STRATFOR - strategic forecasting - FYO

zao mi je, nemam snage da prevodim. mod moze da skloni, samo ostavite malo da procitaju ti koji mogu.
ova agencija je jedan od vidjenijih komercijalnih obavestajnih resursa. neke stvari vrede, vecina ne, ali da ne objasnjavam. s obzirom da rade analize za mnoge vlade, drustvene organizacije i kompanije sirom sveta, ima smisla da se procita jer ovo citaju ljudi koji vuku poteze na raznim stranama. generalni menadzer agencije je bivsi agent mosada i cie. tako kazu, ali vi i ja znamo da bivsi agenti ili ne postoje ili su bivsi kada prestanu da postoje

resurs se placa a ovo vam je za dz. zdravozivo.

A Question of Integration
By George Friedman

For more than a week, France has been torn by riots that have been, for the most part, concentrated in the poorer suburbs of Paris. The rioters essentially have been immigrants -- or the children or grandchildren of immigrants -- most of whom had come to France from its former colonies. They are, in many cases, French citizens by right of empire. But what is not clear is whether they ever became, in the fullest sense of the word, French.

And in that question rests an issue that could define European -- and world -- history in the 21st century.

Every country has, from time to time, social unrest. This unrest frequently becomes violent, but that is not necessarily defining. The student uprisings around the world in the 1960s had, in retrospect, little lasting significance, whereas the riots by black Americans during the same period were of enormous importance -- symptomatic of a profound tension within American society. The issue with the French riots is to identify the degree to which they are, or will become, historically significant.

For the most part, the rioters have been citizens of France. But to a great extent, they are not regarded as French. This is not rooted necessarily in racism, although that is not an incidental phenomenon. Rather, it is rooted in the nature of the French nation and, indeed, in that of the European nation-state and European democracy -- an experience that distinguishes Europe from many other regions of the world.

The notion of the European nation stands in opposition to the multinational empires that dominated Europe between the 17th and 20th centuries. These were not only anti-democratic, dynastic entities, but they were also transnational. The idea of national self-determination as the root of modern democracy depended first on the recognition of the nation as a morally significant category. Why should a nation be permitted to determine its own fate unless the nation was of fundamental importance? Thus, in Europe, the concept of democracy and the concept of the nation developed together.

The guiding principle was that every nation had a right to determine its own fate. All of the nations whose identities had been submerged within the great European empires were encouraged to reassert their historical identities through democratic institutions. As the empires collapsed, the submerged nations re-emerged -- from Ireland to Slovakia, from Macedonia to Estonia. This process of devolution was, in a certain sense, endless: It has encompassed, for instance, not only the restoration or establishment of sovereignty to the European powers' colonial holdings in places like Africa or Latin America, but pressure from groups within the territorial borders of those recognized powers -- such as the Basques in Spain -- that their national identity be recognized and their right to democratic self-determination be accepted.

Europe's definition of a nation was less than crisply clear. In general, it assumed a geographic and cultural base. It was a group of people living in a fairly defined area, sharing a language, a history, a set of values and, in the end, a self-concept: A Frenchman knew himself to be a Frenchman and was known by other Frenchmen to be French. If this appears to be a little circular, it is -- and it demonstrates the limits of logic, for this definition of nationhood worked well in practice. It also could wander off into the near-mysticism of romantic nationalism and, at times, into vicious xenophobia.

The European definition of the nation poses an obvious challenge. Europe has celebrated national self-determination among all principles, and adhered to a theory of the nation that was forged in the battle with dynastic empires. At the heart of its theory of nationalism is the concept that the nation -- national identity -- is something to which one is born. Ideally, every person should be a part of one nation, and his citizenship should coincide with that.

But this is, of course, not always the case. What does one do with the foreigner who comes to your country and wants to be a citizen, for example? Take it a step further: What happens when a foreigner comes to your country and wants not only to be a citizen, but to become part of your nation? It is, of course, difficult to change identity. Citizenship can be granted. National identity is another matter.

Contrast this with the United States, Canada or Australia -- three examples where alternative theories of nationhood have been pursued. If being French or German is rooted in birth, being an American, Canadian or Australian is rooted in choice. The nation can choose who it wants as a citizen, and the immigrant can choose to become a citizen. Citizenship connotes nationality. More important, all of these countries, which were founded on immigration, have created powerful engines designed to assimilate the immigrants over generations. It would not be unreasonable to say that these countries created their theory of nationhood around the practice of migration and assimilation. It is not that the process is not painful on all sides, but there is no theoretical bar to the idea of anyone becoming, for example, an American -- whereas there is a theoretical hurdle to the idea of elective nationalism in Europe.
...

This obstacle has been compounded by the European imperial experience. France was born of a nationalist impulse, but the nationalism was made compatible with imperialism. France created a massive empire in the 19th century. And as imperialism collided with the French revolutionary tradition, the French had to figure out how to reconcile national self-determination with imperialism. One solution was to make a country like Algeria part of France. In effect, the definition of the French nation was expanded to incorporate wildly different nationalities. It left French-speaking enclaves throughout the world, as well as millions of citoyens who were not French by either culture or history. And it led to waves of immigrants from the former francophone colonies becoming citizens of France without being French.

Adding to this difficulty, the Europeans erected a new multinational entity, the European Union, that was supposed to resurrect the benefits of the old dynastic empires without undermining nationalism. The EU is an experiment in economic cooperation and the suppression of nationalist conflicts, yet one that does not suppress the nations that created it. The Union both recognizes the nation and is indifferent to it. Its immigration policy and the European concept of the nation are deeply at odds.

The results of all of this can be seen in the current riots in France. As evident from this analysis, the riots are far from a trivial event. These have involved, by and large, French citizens expressing dissatisfaction with their condition in life. Their condition stems, to some degree, from the fact that it is one thing to become a French citizen and quite another to become a Frenchman. Nor is this uniquely a French problem: The issue of immigrant assimilation in Europe is a fault line that, under sufficient stress and circumstances, can rip Europe apart. Europe's right-wing parties, and opposition to the EU in Europe, are both driven to a large extent by the immigrant issue.

All societies have problems with immigration. In the United States, there currently is deep concern about the illegal movement of Mexican immigrants across the border. There is concern about the illegality and about the changing demographic characteristics of the United States. But there is no serious movement in the United States interested in halting all immigration. There is a management issue, but in the end, the United States is perpetually changed by immigrants and the immigrants, even more, are changed by the United States. Consider what once was said about the Irish, Italians or Japanese to get a sense of this.

The United States, and a few other nations, are configured to manage and profit from immigration. Their definition of nationhood not only is compatible with immigration, but depends on it. The European states are not configured to deal with immigration and have a definition of nationhood that is, in fundamental ways, incompatible with immigration. Put simply, the Europeans could never quite figure out how to reconcile their empires with their principles, and now can't quite figure out how to reconcile the migrations that resulted from the collapse of their empires with their theory of nationalism. Assimilation is not impossible, but it is enormously more difficult than in countries that subscribe to the American model.

This poses a tremendous economic problem for the Europeans -- and another economic problem is the last thing they need. Europe, like the rest of the advanced industrial world, has an aging population. Over the past generation, there has been a profound shift in reproductive patterns in the developed world. The number of births is declining. People are also living to an older age. Therefore, the question is, how do you sustain economic growth when your population is stable or contracting?

The American answer is relatively straightforward: immigration. Shortages of engineers or scientists? No problem. Import them from India or China, give them advanced education in the United States, keep them there. Their children will be assimilated. Is more menial labor needed? Also not a problem. Workers from Mexico and Central American states are readily available, on a number of terms, legal and illegal. Their children too can be assimilated.

Of course, there have been frictions over immigrants in the United States from the beginning. But there is also a roadmap to assimilation and utilization of immigrants -- it is well-known territory that does not collide with any major cultural taboos. In short, the United States, Australia and Canada have excellent systems for managing and reversing population contractions, which is an underpinning of economic strength. The Europeans -- like the Japanese and others -- do not.

The problem of assimilating immigrants in these countries is quite difficult. It is not simply an institutional problem: A new white paper from Brussels will not solve the issue. It is a problem deeply rooted in European history and liberalism. The European theory of democracy rests on a theory of nationalism that makes integration and assimilation difficult. It can be done, but only with great pain.

It is not coincidental, therefore, that the rates of immigration to European states are rather low in comparison to those of the more dynamic settler-based states. This also places the Europeans at a serious economic disadvantage to the immigrant-based societies. The United States or Canada can mitigate the effects of population shortages with relative ease. The influx of new workers relieves labor market pressures -- encouraging sustained low-inflation economic growth -- and the relative youth of immigrants not only allows for steady population growth but also helps to keep pension outlays manageable. In contrast, the European ideal of nationality almost eliminates this failsafe -- so that while, as a whole, Europe's population is both aging and shrinking, the dearth of young immigrant workers spins its pension commitments out of control.

These are the issues that, over the next few generations, may begin to define the real global divide -- which will be not only between rich and poor nations, but between the rich nations that cannot cope with declining populations and the rich nations that can.

Ja sam ovo batice pisao jos proletos. Na 5 jezika.
pa je bilo pljuvanje kao nikad i istoriji krste pre toga.
...
sreca pa niko ne zna engleski...

Ово је Јабучило једна бриљантна анализа проблема са којим се суочава данашњи свет а посебно Европа. Фридман је имао неколико занимљивих анализа али мислим да је он ипак под капом Вашингтона читајући анализу 9/11 или агресије на Ирак. Доста ствари је тачно рекао, али суштину увек интелигентно заобиђе. Можда је овај човек који има иза себе јако леп ЦВ и искуство у НСА које не спомиње баш често допринело ”независном” гледању на ствари поводом ирачког рата, а нарочито у вези са 9/11.

Auu, dok ja ovo iscitam. Al' po pocetku slutim da nije lose.

Znaci, ja ipak mogu da konkurisem za drzavljanstvo SCG iako sam Afrikanac ?!

Zarathustra:

Auu, dok ja ovo iscitam. Al' po pocetku slutim da nije lose.

Znaci, ja ipak mogu da konkurisem za drzavljanstvo SCG iako sam Afrikanac ?!

Kliknite za proširenje...

Brate, izraste ti kosa preko noci.....

Najkorišćeniji jezik - kineski
12.12.2001



Prema procenama Svetske organizacije za zaštitu intelektualne svojine (World Intellectual Property Organization - WIPO), do 2007. godine će dominatan jezik web-a postati kineski. Mreža je izmišljena u SAD-u, gde je i prvo počela da se koristi, pa je i prirodno da je engleski jezik na web-stranicama bio preovlađujuć. Još uvek je tako, ali se razlika u broju stranica na engleskom i ostalim jezicima sve više smanjuje. Takođe, povećava se i broj korisnika Interneta čiji maternji jezik nije engleski.

Već sledeće godine, predviđa WIPO, prvi put će na Mrežu biti povezano više korisnika kojima je engleski drugi jezik nego onih kojima je on maternji. U 2003. godini, smatra ova organizacija, čak jedna trećina korisnika engleski uopšte neće govoriti, tačnije, koristiće isključivo svoj maternji jezik na Internetu. Velika prepreka korišćenju Mreže na maternjem jeziku bila je neprilagođenost prikazu specifičnih znakova, ali je sada i taj problem rešen, pa više nisu retke web-stranice isključivo na kineskom ili arapskom jeziku.

Od svih nacija na svetu Kinezi, naravno, imaju najveći potencijal kada govorimo o rastu broja korisnika Interneta. Iako trenutno vrlo malo Kineza (27 miliona) u odnosu na ukupan broj staniovnika (1,3 milijarde) koristi Mrežu, primetan je brzi rast: do pre dve godine je u najmnogoljudnijoj zemlji bilo samo 4 miliona surfera. Predviđa se da će stopa rasta biti još veća, pa će i kineski postati preovlađujući jezik na Internetu.

ma nece kineski,tamo je cenzurisano ono sto vecina trazi na netu...kontas....8-) :wink:

Elvin:

ma nece kineski,tamo je cenzurisano ono sto vecina trazi na netu...kontas....8-) :wink:

Kliknite za proširenje...

Da, ali imas kineske sajtove van NR Kine .....snalazi se narod

Go China !

zarathustra vidi se da si buduci sinolog...:-D

Dozvolicu sebi da zastranim.
Licno, drago mi je da vidim Evropu suocenu sa socio-ekonomskim, demografskim, islamskim problemom. Kazem "licno" jer ce vrli sukontinentalci konacno pojmiti ovaj krst koji Srbima pleca lomi i koji je distancirao Evropu i ucinio je indiferentnom kad god su se nedace obrusavale na ovo parce Starog kontinenta. Hoce li pokleknuti sistem koji je ekonomski prosperitet video u kontradiktornostima: socijalnoj koheziji, klasnoj solidarnosti, religijskoj degradaciji,...religijskoj eksploataciji, klasnoj netrpeljivosti, socijalnom kolapsu? Budimo zluradi, evropski je!

Doktrina sekularizma nece nikada biti prihvatljiva islamu cija ekspanzija biva odbacivanjem fundamentalnih evropskih odlika. Zato islamu nece nikada biti prihvatljivo ni asimiliranje u zapadni sistem obezvredjivanja, bezboznosti, moralne degradacije. I zato ce vernici ove religije ostati na povrsini integracije u evropskim zemljama pa ce svaka borba za priznavanje biti borba za p r e p o z n a v a nj e koje ce, po svom karakteru, i ostati samo u domenu borbe.

Zasto je ideja multikulturalizma precenjena, a realizacija iste potcenjena? I ima li uopste ta ideja snage da sa kraja civilizacije odskoci na svez pocetak? I koliko moze biti labilna simbioza tih tacaka dijagonale: ekstremni atributi islamske kulture (submisivnost zena, Bog=bojeva municija)+ i nista manje ekstremna zapadna kultura ( korozija bozjih, moralnih...vrednosti)? Fuzija u korist anuliranja, za novo doba beskorisnih, identiteta?

Da li globalna kulturna kompatibilnost zahteva zrtvu - uzurpiranje sna pacifistima?

Bojim se da sam mogla i cutati.

migud:

Dozvolicu sebi da zastranim.
Licno, drago mi je da vidim Evropu suocenu sa socio-ekonomskim, demografskim, islamskim problemom. Kazem "licno" jer ce vrli sukontinentalci konacno pojmiti ovaj krst koji Srbima pleca lomi i koji je distancirao Evropu i ucinio je indiferentnom kad god su se nedace obrusavale na ovo parce Starog kontinenta. Hoce li pokleknuti sistem koji je ekonomski prosperitet video u kontradiktornostima: socijalnoj koheziji, klasnoj solidarnosti, religijskoj degradaciji,...religijskoj eksploataciji, klasnoj netrpeljivosti, socijalnom kolapsu? Budimo zluradi, evropski je!

Doktrina sekularizma nece nikada biti prihvatljiva islamu cija ekspanzija biva odbacivanjem fundamentalnih evropskih odlika. Zato islamu nece nikada biti prihvatljivo ni asimiliranje u zapadni sistem obezvredjivanja, bezboznosti, moralne degradacije. I zato ce vernici ove religije ostati na povrsini integracije u evropskim zemljama pa ce svaka borba za priznavanje biti borba za p r e p o z n a v a nj e koje ce, po svom karakteru, i ostati samo u domenu borbe.

Zasto je ideja multikulturalizma precenjena, a realizacija iste potcenjena? I ima li uopste ta ideja snage da sa kraja civilizacije odskoci na svez pocetak? I koliko moze biti labilna simbioza tih tacaka dijagonale: ekstremni atributi islamske kulture (submisivnost zena, Bog=bojeva municija)+ i nista manje ekstremna zapadna kultura ( korozija bozjih, moralnih...vrednosti)? Fuzija u korist anuliranja, za novo doba beskorisnih, identiteta?

Da li globalna kulturna kompatibilnost zahteva zrtvu - uzurpiranje sna pacifistima?

Bojim se da sam mogla i cutati.

Kliknite za proširenje...

Pacifisti su davno izgubili miran san. Prvo u sredinama kao sto je nasa, a sada se polako taj virus insomnije siri po citavoj Evropi.

Svakako da si u pravu, pitanje je bilo vise retoricko. Mislim da ce biti rec o permanentnim konfliktima.

Uzgred, dobro jutro, Maki. Ja se uspavala (otisla u horizontalu u 8 am pa do malopre).

Dobro jutro migud. za mene je nedelja danas bila radna, kad si u slobodnoj profesiji nikad nisi nacisto kad ce sta da ispadne. Inace razmisljao sam ozbiljno juce da dignem ruke vise od ovoga. Nema koristi. Pocinje da smara...videcu za dan...dva.

E, ako nema koristi, batali. Ostavimo deci da se vijaju beskorisnostima.

WTO: Where Have All the Activists Gone?
By Bart Mongoven

The Doha round of World Trade Organization (WTO) talks will resume in Hong Kong on Dec. 12, and the silence from anti-globalization activists is noticeable. This is curious, since these activists' arguments have not lost their salience, and the ideological position that anti-globalization generally represents is not on the wane. The WTO has placed many impediments before would-be demonstrators -- such as convening meetings on small, tightly policed islands -- but there has not even been much chatter about the meeting among those whose rhetoric and activity was once focused squarely on WTO. One must question why.

It is tempting to say the answer lies in the fact that nothing important is going to happen in Hong Kong, and that is indeed partly true. Developing countries have said they will discuss no other issues until the WTO tackles agricultural subsidies, and based on recent comments by French President Jacques Chirac, questions about subsidies simply will not be resolved.

If progress were possible, advocates on both sides would be actively lobbying inside and outside the meeting venue, and activist groups of all stripes would be trying to define issues for the media to ensure that their side gets good treatment from reporters. With no meaty debates possible, it seems there is no opposition to be found.

Five years ago, however, that would hardly have been the case. The inability to stage a protest and the lack of actual material progress possible at the meeting would not have prevented the dozens of anti-globalization organizations drawn to the WTO from calling press conferences, generating media blitzes or taking out full-page ads to support their positions.

The arguments then had to do with the very idea of the WTO meeting. What the activists opposed was largely what they said the WTO represented -- reciting a litany that included mentions of violations of poor countries' sovereignty, the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer, cultural imperialism, environmental damage and myriad other sins. But now, with no free trade deals on the table for negotiation, the activists apparently have nothing to talk about. This suggests that the WTO and its role in global affairs have come to be accepted almost across the board.

And it raises the question: What happened to the anti-globalization movement, and what does its disappearance mean for consumers, business and government?

Stvarno brate sta bi sa aktivistima i pokretom. Ovi izgleda behu ko placena opozicija kod nas za vreme Age kana.

i rece On neka bude sloga, i bi sloga ...

In attempting to define even who or what the anti-globalization movement is, one comes across the first major problem in determining why the movement appears to be having such trouble. Anti-globalization is commonly understood to refer to those who oppose the existence of the WTO and the development of free trade agreements, such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas. But in truth, the movement is broader than that.

Many who actively oppose new free trade agreements accept the WTO as a necessary, and potentially beneficial, instrument, but dislike the precise rules that these trade agreements impose. These individuals tend to be professional advocates attached to left-leaning think tanks, activist groups or academics. At the same time, however, many anti-globalization activists are more strident and are opposed generally to modern capitalism, and they see the WTO as a symbol of the system they claim is inherently unjust. These activists tend to belong to different social and political movements -- such as those opposing sweatshop labor, championing human rights, decrying "corporate power" and the like. They see the WTO as a personification of capitalism and particularly of the global acceptance of what they call the "neo-liberal order," which itself is poorly defined but generally means European and American-style market capitalism.

The problems with self-identity date back to the earliest days of the anti-globalization movement, which emerged from protests against the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in the mid-1990s.

After the Uruguay round brought the WTO into existence, the movement immediately was viewed as ardently anti-WTO. The messages broadcast by activists and the visuals they used inextricably linked the WTO with globalization. The unintended consequence of this linkage is that the wider public still cannot separate the two concepts. At this point, the public appears to reason that if globalization is inevitable and the WTO is the manager of globalization, the existence of the WTO is irrefutable as well. The subtlety of contemporary anti-globalization, which focuses on specific rules and elements of trade agreements, is easily lost on the broader public as a result of the ambiguity that so long has plagued the movement's identity.

For much of the world, the anti-globalization movement sprang into public view in 1999, amid the demonstrations and riots at the Seattle WTO summit. These riots made news around the world and were particularly important in the United States. However, most insiders at the negotiations already were well acquainted with the movement. They had felt its effects a year earlier, when their efforts to bring a treaty on investment drafted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development were brought to a halt. The activists also were known in Europe. Many of the Europeans among the rioters had held similar displays at anti-capitalist "street parties" for two years leading up to Seattle. What was different in 1999 was that the rioting was taking place in the United States. It was only when the world saw that the Seattle police had lost control of certain sections of the city that recognition of the anti-globalization movement expanded beyond professional trade agreement negotiators to the public at large.

The problem with riots, however, is that they do not afford activists much subtlety. In the Seattle riots, then, demonstrators inspired by many different causes were painted together with a very broad brush. The "Battle in Seattle" received global news coverage, and the message that emanated from it was clear and monolithic: Many on the vocal left do not want the WTO to succeed. Anti-globalization activists came to be viewed as young, uncouth or out-of-control rioters who represented only a small fraction of public sentiment, and therefore were not to be taken seriously except as a public disturbance threat. For the thousands who traveled to Seattle to demonstrate in favor of side agreements on labor or environmental issues, and for the lobbyists who were trying to change specific articles within the ministerial text, being labeled "anti-globalization" and consequently "anti-WTO" was neither fitting nor helpful.

Though the 1999 summit was distracted and ineffective, the WTO survived Seattle. The anti-globalization movement, on the other hand, crested at about the time that the rioters famously ran into Starbucks to take cover from tear gas. Less than two years later, al Qaeda attacked the United States, and the focus of global attention -- indeed, the very nature of global politics -- shifted.

In response to the 2001 attacks, some leading anti-globalization leaders became outspoken opponents of the U.S. war in Afghanistan and, later, Iraq -- a move that cost the earlier movement leaders and momentum. Meanwhile, and of equal significance in the anti-globalization context, advocates for corporate social responsibility and other movements designed to turn corporations into instruments of change have gained significant momentum.

The anti-war and corporate-responsibility campaigns -- which are much easier rallying points for the public than labored discussions over trade relationships -- now are vectors of attention and pressure being brought to bear against multinational corporations. Groups such as Oxfam and Amnesty International have concentrated on the idea that corporations can play a critical role in ensuring fair labor standards are adhered to, human rights are protected and local communities, with their rights to self-determination, are given due respect. These groups argue that multinational corporations should voluntarily take responsibility for guaranteeing certain aspects of the public's rights and protections, particularly in developing countries. As this message resonates in the public, it eventually will begin to affect corporate policy.

As this happens, the market is addressing many of the problems the anti-globalization movement likes to point out as a way of justifying arguments for a radical shift in global trade policy. A baton has been passed -- from a movement that was, at its core, fundamentally anti-capitalist to the newer movement advocating corporate social responsibility. Significantly, this movement does not depend on the WTO for its life. It is capable of generating parallel sets of public policies that reflect both its own ends and the goals of the original anti-globalization activists.

'ajmo malo kina, o kini, o kinezima - iz ugla 'poznavalaca':

The recent events in Shanwei are unique only in that they resulted in gunfire and death, and because they were brought to light by the anti-Communist media. After these reports were picked up and widely circulated by the international media, the government in Beijing acknowledged what had occurred, adding details that appeared to show that the demonstrators forced the police into shooting. But later, the government announced that the head of the police unit involved had been arrested -- which seems to imply that the story as originally told by the Chinese wasn't altogether accurate. Why arrest the cop if explosives were being hurled at police?

The specifics of what happened, of course, have no geopolitical consequence. What is important is that tensions in China have been rising steadily. Thousands of demonstrations (74,000, according to figures released last year by the government) have taken place -- some reportedly violent, if not fatal. In one case earlier this year, residents protesting corruption related to land seizures took control of their town, forcing the police out. The Chinese government appeared to capitulate to the demonstrators, giving into their demands -- but weeks later, those who had participated in the rising were quietly arrested. In another incident, which also turned deadly, brute squads believed to have been hired by local officials and businesses attacked protesters. There are numerous other examples to draw from.

Beneath the surface, a number of things are taking place. The Chinese economy has been growing at a frantic pace. This is not necessarily because the economy is so healthy, nor because many of these industrial projects make economic sense. In fact, the government in Beijing has been very clear that the new projects frequently don't make a great deal of economic sense, and has been trying to curb them (though it does not necessarily command obedience in every case from provincial or local governments). On the other hand, China needs to run very hard to stay in place. Within what we will call the entrepreneurial bureaucracy -- with pyramiding, undercapitalized, highly leveraged projects being piled one on top of the other -- new investment projects are needed in order to generate cash that stabilizes older, failing projects. Slowing down and consolidating is not easy when there are bank loans coming due and when money has to be spread around in order to maintain one's position in the system.

That means that aggressive economic growth is needed. It also means that massive social dislocation -- including theft of land -- is embedded in the Chinese system. The flashpoint is the interface between the rapidly spreading industrial plants and the farmers who own the land. The bureaucratic entrepreneurs need not only the land, but also the money that legally is due to the farmers.

China is a mass of dispossessed farmers, urban workers forced into unemployment by the failure of state-owned enterprises, and party officials who are urgently working to cash in on their position. It is a country where the banking system has been saved from collapse by spinning off bad debts -- at least $600 billion worth, or nearly half the GDP of China -- into holding companies. This maneuver cleaned up the banks' books and allowed Western banks to purchase shares in them, shoring them up. But it also left a huge amount of debt that is owed internally to people who will never see the funds. Imagine the U.S. savings-and-loan scandal growing to a size that was nearly half of the national GDP. As it happened, in the United States the federal government swallowed a great deal of the S&L bad loans -- but in China, these bad loans would just about wipe out the country's currency reserves, assuming that the numbers provided by the government are valid.

Under such circumstances, it is no surprise that Chinese money is leaving the country, flowing into the safe havens of U.S. T-Bills or offshore mineral deposits. Moreover, it is not clear that China's economy is continuing to grow. China's imports of oil have topped out and, by some reports, have started to decline -- yet the Chinese are continuing to report unabated growth rates. How can the economy be growing rapidly while oil imports decline? The country lacks sufficient energy reserves to fuel such growth, nor can that level of growth be coming from service industries. At any rate, growth rates do not by themselves connote economic health. The rate of return on capital is the ultimate measure of economic success. Anyone prepared to lose money can generate rapid revenue growth. And anyone facing cash-flow crises due to debt burden knows how easy it is to slip into revenue-growth obsession. The Chinese certainly have.

There is, therefore, a tremendous tension within China's new economy. The root problem is simple: Capital allocation has been driven by political and social considerations more than by economic ones. Who gets loans, and at what rates, frequently has been decided by the borrower's relation to the bureaucracy, not by the economic merits of the case. As a result, China, as a nation, has made terrible investments and is trying to make up for it with rapid growth. That is where things get difficult: As before with Japan and East Asia, the economy is thrown into a frenzy of growth in efforts to stabilize the system, but that growth throws off cash that cannot easily be capitalized and therefore is invested abroad. Meanwhile, bad debts -- stemming from continued investment into nonviable or unprofitable businesses, for social or political reasons -- surge, and the government tries to come up with ways to shuffle the debt around. In other words, the origin of the problem is simple -- but the evolution of the problem becomes dizzyingly complex.

This leads to stresses within the advanced economic sector. In China's case, these manifest as competition between different political factions for access to the funds needed to maintain their enterprises. But that is nothing compared to the tension between the new economy and farmers and the unemployed. As the system tries to stabilize itself, it seeks both to grow and to become more efficient. As it grows, the farmers are forced to give up their land. And as it seeks efficiency, industrial workers lose their jobs.

This is an explosive mix in any country, but particularly so in China, which has a tradition of revolution and unrest. The idea that the farmers will simply walk away from their land or that the unemployed will just head back to the countryside is simplistic. There are massive social movements in play that combine the two most powerful forces in China: workers and peasants. Mao did a lot of work with these two groups. Their interests are now converging. The decisions of the bureaucratic entrepreneurs are now causing serious pain, which is becoming evident in increasing social unrest. At Shanwei, that unrest broke into the open, complete with casualties.

The important thing to note is that both the quantity and intensity of these confrontations is increasing. While the Western media focus on the outer shell of China's economic growth -- the side that is visible in Western hotels throughout major cities -- the Chinese masses are experiencing simultaneously both the costs of industrialization and the costs of economic failure. The sum of this equation is unrest. The question is how far the unrest will go.

At the moment, there does not appear to be any national organization that speaks for the farmers or unemployed workers. The risings are local, driven by particular issues, and are not coordinated on any national scale. The one group that tried to create a national resistance, Falun Gong, has been marginalized by the Chinese government. China's security forces are capable, growing and effective. They have prevented the emergence of any nationalized opposition thus far.

At the same time, the growth and intensification of unrest is there for anyone to exploit. It won't go away, because the underlying economic processes cannot readily be brought under control. In China, as elsewhere, the leadership cadre of any mass movement has been made up of intellectuals. But between Tiananmen Square and jobs in Westernized industries, the Chinese intellectuals have been either cowed or hired. China is now working hard to keep these flashpoint issues local and to placate localities that reach the boiling point -- at least until later, when arrests can be made. That is what they are doing in Shanwei. The process is working. But as the economy continues to simultaneously grow and worsen, the social unrest will have to spread.

The discussion about China used to be about "hard" and "soft" landings -- terms that were confined to economics. The events in Shanwei raise the same question in another domain, the political. Police shooting down demonstrators is not an everyday event in China or anywhere else. But it has happened, and this event didn't just come from nowhere. The question of soft and hard landings now must be considered more literally than before.

And in China, hard landings over the past couple of centuries have been bloody affairs indeed.

Извадио сам по мени најбитније пасусе, а после ћу дати свој коментар:
The notion of the European nation stands in opposition to the multinational empires that dominated Europe between the 17th and 20th centuries. These were not only anti-democratic, dynastic entities, but they were also transnational. The idea of national self-determination as the root of modern democracy depended first on the recognition of the nation as a morally significant category. Why should a nation be permitted to determine its own fate unless the nation was of fundamental importance? Thus, in Europe, the concept of democracy and the concept of the nation developed together.

Europe's definition of a nation was less than crisply clear. In general, it assumed a geographic and cultural base. It was a group of people living in a fairly defined area, sharing a language, a history, a set of values and, in the end, a self-concept: A Frenchman knew himself to be a Frenchman and was known by other Frenchmen to be French. If this appears to be a little circular, it is -- and it demonstrates the limits of logic, for this definition of nationhood worked well in practice. It also could wander off into the near-mysticism of romantic nationalism and, at times, into vicious xenophobia.

This obstacle has been compounded by the European imperial experience. France was born of a nationalist impulse, but the nationalism was made compatible with imperialism. France created a massive empire in the 19th century. And as imperialism collided with the French revolutionary tradition, the French had to figure out how to reconcile national self-determination with imperialism. One solution was to make a country like Algeria part of France. In effect, the definition of the French nation was expanded to incorporate wildly different nationalities. It left French-speaking enclaves throughout the world, as well as millions of citoyens who were not French by either culture or history. And it led to waves of immigrants from the former francophone colonies becoming citizens of France without being French.

The European states are not configured to deal with immigration and have a definition of nationhood that is, in fundamental ways, incompatible with immigration. Put simply, the Europeans could never quite figure out how to reconcile their empires with their principles, and now can't quite figure out how to reconcile the migrations that resulted from the collapse of their empires with their theory of nationalism. Assimilation is not impossible, but it is enormously more difficult than in countries that subscribe to the American model.

This poses a tremendous economic problem for the Europeans -- and another economic problem is the last thing they need. Europe, like the rest of the advanced industrial world, has an aging population. Over the past generation, there has been a profound shift in reproductive patterns in the developed world. The number of births is declining. People are also living to an older age. Therefore, the question is, how do you sustain economic growth when your population is stable or contracting?

The American answer is relatively straightforward: immigration. Shortages of engineers or scientists? No problem. Import them from India or China, give them advanced education in the United States, keep them there. Their children will be assimilated. Is more menial labor needed? Also not a problem. Workers from Mexico and Central American states are readily available, on a number of terms, legal and illegal. Their children too can be assimilated.

На почетку је дата најбоља дефиниција нације и национализма. Не треба заборавити уплив идеја Америчке револуције (чак више него Француске) приликом борбе народа за самоопредељење.
Модел политичке нације у Европи се сводио на елиминисање мањих, "парохијалних" локал-патриотизама. Тако су у Уједињеном Краљевству постали Британци, иако су задржани локални идентитети Енглеза и Шкота (док су Ирци и Велшани били под репресијом). У Француској је тај болан процес скоро завршен тек почетком ХХ века, мада не потпуно - још увек постоје корзикански сепатаратисти па чак и бретонски идентитет. У Немачкој је процес довршио, парадоксално, Адолф Хитлер.
Идеали француске револуције су понудили наду свима, па и имигрантима.
СЛОБОДА-ЈЕДНАКОСТ-БРАТСТВО
може се о томе нашироко дискутовати... али погледајмо то мало из угла арапског емигранта:
СЛОБОДА - рецимо слобода да се носе мараме. зашто да не?
БРАТСТВО - да ли их пореклом Французи доживљавају као браћу?
ЈЕДНАКОСТ - да ли су емигранти једнаки приликом запошљавања? или се гледају такве ствари као што су име или адреса (предграђе)?!?

Имиграциони проблеми су у Европи веома јаки и због старења становништва, што је апострофирано посебно. У Америци слабије стари становништво, постоји лакша асимилација, али ни они нису имуни, ма шта причали.
Можете ли замислити да је председник Сједињених Држава црнац. Или неко ко се презива Рамирез?!?
Ја тврдим да се Мексиканци не могу до краја асимиловати, а о Арапима да не говоримо. Што се тиче црнаца, они већ имају Афро-Амерички идентитет. Дакле они су Афроамериканци, не само Американци.
Чак и да се асимилују, цивилизацију чине људи. А није сваки људски материјал једнако погодан за све. Макар то звучало политички некоректно... Уосталом, читајте шта је рекао Хантингтон.