Ko se borio za nas,a ne samo za jugoslaviju?
Ko se borio za nas,a ne samo za jugoslaviju?
Brus li bi ih obojicu polomio ko pi.ke!
Draža naravno. Borio se upravo za nas i nije ubio nijednog srbina, prava i nepodmitljiva istorija odavno je posvedočila.
Za razliku od Tita koji je pobio i progonio na hiljade čestitih građana Srbije, čija je krivica bila samo ta što su voleli svoju zemlju i slavili Krsnu Slavu. Sve dok nije iz straha za sebe i svoju vlast naredio svim potčinjenima da dalje odmazde prestanu. I to je argumentovano od strane nepodmitljivog sudije - autentične istoriografije - jasno posvedočeno.
tu grdno gresis,cetnici iz uze srbije,nisu nikada u zivotu videli nikoga drugog van svog sreza,i ubijali su upravo srbe za koje se sumnjalo da su komunisti a neretko i vidjenije seoske domacine,kradje radi,narocito pri kraju rata 1944 i 1945
zapadna srbija od valjeva i rudnika do sjenice i bajine baste,puna je takvih primera
nije narod izmislio trojke i cetnicku gibanicu
BRITISH REPORT ON CHETNIK COLLABORATION
W. O. 202,132 A,X/L 01206
1) On 3 July 1943, 80 rifles of the Zenica Chetniks (v. Pt. II A) which had been taken from them by the Germans, were returned to them with the permission of the German GOC.
2) On 4 July 1943, the Chetnik forces of Maj. JAKIC (v. Pt.
II A 3) are reported as collaborating with the Germans in the
area of Visegrad.
3) On 12 July 1943, it is reported that the majority of the Ozren Chetniks (v. Pt. II A) are fighting on the German side.
4) On 22 August 1943, it is reported that in North-Eastern Bosnia the Chetnik forces of KEROVIC are fighting with the Germans against the Partisans.
Information from these sources on Dalmatia refers to the southern area, especially to Dubrovnik, whose Chetniks were part of the Hercegovina Chetnik organization. This information is therefore treated under the next heading.
1) On 10 June 1943, it is reported that the Chetniks in the Mostar area, commanded by PER.OVIC, are showing a loyal attitude towards Germans, and declare that they arc not connected with MIHAILOVIC, they are merely concerned with the preservation of Serbian lives and goods, not with resistance to the occupiers.
2) On 20 June 1943 it is reported that the Chetniks in the Bileca—Gacko area are being provided with food and weapons by the Italians.
3) On 27 June 1943, it is reported that on 20 June, Chetniks were strolling round Trebinje, on the most cordial terms with the Italians.
4) On 31 July 1943 it is reported that MILORAD POPOVIC (v, Pt II C) received 1,260,000 kuna from the Italians.
5) In August it is reported that the Chetniks of VIDACIC" in the Bileca area are collaborating with the Germans against the Partisans.
6) On 14 August, it is reported that PEROVIC is in command of all Chetniks in Dubrovnik area.
7) On 15 August, it is reported that the Chetnik comamnder Capt. MILOS KURES (v. Ft. II C), commanding the forces round Trebinje, is seeking German collaboration, offering 1,000—1,500 men to fight against the Partisans.
8) On 15 August it is reported that BACOVIC (v. Pt. II C) has approached the German Consul-General in Dubrovnik with the aim of starting negotiations with the German QC Mostar, He stated that he was empowered by the Chetnik leaders to do this. He stated that the Chetniks set great value on collaboration with the Germans, but do not wish the fact of this collaboration to be generally known.
9) On 16 August it is reported that JEVDJEVIC^ on his return from Rome has asked Abwehr in Dubrovnik for an early interview with a German plenipotentiary.
10) On 20 August, it is reported that JEVDJEVIC and MIHAILOVTC are not in agreement on the question of collaboration with the Germans.
11) On 31. August, it is reported that JEVDJEVIC has offered the German GOC Prinz Eugen Div., Gen. Oberkamp, 5,000—6,000 Chetniks for fighting against the Partisans. He asked for German official approval. Gen. OBERKAMP referred the matter to higher quarters.
12) On 12 September, it is reported that Chetniks led by SAMARDJIC (v. Pt. II C) and MILORAD POPOVIC are fighting with the Germans against the Partisans in the Gacko area.
13) On 14 September it is reported that PEROVIC has offered the Germans armed collaboration of his forces against the Partisans, and accepted the Independent State of Croatia as being sovereign over Dalmatia after the Italian capitulation.
14) On 9 September instructions were given to Abwher in Croatia to further by all possible means their connection with JEVDJEVIC. The importance of a direct link with MIHAILOVIC'S circle was most strongly emphasised.
15) On 14 September it is reported that, by agreement of the GOC-in-C and Gen. PHLEPPS, the 2nd. Rcgt. is trying through PEROVIC to arrange with JEVDJEVIC for the employment of Chetniks against the Communists.
16) On 15 September the 2nd. SS regt. was seeking contact with JEVDJEVIC, who was then in Sushak.
17) On 21 September, orders were given by the Germans to suspend the arrests of prominent Chetniks which had been undertaken on the grounds that negotiations were in progress with JEVDJEVIC, and that the Chetniks had refused to fight with the Italians against the Germans. The Chetniks had so far maintained a loyal attitude.
18) In September it is reported that HIMMLER'S personal representative has agreed to a proposal for a meeting between the Sichcrheitsdienst (Security Service) and JEVDJEVIC in Zagreb.
1) On 11 May, it is reported that the political leader of the Chetniks is Gen. DJUKANOVIC, and that their military leaders are STANISIC, DJURISIC, BACOVIC, LASIC and RUSIC. (v Pt. II D).
2) On 14 May, DJURISIC stated that he was willing to fight with the Germans against the Communists, and would then place himself afterwards at the disposal of the Germans.s
3) On 27 September, it is reported that the Germans were in touch with STANISIC and DJUKANOVIC, who feared that the Partisans would deprive them of the arms which they had hoped to take over from the Italians.
4) On 13 September, it is reported that Chetniks of DJURISIC, who had been released by the Germans after the May fighting, were in occupation of the Kolashin—Berane—Bijelo Polje area, under MILAN RADOVIC and DIMITRIJE KALATOVIC.
5) On 9 September, it was reported that STANISIC and DJUKANOVIC were both near Danilovgrad. STANISIC was willing to join with the Montenegrin Nationalists collaborating with the Germans.
6) On 31 October, it is reported that LASIC is in command of 2,000 Chetniks near Lijeva Rijeka.
7) On 21 November it is reported that LASIC (v. Pt. II D) has asked the Germans for help in order to hold Ubli against the Partisans.
8) On 6 December it is reported that LASIC is collaborating with the Abwehr in a sabotage undertaken in the Andrijevica— Kolasin—Podgorica area, providing 400 men for this purpose
E. SERBLA AND SANDJAK
1) On 19 June 1943 it is reported that LUKACEVIC (v. Pt. II D) is leading 2,500 Chetniks against the Partisans in the area Kovac Planina—Prijepolje—Pljevlja—Priboj.
2) On 5 November it was reported that MIHAILOVIC ordered all Chetnik units to collaborate loyally with the Germans.
3) On... it was reported that these orders had referred only to Montenegro.
4) On 3 December it is reported that a secret treaty was made between the German military authorities and Maj. LUKACEVIC. All hostilities were to cease between the Chetniks and the German, Bulgarian or NEDIC forces. All were to collaborate against the Partisans. The Germans were to have the Supreme Command and to supply the Chetniks with arms. The treaty was to extend to West Serbia, Sandjak and North Montenegro.
5) On 10 December it was reported that negotiations are going on between MIHAILOVIC and NEDIC.
For proof of close relations of MIHAILOVIC with BACOVIC, JEVDJEVIC, LUKAGEVIC, LASIC, DJURISIC, STANISIC and DJUKANOVIC, see Part Two, sections C and D.
For examples of Chetnik leaders collaborating with the Germans with approval of MIHAILOVIC, but at the same time denying to the Germans that they were connected with MIHAILOVIC, see Part Two, section A.
......Mikhailovic's Collaboration with the Germans
Excerpts of Testimony of Walter Warlimont, taken at
Numberg, Germany, 16 October 194-5, 1600-1745, by Maj.
Gen. William J. Donovan. Also present: Pvt. Clair Van Vleck,
Q. I show you a paper dated the 25th of January '43,* and ask
if you can identify it; if your initial is on it; and if you can
inform us of any matters relating to this that do not appear in
the document itself?
A. It is a telegram set up and sent off by subsection four of the
Division for National Defense, which does not bear my signature. The
signature which appears at the bottom on the right side, is that of a
Captain who was with this section, but whose name I cannot recall at
Q. You. just note that down and let us know when it occurs to you.
A. Yes. I know the other signature too, but I cannot say whom it
belongs to, this blue one. I know the signature. The telegram is directed
to the German Foreign Office and repeats the contents of another
telegram which the commanding general of Serbia had sent to the
OKW. This telegram of the commanding general of Serbia reads: That
the President of the Serbian Cabinet on his own initiative has proposed
to arrest six hundred former Serbian officers and to transport them, as
prisoners of war, to Germany. Those officers are undesirable, as
followers of Tito, Mikhailovic, and as supporters of rumor propaganda
and unrest in the country. The telegram further reads that it is
intended to carry through the undertaking as soon as possible. The proposition
of the President of the Council complies with the intentions of the German
Q. I would like to ask you a question on that paper. Do you know of your
own knowledge or, if not of your own knowledge, has it even been reported to
you that Mikhaiiovic was working with the local German commanders in the
A. Yes. That was known.
Q. For how long a period did he do that?
A. I have to think of that to give you an exact answer, but I am certain that it
started several times and was discontinued several times; taken up again and
lasted at least for several months each time.
Q. Did he do that in order to obtain aid in fighting the Tito partisans ?
A. We never knew why he did it. Hitler always believed that he only did it
because he was short of ammunition and tried to persuade the German
officers, who always were inclined to believe in a nationalist like him, that he
was going to support them, but Hitler said, "He will always remain a friend of
England and a foe of Germany, so it is entirely wrong to go with him." He
didn't want it.
Q. What was your opinion about it?
A. I couldn't form any opinion of my own, in spite of being two or three
times in Serbia. I always got the opinion of the officers down there who
believed in the things and wanted to continue with it.
Q. Had Tito ever given assistance to the Germans? A. So far
as I know, no.
Q. Do you know whether or not Tito had ever fought Mikhaiiovic?
A. Fought him?
Q. Yes; had he had battles with Mikhaiiovic?
A. It was hard to reco'gnize who fought who in that country, but 1 am
convinced that parts of both parties fought each other several times.
. Q. It was Hitler's considered opinion that on any occasion when Mikhaiiovic
sought the assistance of the Germans, it was as a temporary expedient?
A. As a temporary expedient?
Q. As a temporary means of getting over a moment when he didn't have
A. Yes.- He only looked at it like that, and if Hitler had discovered before
that such a connection, between the subordinates of Mikhailovic on one side
and German officers on the other side, was going on, he would have prevented
it. It may be of some interest to you, General, that Hitler's respect for Tito was
very high and that in the last stages of the war he said several times that Tito
should be an example to every German general. That is specially interesting
for us as General Staff officers because Hitler wanted to demonstrate by this
means the difference between the rough field general, as he thought Tito to be,
and the thinking European generals, as we saw ourselves to be.
Q. Do you mean by that, that he preferred the Rommel type of soldier rather
than the intellectual type of general?
Q. And he compared Tito to Rommel?
A. No, more like Schoerner.
Q. What did the German Generals think of Tito?
A. He certainly was a strong man who came through all difficulties and lost
a great number of his men, and in spite of that, always was there again, but
politically he was entirely opposed to our kind of thinking.
Pa znate šta? Brus Li je što se tiče Broza, imao priliku za to, samo je nije iskoristio (ili zato što nije doživeo Brozovu smrt ili možda namerno nije hteo), dok za Dražu priliku nije ni imao, jer 1946. godine nije još ni bio rođen.
Pa šta ćete...
Hektoriuse, to su ili nacisticki ili komunisticki agenti; nemoj da postavljas ovde kojekakve podmetacine!