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Clinton-Approved Iranian Arms Transfers Help Turn
Bosnia into Militant Islamic Base
"'There is no question that the policy of getting arms into Bosnia was of great
assistance in allowing the Iranians to dig in and create good relations with the
Bosnian government,' a senior CIA officer told Congress in a classified deposition.
'And it is a thing we will live to regret because when they blow up some Americans,
as they no doubt will before this . . . thing is over, it will be in part because the
Iranians were able to have the time and contacts to establish themselves well in
Bosnia.'" ["Iran Gave Bosnia Leader $500,000, CIA Alleges: Classified Report Says
Izetbegovic Has Been 'Co-Opted,' Contradicting U.S. Public Assertion of Rift," Los
Angeles Times, 12/31/96. Ellipses in original. Alija Izetbegovic is the Muslim president of
Bosnia.]
"'If you read President Izetbegovic's writings, as I have, there is no doubt that he is
an Islamic fundamentalist,' said a senior Western diplomat with long experience in
the region. 'He is a very nice fundamentalist, but he is still a fundamentalist. This has
not changed. His goal is to establish a Muslim state in Bosnia, and the Serbs and
Croats understand this better than the rest of us.'" ["Bosnian Leader Hails Islam at
Election Rallies," New York Times, 9/2/96]
Introduction and Summary
In late 1995, President Bill Clinton dispatched some 20,000 U.S. troops to Bosnia-
Hercegovina as part of a NATO-led "implementation force" (IFOR) to ensure that the
warring Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian factions complied with provisions of the Dayton
peace plan. [NOTE: This paper assumes the reader is acquainted with the basic facts of
the Bosnian war leading to the IFOR deployment. For background, see RPC's "Clinton
Administration Ready to Send U.S. Troops to Bosnia, "9/28/95," and Legislative Notice
No. 60, "Senate to Consider Several Resolutions on Bosnia," 12/12/95] Through
statements by Administration spokesmen, notably Defense Secretary Perry and Joint
Chiefs Chairman General Shalikashvili, the president firmly assured Congress and the
American people that U.S. personnel would be out of Bosnia at the end of one year.
Predictably, as soon as the November 1996 election was safely behind him, President
Clinton announced that approximately 8,500 U.S. troops would be remaining for another
18 months as part of a restructured and scaled down contingent, the "stabilization
force" (SFOR), officially established on December 20, 1996.
SFOR begins its mission in Bosnia under a serious cloud both as to the nature of its
mission and the dangers it will face. While IFOR had successfully accomplished its basic
military task -- separating the factions' armed forces -- there has been very little progress
toward other stated goals of the Dayton agreement, including political and economic
reintegration of Bosnia, return of refugees to their homes, and apprehension and
prosecution of accused war criminals. It is far from certain that the cease-fire that has held
through the past year will continue for much longer, in light of such unresolved issues as
the status of the cities of Brcko (claimed by Muslims but held by the Serbs) and Mostar
(divided between nominal Muslim and Croat allies, both of which are currently being
armed by the Clinton Administration). Moreover, at a strength approximately one-third
that of its predecessor, SFOR may not be in as strong a position to deter attacks by one or
another of the Bosnian factions or to avoid attempts to involve it in renewed fighting:
"IFOR forces, despite having suffered few casualties, have been vulnerable to attacks
from all of the contending sides over the year of the Dayton mandate. As a second
mandate [i.e., SFOR] evolves, presumably maintaining a smaller force on the ground, the
deterrent effect which has existed may well become less compelling and vulnerabilities of
the troops will increase." ["Military Security in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Present and Future,"
Bulletin of the Atlantic Council of the United States, 12/18/96]
The Iranian Connection
Perhaps most threatening to the SFOR mission -- and more importantly, to the safety of
the American personnel serving in Bosnia -- is the unwillingness of the Clinton
Administration to come clean with the Congress and with the American people about its
complicity in the delivery of weapons from Iran to the Muslim government in Sarajevo.
That policy, personally approved by Bill Clinton in April 1994 at the urging of CIA
Director-designate (and then-NSC chief) Anthony Lake and the U.S. ambassador to
Croatia Peter Galbraith, has, according to the Los Angeles Times (citing classified
intelligence community sources), "played a central role in the dramatic increase in Iranian
influence in Bosnia." Further, according to the Times, in September 1996 National
Security Agency analysts contradicted Clinton Administration claims of declining Iranian
influence, insisting instead that "Iranian Revolutionary Guard personnel remain active
throughout Bosnia." Likewise, "CIA analysts noted that the Iranian presence was
expanding last fall," with some ostensible cultural and humanitarian activities "known to
be fronts" for the Revolutionary Guard and Iran's intelligence service, known as VEVAK,
the Islamic revolutionary successor to the Shah's SAVAK. [LAT, 12/31/96] At a time
when there is evidence of increased willingness by pro-Iranian Islamic militants to target
American assets abroad -- as illustrated by the June 1996 car-bombing at the Khobar
Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, that killed 19 American airmen, in which the Iranian
government or pro-Iranian terrorist organizations are suspected ["U.S. Focuses Bomb
Probe on Iran, Saudi Dissident," Chicago Tribune, 11/4/96] -- it is irresponsible in the
extreme for the Clinton Administration to gloss over the extent to which its policies have
put American personnel in an increasingly vulnerable position while performing an
increasingly questionable mission.
Three Key Issues for Examination
This paper will examine the Clinton policy of giving the green light to Iranian arms
shipments to the Bosnian Muslims, with serious implications for the safety of U.S. troops
deployed there. (In addition, RPC will release a general analysis of the SFOR mission and
the Clinton Administration's request for supplemental appropriations to fund it in the near
future.) Specifically, the balance of this paper will examine in detail the three issues
summarized below:
1. The Clinton Green Light to Iranian Arms Shipments (page 3): In April 1994,
President Clinton gave the government of Croatia what has been described by
Congressional committees as a "green light" for shipments of weapons from Iran and
other Muslim countries to the Muslim-led government of Bosnia. The policy was
approved at the urging of NSC chief Anthony Lake and the U.S. ambassador to Croatia
Peter Galbraith. The CIA and the Departments of State and Defense were kept in the dark
until after the decision was made.
2. The Militant Islamic Network (page 5): Along with the weapons, Iranian
Revolutionary Guards and VEVAK intelligence operatives entered Bosnia in large
numbers, along with thousands of mujahedin ("holy warriors") from across the Muslim
world. Also engaged in the effort were several other Muslim countries (including Brunei,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Turkey) and a number of radical Muslim
organizations. For example, the role of one Sudan-based "humanitarian organization,"
called the Third World Relief Agency, has been well-documented. The Clinton
Administration's "hands-on" involvement with the Islamic network's arms pipeline
included inspections of missiles from Iran by U.S. government officials.
3. The Radical Islamic Character of the Sarajevo Regime (page 8): Underlying the
Clinton Administration's misguided green light policy is a complete misreading of its
main beneficiary, the Bosnian Muslim government of Alija Izetbegovic. Rather than being
the tolerant, multiethnic democratic government it pretends to be, there is clear evidence
that the ruling circle of Izetbegovic's party, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), has
long been guided by the principles of radical Islam. This Islamist orientation is illustrated
by profiles of three important officials, including President Izetbegovic himself; the
progressive Islamization of the Bosnian army, including creation of native Bosnian
mujahedin units; credible claims that major atrocities against civilians in Sarajevo were
staged for propaganda purposes by operatives of the Izetbegovic government; and
suppression of enemies, both non-Muslim and Muslim.
Bosnia into Militant Islamic Base
"'There is no question that the policy of getting arms into Bosnia was of great
assistance in allowing the Iranians to dig in and create good relations with the
Bosnian government,' a senior CIA officer told Congress in a classified deposition.
'And it is a thing we will live to regret because when they blow up some Americans,
as they no doubt will before this . . . thing is over, it will be in part because the
Iranians were able to have the time and contacts to establish themselves well in
Bosnia.'" ["Iran Gave Bosnia Leader $500,000, CIA Alleges: Classified Report Says
Izetbegovic Has Been 'Co-Opted,' Contradicting U.S. Public Assertion of Rift," Los
Angeles Times, 12/31/96. Ellipses in original. Alija Izetbegovic is the Muslim president of
Bosnia.]
"'If you read President Izetbegovic's writings, as I have, there is no doubt that he is
an Islamic fundamentalist,' said a senior Western diplomat with long experience in
the region. 'He is a very nice fundamentalist, but he is still a fundamentalist. This has
not changed. His goal is to establish a Muslim state in Bosnia, and the Serbs and
Croats understand this better than the rest of us.'" ["Bosnian Leader Hails Islam at
Election Rallies," New York Times, 9/2/96]
Introduction and Summary
In late 1995, President Bill Clinton dispatched some 20,000 U.S. troops to Bosnia-
Hercegovina as part of a NATO-led "implementation force" (IFOR) to ensure that the
warring Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian factions complied with provisions of the Dayton
peace plan. [NOTE: This paper assumes the reader is acquainted with the basic facts of
the Bosnian war leading to the IFOR deployment. For background, see RPC's "Clinton
Administration Ready to Send U.S. Troops to Bosnia, "9/28/95," and Legislative Notice
No. 60, "Senate to Consider Several Resolutions on Bosnia," 12/12/95] Through
statements by Administration spokesmen, notably Defense Secretary Perry and Joint
Chiefs Chairman General Shalikashvili, the president firmly assured Congress and the
American people that U.S. personnel would be out of Bosnia at the end of one year.
Predictably, as soon as the November 1996 election was safely behind him, President
Clinton announced that approximately 8,500 U.S. troops would be remaining for another
18 months as part of a restructured and scaled down contingent, the "stabilization
force" (SFOR), officially established on December 20, 1996.
SFOR begins its mission in Bosnia under a serious cloud both as to the nature of its
mission and the dangers it will face. While IFOR had successfully accomplished its basic
military task -- separating the factions' armed forces -- there has been very little progress
toward other stated goals of the Dayton agreement, including political and economic
reintegration of Bosnia, return of refugees to their homes, and apprehension and
prosecution of accused war criminals. It is far from certain that the cease-fire that has held
through the past year will continue for much longer, in light of such unresolved issues as
the status of the cities of Brcko (claimed by Muslims but held by the Serbs) and Mostar
(divided between nominal Muslim and Croat allies, both of which are currently being
armed by the Clinton Administration). Moreover, at a strength approximately one-third
that of its predecessor, SFOR may not be in as strong a position to deter attacks by one or
another of the Bosnian factions or to avoid attempts to involve it in renewed fighting:
"IFOR forces, despite having suffered few casualties, have been vulnerable to attacks
from all of the contending sides over the year of the Dayton mandate. As a second
mandate [i.e., SFOR] evolves, presumably maintaining a smaller force on the ground, the
deterrent effect which has existed may well become less compelling and vulnerabilities of
the troops will increase." ["Military Security in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Present and Future,"
Bulletin of the Atlantic Council of the United States, 12/18/96]
The Iranian Connection
Perhaps most threatening to the SFOR mission -- and more importantly, to the safety of
the American personnel serving in Bosnia -- is the unwillingness of the Clinton
Administration to come clean with the Congress and with the American people about its
complicity in the delivery of weapons from Iran to the Muslim government in Sarajevo.
That policy, personally approved by Bill Clinton in April 1994 at the urging of CIA
Director-designate (and then-NSC chief) Anthony Lake and the U.S. ambassador to
Croatia Peter Galbraith, has, according to the Los Angeles Times (citing classified
intelligence community sources), "played a central role in the dramatic increase in Iranian
influence in Bosnia." Further, according to the Times, in September 1996 National
Security Agency analysts contradicted Clinton Administration claims of declining Iranian
influence, insisting instead that "Iranian Revolutionary Guard personnel remain active
throughout Bosnia." Likewise, "CIA analysts noted that the Iranian presence was
expanding last fall," with some ostensible cultural and humanitarian activities "known to
be fronts" for the Revolutionary Guard and Iran's intelligence service, known as VEVAK,
the Islamic revolutionary successor to the Shah's SAVAK. [LAT, 12/31/96] At a time
when there is evidence of increased willingness by pro-Iranian Islamic militants to target
American assets abroad -- as illustrated by the June 1996 car-bombing at the Khobar
Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, that killed 19 American airmen, in which the Iranian
government or pro-Iranian terrorist organizations are suspected ["U.S. Focuses Bomb
Probe on Iran, Saudi Dissident," Chicago Tribune, 11/4/96] -- it is irresponsible in the
extreme for the Clinton Administration to gloss over the extent to which its policies have
put American personnel in an increasingly vulnerable position while performing an
increasingly questionable mission.
Three Key Issues for Examination
This paper will examine the Clinton policy of giving the green light to Iranian arms
shipments to the Bosnian Muslims, with serious implications for the safety of U.S. troops
deployed there. (In addition, RPC will release a general analysis of the SFOR mission and
the Clinton Administration's request for supplemental appropriations to fund it in the near
future.) Specifically, the balance of this paper will examine in detail the three issues
summarized below:
1. The Clinton Green Light to Iranian Arms Shipments (page 3): In April 1994,
President Clinton gave the government of Croatia what has been described by
Congressional committees as a "green light" for shipments of weapons from Iran and
other Muslim countries to the Muslim-led government of Bosnia. The policy was
approved at the urging of NSC chief Anthony Lake and the U.S. ambassador to Croatia
Peter Galbraith. The CIA and the Departments of State and Defense were kept in the dark
until after the decision was made.
2. The Militant Islamic Network (page 5): Along with the weapons, Iranian
Revolutionary Guards and VEVAK intelligence operatives entered Bosnia in large
numbers, along with thousands of mujahedin ("holy warriors") from across the Muslim
world. Also engaged in the effort were several other Muslim countries (including Brunei,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Turkey) and a number of radical Muslim
organizations. For example, the role of one Sudan-based "humanitarian organization,"
called the Third World Relief Agency, has been well-documented. The Clinton
Administration's "hands-on" involvement with the Islamic network's arms pipeline
included inspections of missiles from Iran by U.S. government officials.
3. The Radical Islamic Character of the Sarajevo Regime (page 8): Underlying the
Clinton Administration's misguided green light policy is a complete misreading of its
main beneficiary, the Bosnian Muslim government of Alija Izetbegovic. Rather than being
the tolerant, multiethnic democratic government it pretends to be, there is clear evidence
that the ruling circle of Izetbegovic's party, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), has
long been guided by the principles of radical Islam. This Islamist orientation is illustrated
by profiles of three important officials, including President Izetbegovic himself; the
progressive Islamization of the Bosnian army, including creation of native Bosnian
mujahedin units; credible claims that major atrocities against civilians in Sarajevo were
staged for propaganda purposes by operatives of the Izetbegovic government; and
suppression of enemies, both non-Muslim and Muslim.
