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Kiseli: nema nerazjasnjenih okolnosti, teorije zavere, ili gluposti , "da je streljan u banja-luci pod nerazjasnjenim okolnostima"
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Kiseli: nema nerazjasnjenih okolnosti, teorije zavere, ili gluposti , "da je streljan u banja-luci pod nerazjasnjenim okolnostima"
Izvor?
DJURISIC'S ILL-FATED MOVE
From the time of his arrival in north-central Bosnia, Pavle Djurisic had been very critical of Mihailovic's leadership, and he was the chief proponent of moving to Slovenia. Djurisic's firm hold over the Montenegrin Chetniks and good military record were respected by the other Chetnik commanders, and most of them agreed with him about moving to Slovenia. When Mihailovic remained unconvinced, Djurisic decided that he would take his Montenegrin troops and leave. He implored Ljo-tic to help by sending some of his troops to meet him halfway, and this Ljotic willingly agreed to do; but Djurisic still had to reach the area of Bihac in western Bosnia on his own.47 Djurisic then arranged what he understood to be a safe-conduct agreement with the Croatian Ustasha authorities and representatives of the Montenegrin separatist, Dr. Sekula Drljevic. Drljevic had spent most of the war years in the puppet state of Croatia, first in Zemun and from the spring of 1944 in Zagreb, and in the summer of 1944 he set up a Montenegrin State Council, which amounted to a sort of Montenegrin government-in-exile. The idea was to establish a Montenegrin state with German and Croatian help, and he wanted to establish his own Montenegrin army. Thus when Djurisic's representatives negotiated with his representatives for safe-conduct, Drljevic saw a chance to appropriate the Djuriiic Chetnik forces for his own ends. It was after the conclusion of this sale-conduct agreement with Ustasha authorities and Drljevic that Djuriiic and his troops, accompanied by a large group of civilian refugees including several scores of Montenegrin Orthodox priests, set out on March 18 from Vucjak Mountain toward Slovenia (see Map )
How deep the split among the Chetniks had become was indicated not only by Djurisic's breaking away from Mihailovic, but even more so by the fact that Mi ha i lovic's original titular deputv and chief political adviser, Dragila Vasic, joined Djurisic for the trek westward. So did many of Mihailovic's leading commanders, among them Zaharije Osto-jic, the chief of the East Bosnia Area Command, Petar Bacovie, commander of the Herzegovinian Chetniks, Mirko Lalatovic, one of the leading Chetnik staff officers, Luka Baletic, and Pavle Novakovic.49 The principal Chetnik commanders from Serbia, Dragoslav Racic and Nikola Kalabic, also favored the march westward and did their best to persuade Mihailovic to make it, but when he refused to move, they stayed with him.50 The bulk of the Bosnian Chetniks (excepting those under Ostojic) joined neither Djurisic nor Mihailovic but simply disbanded, most of them to slip back into the mass of the Serbian Orthodox population of Bosnia whence they had come, others to go into the deep forests of Bosnia, where they remained for many months after the end of the war. Thus there were at the beginning of April four distinct groups of Chetniks, each pursuing its own way in the hope of escaping the impending disaster: the group that remained true to Mihailovic, the group that sided with Djurisic, the Bosnian Chetniks who stayed back, and the Chetniks of Djujic and Jevdjevic, who were already in the Ljubljana Gap area.
The details of the agreement that Djurisic made with the Ustashas and the representatives of Drljevic are not known, but it appears that Djurisic and his troops were supposed to cross the Sava River into Slavonia. There they would align themselves with Drljevic under the name "Montenegrin National Army," with Djurisic retaining operational command, and would be moved west by rail transport. Chetnik sources indicate that Djurisic intended to follow this agreement only to the point where he could rid himself of the sick and wounded among his troops and following, so that he could achieve greater mobility and opera tional freedom.51 With that intention, he sent about eight hundred of his sick and wounded across the Sava River to the Ustashas and Drljevic. Then with his troops and other refugees, and reinforced by the detachments of Bacovic and Ostojic, he moved westward somewhat south of the right bank of the Sava River. It is more than likely that Drljevic and the Ustashas had from the outset intended the agreement as a trap for Djurisic; when Djurisic tried to outsmart them, they abandoned all pretense of good faith. Both the Ustashas and Drljevic had specific reasons to wrant to ensnare Djurisic—the Ustashas because Djurisic had been one of the most active practitioners of mass terror over the Moslem population in Sandjak and southeastern Bosnia, and Drljevic because Djurisic was one of the strongest exponents of complete union between Montenegro and Serbia, and thus opposed to Drljevic's separatism.
Almost from the beginning of their move westward, Djurisic and his troops had to fight off intermittent Ustasha attacks and occasionally attacks by Partisans, but they reached the Vrbas River, and most of the troops crossed it and reached the Lijevce Polje plain, north of Banja Luka. But at that point they were attacked by strong Ustasha forces. Djurisic's forces were badly beaten, and as a consequence of the defeat representatives of Drljevic and the Ustashas succeeded in inducing Djurisic's first regiment to switch to Drljevic's leadership.52 Djurisic and a part of his remaining troops tried to make a roundabout turn south of Banja Luka, intending to continue on in a westerly direction, but again they encountered Croatian quisling forces. Djurisic was contacted by Ustasha officers and he at last agreed to undertake direct negotiations with the Ustasha authorities and Drljevic's representatives about further movement of his troops westward. This talk of new negotiations proved to be only a snare. On his way to the meeting place Djurisic was attacked and captured by the Ustashas, along with many of his followers, including some political leaders and priests. There are several versions of what happened next. What is definite is that Djurisic and several other Chetnik commanders, including Ostojic and Bacovic, Vasic and some other political leaders, and also a number of Orthodox priests were all killed. Some of the troops and refugees who were accompanying Djurisic were killed also. A small part of Djurisic's troops managed to escape and pushed their way west; but a larger part of them, left leaderless, were integrated into Drljevic's forces and dispatched toward the Austrian border. A portion of both these groups were later caught by the Partisans in Slovenia. Most of those who succeeded in crossing into Austria were returned bv the Partisans to Slovenia, where, with various other collaborationist forces, they met their doom in the second half of May. Of the entire force that started with Djurilic in Montenegro and those other Chetnik* who joined him for the trek westward, perhaps less than a fourth survived. Drljevie himself, like his Ustasha friends, was forced by the advancing Partisans to flee to Austria in the last days of the war. There he and his wife were discovered a few weeks later and killed by some followers of Djurisic,'52 It should be noted that on April 11 three regiments of the Serbian Volunteer Corps and a contingent of Jevdjevic Chetniks had been sent into southwestern Croatia to meet Djurisic forces, which of course never appeared. These units were later directed northward toward Ljubljana where they fought against the Partisans. In the closing days of the war they succeeded in crossing into Austria, but they were later returned to Slovenia with Slovene quisling forces and there liquidated by the Partisans.
45 Ibid., pp. 237-38.
46 The holding of Sarajevo was also to some extent conditioned on the progress of the German offensive in western Hungary. That offensive fizzled out in mid-March, and on March 20 Hitler gave permission for Sarajevo to be evacuated, an operation which from "an operational point of view was unavoidable for a long time." Schmidt-Richberg, pp. 98-108, esp. p. 107. See also Hronologija 1941-1945, p. 1094. It might be noted in passing that for the protection of the Sarajevo-Bosanski Brod communication line, the Germans used in certain sections the Russian Protective Corps which they organized and had used in Serbia. Later they evacuated it to Germany. See Vertepov,
ed., pp. 316-25.
47 Karapandzic, pp. 405-17; Kostic, pp. 230-32.
48 Metropolitan Joanikije was not among the priests. He apparently went from eastern Bosnia to Serbia, where he is reported to have died later in 1943.
49 Banovic and Stepanovic, in Politika, Aug. 22 and 25, 1962. The Sandjak Chetnik leader Vuk Kalaitovic also started out with Djurisic, but after a time changed his mind and struck off toward Sandjak with about 200 of his men. Apparently they reached Sandjak successfully. On the last phase of the ill-fated trek of the Djurisic group see Cemovic, pp. 68-88.
50 Kostic, p. 229; Banovic and Stepanovic, in Politika, Aug. 22, 1962.
51 Cemovic, p. 65; Zecevic, pp. 87-91. Zecevic, like Cemovic, was a survivor of the Djurisic" troops, but he belonged to a unit that rather early shifted to Drljevic. See also Vucetic, pp. 139-40.
52 Cemovic, pp. 71-80; Banovic and Stepanovic, in Politika, Aug. 22-25, 1962. For the Ustasha view of this engagement see Luburic [Domangoj, pseud.], "The Battle at Lijevce Polje." Luburic's thesis seems to be (p. 78) that Djurisic's march westward was part of a grand Chetnik plan intended to establish a link with the Serbian forces in the Ljubljana Gap area, then to destroy the Independent State of Croatia, and to bring back King Peter. Luburic mentions (p. 89) that the Ustashas captured on that occasion about 7,000 men, but he says nothing about the fate of Djurisic and his troops after their capture.
plageton: И у каквом је то нескладу са претпоставком да је стрељан у Бањалуци под неразјашњеним околностима?
može li neko da pojasni šta znači kad je neko rehabilitovan ?
U ovom slučaju radi se o sudskoj rehabilitaciji.Sudskom rehabilitacijom,sud konstatuje da je neki drugi sud u prošlosti ,koji je odlučivao o istom slučaju pogrešio i oštetio lice koje je osuđeno .Rehabilitacijom,ta presuda prestaje da proizvodi dejstva u pravnom poretku a rehabilitovni se smatra neosuđivanim za to konkretno delo tj.nastaje situacija kao da osuđujuća presuda nikad nije ni bila doneta.Pored moralne satisfakcije,rehabilitovani stiče pravo i na naknadu materijalne i nematerijalne štete.
To važi za sve vrste krivičnih dela. Ne znam da li pravila o naknadi štete važe i u slučaju Dragiše Vasića i ostalih,jer se te rehabilitacije sprovode po posebnom zakonu.Vrlo mali broj političkih osuđenika je među živima a kao podnosioci zahteva za naknadu štete ili zahteva za vraćanje ,nepravilnim presudama, oduzete imovine,bi se mogli pojaviti njihovi najbliži srodnici -naslednici .To bi mogli biti i jedini praktični efekti rahabilitacije.Nije mi poznato da se ijedan takav postupak vodi pred sudovima.
Da si pročitao uvodni tekst,primetio bi da je odlukom parasudske državne komisije Vasić oglašen za izdajnika i da je sud u Gornjem Milanovcu na osnovu te odluke konfiskovao Vasićevu imovinu.on nije bio ni sudjen, ni osudjen....pa ne znam kako ga mislis rehabilitirati.
Da si pročitao uvodni tekst,primetio bi da je odlukom parasudske državne komisije Vasić oglašen za izdajnika i da je sud u Gornjem Milanovcu na osnovu te odluke konfiskovao Vasićevu imovinu.
Nego kad smo već kod ove teme - kako je kod vas u Hrvatskoj rešeno pitanje rehabilitacije?
Otkud kod tebe Kiseli tolika opsednutost ravnogorskim pokretom i istaknutim komandatima ili funkcionerima tog pokreta.Nije mi cilj da pravim paralelu al kad bi neki Srbin iz npr. Leskovca pokazivao toliko interesovanje ili mržnju prema npr. hss ili nekoj hrvatskoj oružanoj formaciji ,svima bi izgledao čudan, da ne kažem lud.