Ja sam rekao "Najznacajniji lovac" ne uticaj na razvoj situacije. Radi se o tome koji je najbolji lovac.
Evo izvoda o mandzurijskoj ofanzivi:
As a result of the Russians' meticulous planning and
bold offensive plan, they took 594,000 Japanese prisoners
including 143 generals and 20,000 wounded. The Kwangtung
Army suffered over 80,000 men and officers killed in combat
which lasted less than two weeks. In contrast, the well-
prepared Soviet Army had 8,219 killed and 22,264 wounded.
[13-175]
The lessons to be learned from this closing chapter to
World War II are many indeed. Foremost in one's mind must
be the adaptability and boldness demonstrated by the Soviets
as well as the high degree of initiative shown by commanders
at all levels during the campaign. The Soviet war machine
had matured. It developed a combined-arms army concept
which relied on armored units at every unit level as the
spearhead of the offensive thrust and heavy concentrations
of artillery. Tactical surprise, a key element to their
rapid success, was achieved despite the enormous volume of
supplies, equipment and men moved forward to the border
regions. The Soviet planners were aucacious and imaginative
in their utilization of multiple axes of advance through the
worst terrain to maneuver hundreds of thousands of men and
machines. They task-organized their forces to accomplish
their assigned missions in different terrain against varying
degrees of enemy opposition. The Manchurian campaign was
characterized by its gigantic scale, use of large formations
and extensive employment of amphibious and airborne troops.
[7-7] As Raymond Garthoff stated, "to mount such a campaign
after being bled for four years in Europe represented a
major achievement." [7-61]
This achievement should be studied closely by present
day war-planners and tacticians to avoid the danger of
underestimating Soviet military capability. The deception
techniques and offensive combined-arms tactics begun by
General Zhukov at Nomonhan and refined by Marshal Vasilevsky
in the Far East offer a case study in which modern Soviet
Army tactics can be studied. With the exception of new
weapons, notably long range missiles and nuclear weapons,
today's Soviet tactics are very similar to those used in
Manchuria. Indeed, the predecessor of the Soviet
Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) was the Front army and
mobile detachments of this very campaign. Today's OMG is
designed to penetrate deep into rear areas, destroy command,
control and logistic centers, encircle and destroy enemy
forces and capture or destroy vital areas. With the absence
of any peace-time Soviet or Warsaw Bloc exercise on such a
gigantic scale, "The 1945 attack on the Kwangtung Army with
its ten-day capitulation provides a classic of contemporary
Soviet military thinking." [15-160]
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1986/RMF.htm