen next?

Five in the morning. From dawn the beginning of the day was exceptional. Departure aboard a prison van divided into small cells (terrible!) [We] were brought to a place in the forest - something of a summer vacation spot. Here - a thorough search.. They confiscated [my] watch, which showed 6:30. They asked about my wedding band which (...). They took away the roubles, the main belt, the penknife... [here the diary ends]

J. Zawodny, Katyń (Katyn), Lublin-Paris 1989.
 
http://katyncrime.pl/The,Katyn,Massacre,517.html

The Katyn Massacre
For Poles, Katyn is a symbol of the criminal policy of the Soviet system against the Polish nation. In the Polish-Soviet relations in the years 1917-1991, Katyn is the culminating moment. The "Katyn Massacre" is a symbolic term, referring to one of the places of extermination of the Polish leading elite during the Second World War, the first to be discovered - the Katyn forest near Smolensk.

The Katyn Massacre was the secret execution by the Soviets of almost 22,000 citizens of the Polish state who - after the Red Army entered Poland on 17 September 1939 - were taken prisoner or arrested. Pursuant to a secret decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) of 5 March 1940, approximately 15,000 POWs, previously held in special NKVD camps in Kozelsk, Ostashkov and Starobilsk, and 7,000 persons interned in prisons of the western district of the Ukrainian and Belarusian republic, i.e. the eastern territories of Poland included into the Soviet Union in 1939, were killed with a shot in the back of the head.

The victims were mainly important citizens of the Polish state: officers of the Polish Army and the Police, officials of the state administration, and representatives of intellectual and cultural elites in Poland. They were buried anonymously in mass graves, in at least five places within the territory of the Soviet Union. In April-May 1940, POWs from three special NKVD camps were transported by trains to the places of execution: Katyn (from the Kozelsk camp), Kalinin (from the Ostashkov camp), from Kharkiv (Starobilsk camp). Those killed in Kalinin (currently Tver) were buried in Mednoye. Others, held in prisons and murdered there, were buried in previously undetermined places; two are known: in the Belarusian Republic and the Ukrainian Republic of the USSR (Kuropaty near Minsk and Bykivnia near Kiev).

After the outbreak of the German-Soviet war and the Polish Government-in-Exile initiating official relations with the Government of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, the Soviet authorities failed to provide Poles - despite their efforts - with any information concerning those "missing in action". The Soviet Union broke the alliance in April 1943, when the German Army stationed in the Smolensk region discovered a burial ground in the Katyn Forest and attacked the Soviet Union for propaganda purposes. Soviet authorities responded with the tactic of pinning the blame on the Germans who had allegedly murdered Poles after entering those territories in 1941. Stalin, using the pretext of "slander against the USSR", broke relations with the Polish Government-in-Exile (in London).

The "Katyn" case was one the best guarded secrets of the Kremlin during the entire USSR period. When, after the end of the Second World War, during the Nuremberg Trials, the Soviet Union failed to pin the blame for the massacre on the Germans (but at the same time managed to avoid being judged for its deeds), the Soviet authorities permanently adopted the interpretation of the "Katyn lie", in defiance of the facts: the Soviets had nothing to do with the massacre of Polish officers - German fascism is responsible for everything...

The Katyn Massacre was not an isolated event. It was the consequence of system differences, the Soviet attempt at creating a state of the world proletariat, and the growing hostility between the Soviet Russia and the pre-war Poland. When, after the end of the Polish-Bolshevik war in 1920, which was victorious for Poland, the Soviets had to give up the export of the revolution to the West for many years, and Stalin himself was criticised for his significant mistakes on the Polish front - the Soviet authorities accepted their Western neighbour to be their main enemy. During the Great Terror in the USSR in the years 1937-1938, which was aimed at pacifying the anti-Bolshevik mutiny brewing in the whole of Russia, the Soviets fought Polish groups in their territories with extreme fierceness. Over 70,000 Poles (Soviet citizens) were killed with a shot to the back of the head at that time. One in every ten victims of the Great Terror was related to Poland. The mechanism of mass exterminations was fine-tuned in the USSR then.

When in September 1939 Stalin, after entering into an alliance with Hitler, attacked Poland defending itself against the Germans, one of his aims was to permanently destroy the Polish statehood. From the very first moments of that aggression, the Soviets consistently isolated (or killed on the spot) those people whom they regarded to be representatives of the group of leaders of the state that was being destroyed, and particularly the officers. One might imagine that the Soviet authorities planned their systemic elimination in advance - just as it was planned by the Nazis in "their" part of the occupied Poland. With regard to those prisoners the Soviet did not apply the rules of international law, that is why they held on to the lie they devised with such consistency.
After the relations with Poland were severed in 1943, and after the Soviet Union took control of Poland's territory in the years 1944-1945, it controlled the subjugated country, ruled by puppet governments subordinated to the communist empire, well into the eighties. During that period, the demands for the truth about "Katyn" were treated as an act hostile not only against the USSR but also the People's Republic of Poland. This is because the post-war Poland was harnessed to the "Katyn lie".

After the system changes in the entire Soviet bloc (1989-1991), the demand for the explanation of the truth about "Katyn" also appeared on the Russian side. Many Russians helped in discovering the truth about that crime. In the years 1990-1992 the main "Katyn" documents were disclosed, including the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (b) of 5 March 1940, signed among others by Stalin. In August 1993, a group of Russian historians developed an exhaustive expert appraisal in Moscow, presenting honestly the process of the crime and the subsequent lies.

Those guilty of this crime have never been judged. Although the people who made the decision are known, as are over one hundred executioners (the list of persons rewarded for the "camp clearing" campaign was disclosed). However, the investigation on the Russian side was discontinued, and the Russian authorities refuse to make any comments on this subject. No one has been and no one will be punished for the crime.
There is a material trace of the crime. Three cemeteries built by the Poles - in Katyn, Mednoye and Kharkiv - where each and every one from among almost 15,000 Polish POWs is commemorated by name. This is an exception among the graveyards remaining after the crimes of the Soviet power.

Zbigniew Gluza



Foreign literature:
Vladimir Abarinov, Katynskij labirint (The Katyn labirynth), Novosti, Moskva, 1991. ISBN: 5-7020374-8

Vladimir Abarinov, The Murderers of Katyn, Hippocrene Books Inc, New York, 1993. ISBN: 9-7818-0032-3

Ray Cowdery, Katyn: A Documentary Account of the Evidence, Victory WW2 Publishing Ltd., 1995. ISBN: 0910667438

Franz Kadell, Die Katyn-Lüge. Geschichte einer Manipulation. Fakten, Dokumente und Zeugen (The Katyn Lie. History of Manipulation. Facts, Documents and Witnesses.), München: Herbig, 1991. ISBN: 3776616768

Gerd Kaiser, Katyn: das Staatsverbrechen, das Staatsgeheimnis (Katyn - Crime and State Secret), Berlin: Aufbau Taschenbuch, 2002. ISBN: 3746680786

Natalya S. Lebedeva, Katyn. Prestuplenie protiv chelovechstva (Katyn. Crime Against Humanity), Moskva, Kultura 1994.

Wojciech Materski, Anna M. Cienciala, Natalia S. Lebedeva, Katyn: A Crime Without Punishment (Annals of Communism Series), Yale University Press, 2008. ISBN: 978-0300108514.

Allen Paul, Katyn: Stalin's Massacre and the Seeds of Polish Resurrection, US Naval Institute Press, 1996. ISBN-10: 1557506701 ISBN-13: 978-1557506702

Rudolf.G.Pikhoia, Natalya S. Lebedeva, Aleksander Gieysztor, Wojciech Materski et al. (ed.), Katyn. Plenniki nieob'iavlennoi voiny (Katyn. The Captives of an Undeclared War.), Moskva, 1997. ISBN: 5 89511 002 9

George Sanford, Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940. Truth, Justice and Memory, Basees/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, Routledge, 2005.ISBN 13: 978-0-415-33873-8
 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/5687

Letter from the Gulag
by Golfo Alexopoulos
The strange story of a prisoner who complained to Stalin's secret police chief—and got results. By Golfo Alexopoulos.

In the last years of Joseph Stalin’s life, the Gulag became increasingly unmanageable. Authorities at one Siberian camp seized ammonium and detonators from a group of thirty prisoners who were planning to dig a tunnel through the Bering Strait and escape, according to a 1951 report, “to the Americans in Alaska.” As the regime handed out seemingly interminable sentences, hopeless prisoners argued that only a bullet to the head would cause them to stop their aggressive behavior. A culture of violence and routine insubordination descended not only on the prisoner population but on camp authorities as well.

In 1952, Alexander Ivanov, a 32-year-old prisoner at a labor camp in the far north, wrote two letters to the Soviet Council of Ministers. The first was intercepted by camp officials, who punished Ivanov for informing the Soviet leadership about acts of torture at the camp. But this did not stop the insolent Gulag prisoner. Ivanov wrote again, and this time gave his letter to another inmate, who smuggled the damaging document out of the camp upon his release and ensured that the letter journeyed hundreds of miles to its Kremlin address. The letter landed in the hands of Stalin’s chief of state security (MVD), Lavrenty Beria, a man so close to the dictator that he was entrusted with supervising the Soviet Union’s nuclear program.

Beria, who was known for his cruelty, not only read the prisoner’s account of torture and abuse at the camp but gave the petition to his deputy, S. N. Kruglov, with the following instructions: “Verify the stated facts carefully and take measures against those guilty of this misconduct. Report your results to me.” Kruglov immediately called a meeting of the Gulag leadership and initiated an extensive investigation that would result in the arrest of several camp officials and the firing of the camp’s director.

“What rules here,” prisoner Alexander Ivanov wrote in a letter smuggled out of the camp, “is a kind of fascist arbitrariness.”

Gulag prisoners wrote many letters of complaint to Soviet authorities about everything from the lack of food, winter clothes, and shoes to the loss of packages from relatives and the illegal acts of camp administrators. This was not the first written complaint from a Gulag prisoner to capture Beria’s attention, nor was it the first that Kruglov had been charged with investigating. Nonetheless, the Kremlin’s response to Ivanov’s letter is astonishing. The prisoner’s petition triggered a massive inquiry into nearly every aspect of operations at this particular camp, Pechorlag. Each of his specific charges of torture was investigated in detail. Many people at the camp were interrogated. A six-member MVD commission produced a remarkably long report whose purpose was noted in the first paragraph: “To confirm the contents of the petition sent to the USSR Council of Ministers by prisoner A. V. Ivanov.”

The MVD chief had been hearing for years about various problems at Pechorlag, and the report catalogs many—acts of extortion, theft, and murder; heterosexual and homosexual relationships; interactions with the local civilian population; work strikes; escape and attempted escape. Ironically, Stalin’s most brutal henchman appears to have taken special interest in the problem of camp violence, whether perpetrated by guards who tortured prisoners or prisoners who murdered each other and their guards. To be sure, the Soviet leadership typically justified repressive policies as prophylactic and necessary while often criticizing individual acts of violence by subordinates as excessive. Nonetheless, Beria might have been motivated by a number of factors. For years, camp officials had worried about the corrupting influence of detention and the fact that camps often functioned as a mere breeding ground for criminal gangs. Many Gulag prisoners, reentering Soviet society after serving their sentences, brought home the criminal behavior learned from survival in the camps. Perhaps Beria sought to mitigate what some considered the contaminating influence of the camps on Soviet society. Or perhaps he believed that the absence of law and order undermined the camps’ economic functions.

digest-20083-alexopoulos-1.jpg
 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/5687

A SYSTEM OF OUT-OF-CONTROL CRUELTY

At the least, a reader in the Kremlin would certainly take note of the prisoner’s comparison of Gulag officials to Nazis and capitalists. “What rules here,” Ivanov wrote, “is a kind of fascist arbitrariness. There are torture chambers, cells for the torture of prisoners, and all the instruments of torture. I was so naive to view movies about the development of torture in capitalist countries and to rejoice that we had no such thing. But torture does exist. It exists in Pechorlag.”

In particular, Ivanov described the case of more than thirty sick inmates who defied orders to work. Camp authorities dismissed the prisoners’ claims of illness and punished them by slashing their food ration. Food represented one of the most powerful weapons in the MVD’s coercive arsenal; Gulag prisoners faced not only barbed wire and armed escorts but the fear that their perpetual state of hunger could deepen still further if they committed the slightest misstep. The prisoners at Ivanov’s camp refused to accept the harsh penalty of a reduced food ration, so they were all sent to an isolation cell.

“This isolation cell,” Ivanov wrote, “is basically a torture chamber. The system is this: the guards ‘work on’ the prisoners who are sent there. That is, if a person keeps quiet, then he is simply beaten. If he says a word, then they put him in a straitjacket, twist his arms and legs, and break his spine. The staff employs these instruments of torture systematically, as ‘prophylactic measures.’ Handcuffs are regularly used. Once they secure the handcuffs, the guards pull on them so that the person becomes incapacitated. And this occurs regularly, from one day to the next. People emerge from the torture chamber and are either crippled or hopelessly ill. Not a single individual has completely recovered from this torture.”

Ivanov identified each of the perpetrators by name, but noted that the worst acts of brutality were committed by “an experienced hangman” who used to be head of the isolation cell block until he committed murder. According to Ivanov, a former MVD officer and current prisoner named Stepanov had essentially remained in his previous post as master of the isolation block. Stepanov’s shifting role was not unusual for a camp employee; Gulag officials often found themselves among the ranks of their prisoners (many were sentenced not only for murder but for embezzlement and theft), and prisoners too often performed administrative tasks in the Soviet Union’s remote and understaffed labor camps. Most of Ivanov’s charges were ultimately confirmed in the investigation.

“People emerge from the torture chamber and are either crippled or hopelessly ill. Not a single individual has completely recovered from this torture.”

Ivanov also experienced firsthand that which he described in his letter: “On August 16, 1952, I was subject to such torture and taken unconscious to the hospital where I remain to this day. . . . Since they are trying to eliminate me as quickly as possible, I ask you this: if you do send your representatives to investigate, then they should look for me immediately, that is, if others haven’t already wiped me off the face of the earth.”

WHAT ALEXANDER IVANOV MAY HAVE ACCOMPLISHED

The Soviet state and party documents held in the Hoover Archives do not tell us what became of Alexander Ivanov; there is no indication that the messenger became the victim of a revenge killing. The MVD report, however, provides a long list of violent incidents at the camp, perpetrated not only by guards but also by prisoners. The camp leadership recorded nearly eighty incidents involving murder or serious injury to prisoners, including cases of stabbings, beatings, and strangulation. Ivanov had reason to be scared.

Reliable information is especially scarce in a totalitarian dictatorship, which is why Kremlin leaders always pored over letters from citizens. From both Ivanov’s letter and the subsequent MVD investigation, we see a picture of Pechorlag that camp bureaucrats would probably not have constructed themselves. An image emerges of a labor camp plagued by routine violence, with perpetrators and victims often switching roles. The prisoners murder, the guards torture. Such routine violence exposed the fundamental volatility and instability that characterized the microsociety of the Gulag archipelago.

“Since they are trying to eliminate me as quickly as possible, I ask you this: if you do send your representatives to investigate, then they should look for me immediately, that is, if others haven’t already wiped me off the face of the earth.”

The Gulag leadership, for its part, blamed camp leaders for the brutal actions of prisoners and staff. It charged that insufficient attention was being paid to political education; the truly irredeemable “bandit” elements were not separated from less dangerous prisoners; top camp leaders supervised their staff poorly; and midlevel officials were not gathering intelligence among prisoners that would head off acts of violence before they could occur.

The MVD investigators spoke as if routine acts of cruelty could be prevented by improvements in political education and law enforcement. By the time Ivanov wrote his letter, however, the Gulag’s ingrained culture of violence was well beyond the reach of socialist education or Soviet control.

Shortly after Stalin died in 1953, Beria openly criticized many features of the penal camp system and arranged a massive release of criminal offenders, for reasons that were largely self-serving. His amnesty would signal the beginning of the end of the Gulag. Could prisoner Ivanov’s letter have played a role?

Professor of History, University of South Florida.
"Gulag: A Cultural History"

Professor Alexopoulos holds the William C. Bark National Fellowship.
 
То су намонтиране слике у време Стаљина слику изнад Москве нису могао да усликаш.

А ти си у спамовању достигла свој врхунац.
 
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